From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AC2DC43217 for ; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 07:56:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231733AbhLGH7g (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2021 02:59:36 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35936 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231334AbhLGH7f (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2021 02:59:35 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-x62a.google.com (mail-pl1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::62a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 912E7C061746; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 23:56:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pl1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id b13so8872308plg.2; Mon, 06 Dec 2021 23:56:05 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=KmCJousBiElqFxBD882RvdjUoER5eWaaA/AcR3+2s20=; b=Oo/euXON2UWgaLcGXKh/Dc34H8OjYvdS6Sg/Adiq6bSc7B4GBpMZ0KjBZBqnqzDa76 tIf6SUphYqejTVrqOaln3BM6zGXisKufxqjqcyp9W82Bd2QLn1KZfjVofq9w7F6axoZ+ cmq5lDx+7O2BPY9TZjJ/WgBNHlbFyyBmBa0eZE+h27XDUxxorXncYfVr7WpQnGCwY26/ 95Mr2CS2CDXWQMmGMdB3ORwTwN/5ORySJeSvTfTJeyx8/ao8BEXAgx0Ysgqrys5K9FNi oC+aWu8BUEd3WG+tFEDO2nDCN/BxDoK/r88am0Yk+h8Fna2uexZR/qu8CObNTIML2pxP 7XYA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=KmCJousBiElqFxBD882RvdjUoER5eWaaA/AcR3+2s20=; b=vaoMW2axJzR4Hx5NHfayRhIDt99vw+j/HR+sMrrCQRthHfByUiZFZTm+mbc+zwAZ0a yooCJ5V7xge4zioIF8GppRU6LdmH8py7RhRjgxWa4LmLQhegwvwaVpkj79uQYsRFLtBG eZR5vlmPVsU3EG/WcClI983yGcfD/GtOljYeJOVXIpFf2D2IDNbF0uSmW3HV5iADi7He FFKH8JcZL8I9kBNJcP5k+7o6qrTUIwuWopR4UFlXUUcyDYXE947dzncdjwl7rAvq8bsK k8LA2V+iKVUfegw8S+lK2PYaYPfmZ4kr8XseOP3USKekY7NeAB1UcdVhHfulu2mcvG2n A+Fw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533MkkfbY0oPHKFzrUE925Ap/i7ZxfvtEpimsj/MizwVGo6aFtdq vrY4nNJq6GL3Trx2QrqB8OQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzqgK74sj3n0s3QeazKBnvtozL+ghOHbSHk4SLEk7d0juOTTyMqAFeBgfH+LR5MfMv1CI3mmw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:4c85:: with SMTP id my5mr4669482pjb.26.1638863765142; Mon, 06 Dec 2021 23:56:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from ubuntu-Virtual-Machine.corp.microsoft.com ([2001:4898:80e8:0:a463:d753:723:c3a9]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n15sm1794353pgs.59.2021.12.06.23.56.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 06 Dec 2021 23:56:04 -0800 (PST) From: Tianyu Lan To: kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com, martin.petersen@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, hch@infradead.org, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com, Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, michael.h.kelley@microsoft.com Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, hch@lst.de, joro@8bytes.org, parri.andrea@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH V6 0/5] x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support(Second part) Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 02:55:56 -0500 Message-Id: <20211207075602.2452-1-ltykernel@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Tianyu Lan Hyper-V provides two kinds of Isolation VMs. VBS(Virtualization-based security) and AMD SEV-SNP unenlightened Isolation VMs. This patchset is to add support for these Isolation VM support in Linux. The memory of these vms are encrypted and host can't access guest memory directly. Hyper-V provides new host visibility hvcall and the guest needs to call new hvcall to mark memory visible to host before sharing memory with host. For security, all network/storage stack memory should not be shared with host and so there is bounce buffer requests. Vmbus channel ring buffer already plays bounce buffer role because all data from/to host needs to copy from/to between the ring buffer and IO stack memory. So mark vmbus channel ring buffer visible. For SNP isolation VM, guest needs to access the shared memory via extra address space which is specified by Hyper-V CPUID HYPERV_CPUID_ ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address of the shared memory should be bounce buffer memory GPA plus with shared_gpa_boundary reported by CPUID. This patchset is to enable swiotlb bounce buffer for netvsc/storvsc in Isolation VM. This version follows Michael Kelley suggestion in the following link. https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/11/24/2044 Change sicne v5: * Modify "Swiotlb" to "swiotlb" in commit log. * Remove CONFIG_HYPERV check in the hyperv_cc_platform_has() Change since v4: * Remove Hyper-V IOMMU IOMMU_INIT_FINISH related functions and set SWIOTLB_FORCE and swiotlb_unencrypted_base in the ms_hyperv_init_platform(). Call swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() in the hyperv_init(). Change since v3: * Fix boot up failure on the host with mem_encrypt=on. Move calloing of set_memory_decrypted() back from swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem to swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl() and rmem_swiotlb_device_init(). * Change code style of checking GUEST_MEM attribute in the hyperv_cc_platform_has(). * Add comment in pci-swiotlb-xen.c to explain why add dependency between hyperv_swiotlb_detect() and pci_ xen_swiotlb_detect(). * Return directly when fails to allocate Hyper-V swiotlb buffer in the hyperv_iommu_swiotlb_init(). Change since v2: * Remove Hyper-V dma ops and dma_alloc/free_noncontiguous. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap netvsc rx/tx ring into extra address space. * Leave mem->vaddr in swiotlb code with phys_to_virt(mem->start) when fail to remap swiotlb memory. Change since v1: * Add Hyper-V Isolation support check in the cc_platform_has() and return true for guest memory encrypt attr. * Remove hv isolation check in the sev_setup_arch() Tianyu Lan (5): swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has() hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 10 +++ arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 11 ++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 +++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 + drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 ++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 + drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 37 ++++---- include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 14 +++ include/linux/swiotlb.h | 6 ++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 43 +++++++++- 15 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1