[PATCH v6 00/21] AMX support for KVM

[PATCH v6 00/21] AMX support for KVM

[Paolo Bonzini]

These are the final patches that I am committing.  They are the
same as v5 except for some cosmetic changes in patch 7 that
remove the need for the IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) check, and
a rebase on top of kvm/next.

Paolo

Guang Zeng (1):
  kvm: x86: Add support for getting/setting expanded xstate buffer

Jing Liu (11):
  kvm: x86: Fix xstate_required_size() to follow XSTATE alignment rule
  kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
  x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function
    argument
  kvm: x86: Enable dynamic xfeatures at KVM_SET_CPUID2
  kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD
  x86/fpu: Prepare xfd_err in struct fpu_guest
  kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR
  kvm: x86: Emulate IA32_XFD_ERR for guest
  kvm: x86: Disable RDMSR interception of IA32_XFD_ERR
  kvm: x86: Add XCR0 support for Intel AMX
  kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX

Kevin Tian (2):
  x86/fpu: Provide fpu_update_guest_xfd() for IA32_XFD emulation
  kvm: x86: Disable interception for IA32_XFD on demand

Sean Christopherson (1):
  x86/fpu: Provide fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features() for KVM

Thomas Gleixner (5):
  x86/fpu: Extend fpu_xstate_prctl() with guest permissions
  x86/fpu: Prepare guest FPU for dynamically enabled FPU features
  x86/fpu: Add guest support to xfd_enable_feature()
  x86/fpu: Add uabi_size to guest_fpu
  x86/fpu: Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state()

Wei Wang (1):
  kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                |  46 +++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h                |  11 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h              |  32 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  16 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h             |  26 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c                    |  99 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                  | 147 +++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h                  |  19 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          |  86 +++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                          |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h                       |   5 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        |  68 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                        |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            | 112 ++++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |   4 +
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h         |  16 +-
 tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                |   3 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |   2 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |  10 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |  32 ++++
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      |  67 +++++++-
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c |   2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c |   2 +-
 .../kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c    |   2 +-
 28 files changed, 711 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 01/21] x86/fpu: Extend fpu_xstate_prctl() with guest permissions

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

KVM requires a clear separation of host user space and guest permissions
for dynamic XSTATE components.

Add a guest permissions member to struct fpu and a separate set of prctl()
arguments: ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM.

The semantics are equivalent to the host user space permission control
except for the following constraints:

  1) Permissions have to be requested before the first vCPU is created

  2) Permissions are frozen when the first vCPU is created to ensure
     consistency. Any attempt to expand permissions via the prctl() after
     that point is rejected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h    |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h  |  9 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 26 ++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c        |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h      | 13 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c         |  2 ++
 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index c2767a6a387e..d8c222290e68 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static inline void fpstate_free(struct fpu *fpu) { }
 /* fpstate-related functions which are exported to KVM */
 extern void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fps, unsigned int xfeature);
 
+extern inline u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void);
+
 /* KVM specific functions */
 extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
 extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index 3c06c82ab355..6ddf80637697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ struct fpstate {
 	/* @regs is dynamically sized! Don't add anything after @regs! */
 } __aligned(64);
 
+#define FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED		BIT_ULL(63)
+
 struct fpu_state_perm {
 	/*
 	 * @__state_perm:
@@ -476,6 +478,13 @@ struct fpu {
 	 */
 	struct fpu_state_perm		perm;
 
+	/*
+	 * @guest_perm:
+	 *
+	 * Permission related information for guest pseudo FPUs
+	 */
+	struct fpu_state_perm		guest_perm;
+
 	/*
 	 * @__fpstate:
 	 *
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 754a07856817..500b96e71f18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -2,20 +2,22 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H
 #define _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H
 
-#define ARCH_SET_GS		0x1001
-#define ARCH_SET_FS		0x1002
-#define ARCH_GET_FS		0x1003
-#define ARCH_GET_GS		0x1004
+#define ARCH_SET_GS			0x1001
+#define ARCH_SET_FS			0x1002
+#define ARCH_GET_FS			0x1003
+#define ARCH_GET_GS			0x1004
 
