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From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>,
	Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>,
	Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>,
	YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>, Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Rolf Eike Beer <eb@emlix.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org (open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and
	infrastructure)), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 0/4] coredump: mitigate privilege escalation of process coredump
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 14:09:04 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211228170910.623156-1-wander@redhat.com> (raw)

v2
==

Patch 02 conflicted with commit 92307383082d("coredump:  Don't perform
any cleanups before dumping core") which I didn't have in my tree. V2
just changes the hunk

+#define PF_SUID   0x00000008

To

+#define PF_SUID   0x01000000

To merge cleanly. Other than that, it is the same patch as v1.

v1
==

A set-uid executable might be a vector to privilege escalation if the
system configures the coredump file name pattern as a relative
directory destiny. The full description of the vulnerability and
a demonstration of how we can exploit it can be found at [1].

This patch series adds a PF_SUID flag to the process in execve if it is
set-[ug]id binary and elevates the new image's privileges.

In the do_coredump function, we check if:

1) We have the SUID_FLAG set
2) We have CAP_SYS_ADMIN (the process might have decreased its
   privileges)
3) The current directory is owned by root (the current code already
   checks for core_pattern being a relative path).
4) non-privileged users don't have permission to write to the current
   directory.

If all four conditions match, we set the need_suid_safe flag.

An alternative implementation (and more elegant IMO) would be saving
the fsuid and fsgid of the process in the task_struct before loading the
new image to the memory. But this approach would add eight bytes to all
task_struct instances where only a tiny fraction of the processes need
it and under a configuration that not all (most?) distributions don't
adopt by default.

Wander Lairson Costa (4):
  exec: add a flag indicating if an exec file is a suid/sgid
  process: add the PF_SUID flag
  coredump: mitigate privilege escalation of process coredump
  exec: only set the suid flag if the current proc isn't root

 fs/coredump.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 fs/exec.c               | 10 ++++++++++
 include/linux/binfmts.h |  6 +++++-
 include/linux/sched.h   |  1 +
 kernel/fork.c           |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

-- 
2.27.0


             reply	other threads:[~2021-12-28 17:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-28 17:09 Wander Lairson Costa [this message]
2021-12-28 17:09 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/4] exec: add a flag indicating if an exec file is a suid/sgid Wander Lairson Costa
2021-12-28 17:09 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/4] process: add the PF_SUID flag Wander Lairson Costa
2021-12-28 17:09 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/4] coredump: mitigate privilege escalation of process coredump Wander Lairson Costa
2021-12-28 17:09 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/4] exec: only set the suid flag if the current proc isn't root Wander Lairson Costa
2022-01-03 22:11 ` [PATCH RFC v2 0/4] coredump: mitigate privilege escalation of process coredump Eric W. Biederman
2022-01-05 12:30   ` Wander Costa

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