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From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
To: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, john.ji@intel.com, susie.li@intel.com,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 14/16] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory
Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 18:06:12 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220104100612.GA19947@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220104091008.GA21806@chaop.bj.intel.com>

On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 05:10:08PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 09:46:35AM +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 23, 2021 at 08:30:09PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > When a page fault from the secondary page table while the guest is
> > > running happens in a memslot with KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, we need go
> > > different paths for private access and shared access.
> > > 
> > >   - For private access, KVM checks if the page is already allocated in
> > >     the memory backend, if yes KVM establishes the mapping, otherwise
> > >     exits to userspace to convert a shared page to private one.
> > >
> > will this conversion be atomical or not?
> > For example, after punching a hole in a private memory slot, will KVM
> > see two notifications: one for invalidation of the whole private memory
> > slot, and one for fallocate of the rest ranges besides the hole?
> > Or, KVM only sees one invalidation notification for the hole?
> 
> Punching hole doesn't need to invalidate the whole memory slot. It only
> send one invalidation notification to KVM for the 'hole' part.
good :)

> 
> Taking shared-to-private conversion as example it only invalidates the
> 'hole' part (that usually only the portion of the whole memory) on the
> shared fd,, and then fallocate the private memory in the private fd at
> the 'hole'. The KVM invalidation notification happens when the shared
> hole gets invalidated. The establishment of the private mapping happens
> at subsequent KVM page fault handlers.
> 
> > Could you please show QEMU code about this conversion?
> 
> See below for the QEMU side conversion code. The above described
> invalidation and fallocation will be two steps in this conversion. If
> error happens in the middle then this error will be propagated to
> kvm_run to do the proper action (e.g. may kill the guest?).
> 
> int ram_block_convert_range(RAMBlock *rb, uint64_t start, size_t length,
>                             bool shared_to_private)
> {
>     int ret; 
>     int fd_from, fd_to;
> 
>     if (!rb || rb->private_fd <= 0) { 
>         return -1;
>     }    
> 
>     if (!QEMU_PTR_IS_ALIGNED(start, rb->page_size) ||
>         !QEMU_PTR_IS_ALIGNED(length, rb->page_size)) {
>         return -1;
>     }    
> 
>     if (length > rb->max_length) {
>         return -1;
>     }    
> 
>     if (shared_to_private) {
>         fd_from = rb->fd;
>         fd_to = rb->private_fd;
>     } else {
>         fd_from = rb->private_fd;
>         fd_to = rb->fd;
>     }    
> 
>     ret = ram_block_discard_range_fd(rb, start, length, fd_from);
>     if (ret) {
>         return ret; 
>     }    
> 
>     if (fd_to > 0) { 
>         return fallocate(fd_to, 0, start, length);
>     }    
> 
>     return 0;
> }
> 
Thanks. So QEMU will re-generate memslots and set KVM_MEM_PRIVATE
accordingly? Will it involve slot deletion and create?

> > 
> > 
> > >   - For shared access, KVM also checks if the page is already allocated
> > >     in the memory backend, if yes then exit to userspace to convert a
> > >     private page to shared one, otherwise it's treated as a traditional
> > >     hva-based shared memory, KVM lets existing code to obtain a pfn with
> > >     get_user_pages() and establish the mapping.
> > > 
> > > The above code assume private memory is persistent and pre-allocated in
> > > the memory backend so KVM can use this information as an indicator for
> > > a page is private or shared. The above check is then performed by
> > > calling kvm_memfd_get_pfn() which currently is implemented as a
> > > pagecache search but in theory that can be implemented differently
> > > (i.e. when the page is even not mapped into host pagecache there should
> > > be some different implementation).
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c         | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 11 +++--
> > >  2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > index 2856eb662a21..fbcdf62f8281 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > @@ -2920,6 +2920,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
> > >  	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
> > >  		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
> > >  
> > > +	if (kvm_slot_is_private(slot))
> > > +		return max_level;
> > > +
> > >  	host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, pfn, slot);
> > >  	return min(host_level, max_level);
> > >  }
> > > @@ -3950,7 +3953,59 @@ static bool kvm_arch_setup_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> > >  				  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn), &arch);
> > >  }
> > >  
> > > -static bool kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, int *r)
> > > +static bool kvm_vcpu_is_private_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
> > > +{
> > > +	/*
> > > +	 * At this time private gfn has not been supported yet. Other patch
> > > +	 * that enables it should change this.
> > > +	 */
> > > +	return false;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static bool kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > +				    struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
> > > +				    bool *is_private_pfn, int *r)
> > > +{
> > > +	int order;
> > > +	int mem_convert_type;
> > > +	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
> > > +	long pfn = kvm_memfd_get_pfn(slot, fault->gfn, &order);
> > For private memory slots, it's possible to have pfns backed by
> > backends other than memfd, e.g. devicefd.
> 
> Surely yes, although this patch only supports memfd, but it's designed
> to be extensible to support other memory backing stores than memfd. There
> is one assumption in this design however: one private memslot can be
> backed by only one type of such memory backing store, e.g. if the
> devicefd you mentioned can independently provide memory for a memslot
> then that's no issue.
> 
> >So is it possible to let those
> > private memslots keep private and use traditional hva-based way?
> 
> Typically this fd-based private memory uses the 'offset' as the
> userspace address to get a pfn from the backing store fd. But I believe
> the current code does not prevent you from using the hva as the
By hva-based way, I mean mmap is required for this fd.

