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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/boot: Add missing handling of setup_indirect structures
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 19:19:32 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210810161932.wdwfu3wosjytdj4h@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1628527136-2478-3-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 12:38:44PM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
> One of the two functions in ioremap.c that handles setup_data was
> missing the correct handling of setup_indirect structures.

What is "correct handling", and how was it broken?

What is 'setup_indirect'?

> Functionality missing from original commit:

Remove this sentence.

> commit b3c72fc9a78e (x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect)

Should be.

Fixes: b3c72fc9a78e ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")

 
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index ab74e4f..f2b34c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -669,17 +669,34 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>  
>  	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>  	while (paddr) {
> -		unsigned int len;
> +		unsigned int len, size;
>  
>  		if (phys_addr == paddr)
>  			return true;
>  
>  		data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
> +		size = sizeof(*data);
>  
>  		paddr_next = data->next;
>  		len = data->len;
>  
> -		early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
> +		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len))) {
> +			early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
> +			return true;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (data->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
> +			size += len;
> +			early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
> +			data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, size);
> +
> +			if (((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->type != SETUP_INDIRECT) {
> +				paddr = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->addr;
> +				len = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->len;
> +			}
> +		}
> +
> +		early_memunmap(data, size);
>  
>  		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
>  			return true;
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 
> 

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-10 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-09 16:38 [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/boot: Add missing handling " Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-08-16 14:16     ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-16 14:18     ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:23 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25  2:10   ` Daniel P. Smith

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