From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16648C4320A for ; Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:01:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0001B60FD9 for ; Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:01:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239488AbhHaACD (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Aug 2021 20:02:03 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:50155 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233270AbhHaABI (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Aug 2021 20:01:08 -0400 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10092"; a="218381561" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.84,364,1620716400"; d="scan'208";a="218381561" Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Aug 2021 17:00:09 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.84,364,1620716400"; d="scan'208";a="530713028" Received: from ajinkyak-mobl2.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO rpedgeco-desk.amr.corp.intel.com) ([10.212.240.95]) by fmsmga003-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Aug 2021 17:00:09 -0700 From: Rick Edgecombe To: dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, shakeelb@google.com, vbabka@suse.cz, rppt@kernel.org Cc: Rick Edgecombe , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, ira.weiny@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] x86/mm: Add PKS table soft mode Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 16:59:26 -0700 Message-Id: <20210830235927.6443-19-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20210830235927.6443-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20210830235927.6443-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Some users may not want to treat errant page table writes as fatal, and would prefer to just log the invalid access and continue. Add a "soft" mode for this. Add a config to make always make this the default behavior, and a config to enable it at boot in the absence of the new config. After a single warning, the page tables will be writable, so no warnings will be reported until the next reboot. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 1 + arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 3 +++ mm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 7902fce7f1da..8bb290fee77f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4254,6 +4254,10 @@ nopti [X86-64] Equivalent to pti=off + nopkstables [X86-64] Disable PKS page table protection + + pkstablessoft [X86-64] Warn instead of oops on pks tables violations + pty.legacy_count= [KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in default number. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 871308c40dac..2e4b4308bd59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ void pks_tables_check_boottime_disable(void); void enable_pgtable_write(void); void disable_pgtable_write(void); bool pks_tables_inited(void); +bool pks_tables_fault(unsigned long addr, bool write); #else /* CONFIG_PKS_PG_TABLES */ static inline void pks_tables_check_boottime_disable(void) { } static void enable_pgtable_write(void) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c index 69b43097c9da..0dcbd976a91b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ pgtable_t pte_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm) #ifdef CONFIG_PKS_PG_TABLES static struct grouped_page_cache gpc_pks; static bool __ro_after_init pks_tables_inited_val; - +static bool __ro_after_init pks_tables_soft; struct page *alloc_table_node(gfp_t gfp, int node) { @@ -971,6 +971,16 @@ bool pks_tables_inited(void) return pks_tables_inited_val; } +bool pks_tables_fault(unsigned long addr, bool write) +{ + WARN(1, "Write to protected page table, exploit attempt?"); + if (!pks_tables_soft) + return 0; + + pks_abandon_protections(PKS_KEY_PG_TABLES); + return 1; +} + static int __init pks_page_init(void) { /* @@ -999,6 +1009,10 @@ __init void pks_tables_check_boottime_disable(void) if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopkstables")) return; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PKS_PG_TABLES_SOFT_ALWAYS) || + cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "pkstablessoft")) + pks_tables_soft = true; + /* * PTI will want to allocate higher order page table pages, which the * PKS table allocator doesn't support. So don't attempt to enable PKS diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c index 48a390722c06..d8df2bb4bbd0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c @@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ static const pks_key_callback pks_key_callbacks[PKS_KEY_NR_CONSUMERS] = { #ifdef CONFIG_DEVMAP_ACCESS_PROTECTION [PKS_KEY_PGMAP_PROTECTION] = pgmap_pks_fault_callback, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PKS_PG_TABLES + [PKS_KEY_PG_TABLES] = pks_tables_fault, +#endif }; bool handle_pks_key_callback(unsigned long address, bool write, u16 key) diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index 0f8e8595a396..1f4fc85cbd2c 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -851,6 +851,18 @@ config PKS_PG_TABLES depends on !HIGHMEM && !X86_PAE && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP depends on ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS +config PKS_PG_TABLES_SOFT_ALWAYS + bool + default y + depends on PKS_PG_TABLES + help + This features enables PKS tables "soft" mode by default, such that + the first PKS table violation is logged and after that protections + are disabled. This is useful for cases where users would not like + to treat bugs that incorrectly modify page tables as fatal, but would + still like to get notifications of illegitimate attempts to modify + them. + config PERCPU_STATS bool "Collect percpu memory statistics" help -- 2.17.1