> userspace address, as long as your memory backing store understand that
> address and can provide the pfn basing on it. But since you already have
> the hva, you probably already mmap-ed the fd to userspace, that seems
> not this private memory patch can protect you. Probably I didn't quite
Yes, for this fd, though mapped in private memslot, there's no need to
prevent QEMU/host from accessing it as it will not cause the severe machine
check.

> understand 'keep private' you mentioned here.
'keep private' means allow this kind of private memslot which does not
require protection from this private memory patch :)


Thanks
Yan
> > Reasons below:
> > 1. only memfd is supported in this patch set.
> > 2. qemu/host read/write to those private memslots backing up by devicefd may
> > not cause machine check.
> > 

  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-04 10:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-23 12:29 [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 00/16] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:29 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 01/16] mm/shmem: Introduce F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE Chao Peng
2022-01-04 14:22   ` David Hildenbrand
2022-01-06 13:06     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-13 15:56       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-12-23 12:29 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 02/16] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:29 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 03/16] mm/memfd: Introduce MEMFD_OPS Chao Peng
2021-12-24  3:53   ` Robert Hoo
2021-12-31  2:38     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-04 17:38       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-05  6:07         ` Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:29 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 04/16] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2021-12-23 17:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-31  2:53     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-04 17:34       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 05/16] KVM: Maintain ofs_tree for fast memslot lookup by file offset Chao Peng
2021-12-23 18:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-24  3:54     ` Chao Peng
2021-12-27 23:50       ` Yao Yuan
2021-12-28 21:48       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-31  2:26         ` Chao Peng
2022-01-04 17:43           ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-05  6:09             ` Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 06/16] KVM: Implement fd-based memory using MEMFD_OPS interfaces Chao Peng
2021-12-23 18:34   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-23 23:09     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-12-24  4:25       ` Chao Peng
2021-12-28 22:14         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-24  4:12     ` Chao Peng
2021-12-24  4:22     ` Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 07/16] KVM: Refactor hva based memory invalidation code Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 08/16] KVM: Special handling for fd-based memory invalidation Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 09/16] KVM: Split out common memory invalidation code Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 10/16] KVM: Implement fd-based memory invalidation Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 11/16] KVM: Add kvm_map_gfn_range Chao Peng
2021-12-23 18:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-24  4:13     ` Chao Peng
2021-12-31  2:33       ` Chao Peng
2022-01-04 17:31         ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-05  6:14           ` Chao Peng
2022-01-05 17:03             ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-06 12:35               ` Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 12/16] KVM: Implement fd-based memory fallocation Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 13/16] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR exit Chao Peng
2021-12-23 18:28   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 14/16] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-01-04  1:46   ` Yan Zhao
2022-01-04  9:10     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-04 10:06       ` Yan Zhao [this message]
2022-01-05  6:28         ` Chao Peng
2022-01-05  7:53           ` Yan Zhao
2022-01-05 20:52             ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-14  5:53               ` Yan Zhao
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 15/16] KVM: Use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext Chao Peng
2021-12-23 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 kvm/queue 16/16] KVM: Register/unregister private memory slot to memfd Chao Peng

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