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From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan  <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	James E J Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter H Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>,
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest
Date: Fri,  8 Oct 2021 17:37:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211009003711.1390019-8-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211009003711.1390019-1-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to directly access guest private memory.
Any memory that is required for communication with VMM must be shared
explicitly. The same rule applies for any DMA to and from TDX guest.
All DMA pages had to marked as shared pages. A generic way to achieve
this without any changes to device drivers is to use the SWIOTLB
framework.

This method of handling is similar to AMD SEV. So extend this support
for TDX guest as well. Also since there are some common code between
AMD SEV and TDX guest in mem_encrypt_init(), move it to
mem_encrypt_common.c and call AMD specific init function from it

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
---

Changes since v4:
 * Replaced prot_guest_has() with cc_guest_has().

Changes since v3:
 * Rebased on top of Tom Lendacky's protected guest
   changes (https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1468760/)

Changes since v1:
 * Removed sme_me_mask check for amd_mem_encrypt_init() in mem_encrypt_init().

 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c                     |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c                 |  5 +----
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c          | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
index 697bc40a4e3d..bc90e565bce4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev);
+void __init amd_mem_encrypt_init(void);
 #else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 static inline bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 {
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline void amd_mem_encrypt_init(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
index 433f366ca25c..ce8e3019b812 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h> /* force_sig_fault() */
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 
 /* TDX Module call Leaf IDs */
 #define TDX_GET_INFO			1
@@ -577,6 +578,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	pv_ops.irq.halt = tdx_halt;
 
 	legacy_pic = &null_legacy_pic;
+	swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
 
 	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "tdx:cpu_hotplug",
 			  NULL, tdx_cpu_offline_prepare);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 5d7fbed73949..8385bc4565e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -438,14 +438,11 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 }
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+void __init amd_mem_encrypt_init(void)
 {
 	if (!sme_me_mask)
 		return;
 
-	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
-	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
-
 	/*
 	 * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
 	 * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
index 119a9056efbb..6fe44c6cb753 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 
 /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
 bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
@@ -24,3 +25,16 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 
 	return false;
 }
+
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * For TDX guest or SEV/SME, call into SWIOTLB to update
+	 * the SWIOTLB DMA buffers
+	 */
+	if (sme_me_mask || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	amd_mem_encrypt_init();
+}
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-10-09  0:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-09  0:36 [PATCH v5 00/16] Add TDX Guest Support (shared-mm support) Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:36 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-20 16:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-20 16:43     ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2021-10-09  0:36 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/tdx: Get TD execution environment information via TDINFO Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:36 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/tdx: Exclude Shared bit from physical_mask Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-11-05 22:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-11-08 14:45     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-10-09  0:36 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-20 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-20 16:41     ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/tdx: Add helper to do MapGPA hypercall Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/tdx: Make DMA pages shared Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-20 16:33   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-20 16:45     ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2021-10-20 17:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-20 17:26         ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2021-10-09  0:37 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan [this message]
2021-10-20 16:39   ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Tom Lendacky
2021-10-20 16:50     ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2021-10-20 17:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/tdx: Enable shared memory confidential guest flags for TDX guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] PCI: Consolidate pci_iomap_range(), pci_iomap_wc_range() Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] asm/io.h: Add ioremap_host_shared fallback Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 12/16] PCI: Add pci_iomap_host_shared(), pci_iomap_host_shared_range() Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  9:53   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-09 20:39     ` Dan Williams
2021-10-10 22:11       ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 17:42         ` Dan Williams
2021-10-12 18:35           ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 21:14             ` Dan Williams
2021-10-12 21:18               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 21:24                 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 21:28               ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 22:00                 ` Dan Williams
2021-10-18 12:13             ` Greg KH
2021-10-12 18:36         ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-12 18:38           ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 18:57             ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-12 19:13               ` Dan Williams
2021-10-12 19:49                 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 21:11           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  6:32             ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-14  6:57               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  7:27                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-14  9:26                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 12:33                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-17 22:17                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 11:49                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-17 21:52               ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-10-18  7:03                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2021-10-18  0:55         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-10-18  1:10           ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-10-18 12:08         ` Greg KH
2021-10-10 22:22     ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-11 11:59       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-11 17:32         ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-11 18:22           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-18 12:15         ` Greg KH
2021-10-18 13:17           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-11  7:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-10-11 17:23     ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-11 19:09       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12  5:31         ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-10-12 18:37           ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] PCI: Mark MSI data shared Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] virtio: Use shared mappings for virtio PCI devices Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/tdx: Implement ioremap_host_shared for x86 Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  0:37 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/tdx: Add cmdline option to force use of ioremap_host_shared Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09  1:45   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-10-09  2:10     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-10-09 11:04   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-11  2:39     ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-11 12:04       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-11 17:35         ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-11 18:28           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 17:55             ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 20:59               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 21:18                 ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-12 21:30                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-15  5:50                     ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-15  6:57                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-15 13:34                         ` Andi Kleen
2021-10-17 22:34                           ` Michael S. Tsirkin

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