From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: xiaoyao.li@intel.com, erdemaktas@google.com,
Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 04/11] KVM: x86: Disable MCE related stuff for TDX
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 23:37:26 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211112153733.2767561-5-xiaoyao.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211112153733.2767561-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
MCE is not supported for TDX VM and KVM cannot inject #MC to TDX VM.
Introduce kvm_guest_mce_disallowed() which actually reports the MCE
availability based on vm_type. And use it to guard all the MCE related
CAPs and IOCTLs.
Note: KVM_X86_GET_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED is KVM scope so that what it reports
may not match the behavior of specific VM (e.g., here for TDX VM). The
same for KVM_CAP_MCE when queried from /dev/kvm. To qeuery the precise
KVM_CAP_MCE of the VM, it should use VM's fd.
[ Xiaoyao: Guard MCE related CAPs ]
Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index b02088343d80..2b21c5169f32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4150,6 +4150,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
break;
case KVM_CAP_MCE:
r = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
+ if (kvm)
+ r = kvm_guest_mce_disallowed(kvm) ? 0 : r;
break;
case KVM_CAP_XCRS:
r = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
@@ -5155,6 +5157,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE: {
u64 mcg_cap;
+ r = EINVAL;
+ if (kvm_guest_mce_disallowed(vcpu->kvm))
+ goto out;
+
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mcg_cap, argp, sizeof(mcg_cap)))
goto out;
@@ -5164,6 +5170,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_X86_SET_MCE: {
struct kvm_x86_mce mce;
+ r = EINVAL;
+ if (kvm_guest_mce_disallowed(vcpu->kvm))
+ goto out;
+
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mce, argp, sizeof(mce)))
goto out;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index a2813892740d..69c60297bef2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -441,6 +441,11 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_irq_injection_disallowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
}
+static __always_inline bool kvm_guest_mce_disallowed(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-12 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-12 15:37 [PATCH 00/11] KVM: x86: TDX preparation of introducing vm_type and blocking ioctls based on vm_type Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 01/11] KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate normal VMs from confidential VMs Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 16:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-11-15 15:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 02/11] KVM: x86: Disable direct IRQ injection for TDX Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 03/11] KVM: x86: Clean up kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce() Xiaoyao Li
2021-12-02 1:19 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2021-11-12 17:01 ` [PATCH 04/11] KVM: x86: Disable MCE related stuff for TDX Sean Christopherson
2021-11-15 15:39 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 05/11] KVM: x86: Disallow tsc manipulation " Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 06/11] KVM: x86: Disable in-kernel I/O APIC and level routes " Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 07/11] KVM: x86: Disable SMM " Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-11-12 18:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-01 6:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 08/11] KVM: x86: Disable INIT/SIPI " Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 09/11] KVM: x86: Block ioctls to access guest state " Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 10/11] KVM: Disallow read-only memory for x86 TDX Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 16:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-11-14 3:43 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-12 15:37 ` [PATCH 11/11] KVM: Disallow dirty logging " Xiaoyao Li
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