From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Subject: [PATCH] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 17:50:52 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20211230165052.2698-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw) RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead. Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2). This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND is going to alleviate things. There is one place, though, where such last-ditch moves might be quasi-sensible, and that's before the CRNG is actually ready. In that case, we're already very much operating from a position of trying to get whatever we can, so we might as well throw in the RDRAND call because why not. But once the CRNG is actually up, it's simply not sensible. Removing the call there improves performance on an i7-11850H by 370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of RDRAND. This commit fixes the issue by only making that call to RDRAND when the CRNG is not yet ready. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 54086e9da05b..239b1455b1a8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, &input_pool : NULL); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) + if (unlikely(!crng_ready()) && arch_get_random_long(&v)) crng->state[14] ^= v; chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); if (crng->state[12] == 0) -- 2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2021-12-30 16:51 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-12-30 16:50 Jason A. Donenfeld [this message] 2021-12-30 22:13 ` Theodore Ts'o 2021-12-30 22:58 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2021-12-31 3:35 ` Theodore Ts'o 2021-12-31 11:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld 2021-12-31 17:13 ` Theodore Ts'o 2022-01-04 5:03 ` Sandy Harris 2022-01-04 5:55 ` Theodore Ts'o 2022-01-20 15:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2022-01-20 15:07 ` [PATCH] random: use named fields for adjusting chacha state Jason A. Donenfeld 2022-01-20 17:50 ` Theodore Ts'o 2022-01-20 21:53 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2022-01-05 15:28 ` [PATCH v2] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Ard Biesheuvel
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