From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>,
Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] x86/hyperv: Properly deal with empty cpumasks in hyperv_flush_tlb_multi()
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2022 10:46:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220106094611.1404218-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> (raw)
KASAN detected the following issue:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_multi+0xf88/0x1060
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880011ccbc0 by task kcompactd0/33
CPU: 1 PID: 33 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 5.14.0-39.el9.x86_64+debug #1
Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine,
BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
? hyperv_flush_tlb_multi+0xf88/0x1060
__kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11e
? hyperv_flush_tlb_multi+0xf88/0x1060
kasan_report+0x38/0x50
hyperv_flush_tlb_multi+0xf88/0x1060
flush_tlb_mm_range+0x1b1/0x200
ptep_clear_flush+0x10e/0x150
...
Allocated by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
hv_common_init+0xae/0x115
hyperv_init+0x97/0x501
apic_intr_mode_init+0xb3/0x1e0
x86_late_time_init+0x92/0xa2
start_kernel+0x338/0x3eb
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc2/0xcb
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880011cc800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 960 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880011cc800, ffff8880011ccc00)
'hyperv_flush_tlb_multi+0xf88/0x1060' points to
hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() and '960 bytes' means we're trying to get
VP_INDEX for CPU#240. 'nr_cpus' here is exactly 240 so we're trying to
access past hv_vp_index's last element. This can (and will) happen
when 'cpus' mask is empty and cpumask_last() will return '>=nr_cpus'.
Commit ad0a6bad4475 ("x86/hyperv: check cpu mask after interrupt has
been disabled") tried to deal with empty cpumask situation but
apparently didn't fully fix the issue.
'cpus' cpumask which is passed to hyperv_flush_tlb_multi() is
'mm_cpumask(mm)' (which is '&mm->cpu_bitmap'). This mask changes every
time the particular mm is scheduled/unscheduled on some CPU (see
switch_mm_irqs_off()), disabling IRQs on the CPU which is performing remote
TLB flush has zero influence on whether the particular process can get
scheduled/unscheduled on _other_ CPUs so e.g. in the case where the mm was
scheduled on one other CPU and got unscheduled during
hyperv_flush_tlb_multi()'s execution will lead to cpumask becoming empty.
It doesn't seem that there's a good way to protect 'mm_cpumask(mm)'
from changing during hyperv_flush_tlb_multi()'s execution. It would be
possible to copy it in the very beginning of the function but this is a
waste. It seems we can deal with changing cpumask just fine.
When 'cpus' cpumask changes during hyperv_flush_tlb_multi()'s
execution, there are two possible issues:
- 'Under-flushing': we will not flush TLB on a CPU which got added to
the mask while hyperv_flush_tlb_multi() was already running. This is
not a problem as this is equal to mm getting scheduled on that CPU
right after TLB flush.
- 'Over-flushing': we may flush TLB on a CPU which is already cleared
from the mask. First, extra TLB flush preserves correctness. Second,
Hyper-V's TLB flush hypercall takes 'mm->pgd' argument so Hyper-V may
avoid the flush if CR3 doesn't match.
Fix the immediate issue with cpumask_last()/hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number()
and remove the pointless cpumask_empty() check from the beginning of the
function as it really doesn't protect anything. Also, avoid the hypercall
altogether when 'flush->processor_mask' ends up being empty.
Fixes: ad0a6bad4475 ("x86/hyperv: check cpu mask after interrupt has been disabled")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 19 +++++++++----------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index bd13736d0c05..0ad2378fe6ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -68,15 +68,6 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpus,
local_irq_save(flags);
- /*
- * Only check the mask _after_ interrupt has been disabled to avoid the
- * mask changing under our feet.
- */
- if (cpumask_empty(cpus)) {
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- return;
- }
-
flush_pcpu = (struct hv_tlb_flush **)
this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
@@ -115,7 +106,9 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpus,
* must. We will also check all VP numbers when walking the
* supplied CPU set to remain correct in all cases.
*/
- if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpumask_last(cpus)) >= 64)
+ cpu = cpumask_last(cpus);
+
+ if (cpu < nr_cpumask_bits && hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpu) >= 64)
goto do_ex_hypercall;
for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
@@ -131,6 +124,12 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpus,
__set_bit(vcpu, (unsigned long *)
&flush->processor_mask);
}
+
+ /* nothing to flush if 'processor_mask' ends up being empty */
+ if (!flush->processor_mask) {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return;
+ }
}
/*
--
2.33.1
next reply other threads:[~2022-01-06 9:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-06 9:46 Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2022-01-07 16:56 ` [PATCH] x86/hyperv: Properly deal with empty cpumasks in hyperv_flush_tlb_multi() Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-01-10 11:51 ` Wei Liu
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