-#define ARCH_GET_CPUID		0x1011
-#define ARCH_SET_CPUID		0x1012
+#define ARCH_GET_CPUID			0x1011
+#define ARCH_SET_CPUID			0x1012
 
-#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP	0x1021
-#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM	0x1022
-#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM	0x1023
+#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP		0x1021
+#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM		0x1022
+#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM		0x1023
+#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM	0x1024
+#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM	0x1025
 
-#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_X32	0x2001
-#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32	0x2002
-#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64	0x2003
+#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_X32		0x2001
+#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32		0x2002
+#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64		0x2003
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 8ea306b1bf8e..ab19b3d8b2f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -450,6 +450,8 @@ void fpstate_reset(struct fpu *fpu)
 	fpu->perm.__state_perm		= fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features;
 	fpu->perm.__state_size		= fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size;
 	fpu->perm.__user_state_size	= fpu_user_cfg.default_size;
+	/* Same defaults for guests */
+	fpu->guest_perm = fpu->perm;
 }
 
 static inline void fpu_inherit_perms(struct fpu *dst_fpu)
@@ -460,6 +462,7 @@ static inline void fpu_inherit_perms(struct fpu *dst_fpu)
 		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 		/* Fork also inherits the permissions of the parent */
 		dst_fpu->perm = src_fpu->perm;
+		dst_fpu->guest_perm = src_fpu->guest_perm;
 		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index d28829403ed0..5f01d463859d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ static int validate_sigaltstack(unsigned int usize)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested)
+static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested, bool guest)
 {
 	/*
 	 * This deliberately does not exclude !XSAVES as we still might
@@ -1605,9 +1605,10 @@ static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested)
 	 */
 	bool compacted = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 	struct fpu *fpu = &current->group_leader->thread.fpu;
+	struct fpu_state_perm *perm;
 	unsigned int ksize, usize;
 	u64 mask;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* Check whether fully enabled */
 	if ((permitted & requested) == requested)
@@ -1621,15 +1622,18 @@ static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested)
 	mask &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
 	usize = xstate_calculate_size(mask, false);
 
-	ret = validate_sigaltstack(usize);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	if (!guest) {
+		ret = validate_sigaltstack(usize);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
+	perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm;
 	/* Pairs with the READ_ONCE() in xstate_get_group_perm() */
-	WRITE_ONCE(fpu->perm.__state_perm, requested);
+	WRITE_ONCE(perm->__state_perm, requested);
 	/* Protected by sighand lock */
-	fpu->perm.__state_size = ksize;
-	fpu->perm.__user_state_size = usize;
+	perm->__state_size = ksize;
+	perm->__user_state_size = usize;
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1640,7 +1644,7 @@ static const u64 xstate_prctl_req[XFEATURE_MAX] = {
 	[XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA,
 };
 
-static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx)
+static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest)
 {
 	u64 permitted, requested;
 	int ret;
@@ -1661,14 +1665,19 @@ static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	/* Lockless quick check */
-	permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm();
+	permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest);
 	if ((permitted & requested) == requested)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Protect against concurrent modifications */
 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-	permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm();
-	ret = __xstate_request_perm(permitted, requested);
+	permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest);
+
+	/* First vCPU allocation locks the permissions. */
+	if (guest && (permitted & FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED))
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+	else
+		ret = __xstate_request_perm(permitted, requested, guest);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1713,12 +1722,18 @@ int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err)
 	return 0;
 }
 #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
-static inline int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx)
+static inline int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest)
 {
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 #endif  /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+inline u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void)
+{
+	return xstate_get_group_perm(true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xstate_get_guest_group_perm);
+
 /**
  * fpu_xstate_prctl - xstate permission operations
  * @tsk:	Redundant pointer to current
@@ -1742,6 +1757,7 @@ long fpu_xstate_prctl(struct task_struct *tsk, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 	u64 __user *uptr = (u64 __user *)arg2;
 	u64 permitted, supported;
 	unsigned long idx = arg2;
+	bool guest = false;
 
 	if (tsk != current)
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -1760,11 +1776,20 @@ long fpu_xstate_prctl(struct task_struct *tsk, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 		permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
 		return put_user(permitted, uptr);
 
+	case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
+		permitted = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
+		permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
+		return put_user(permitted, uptr);
+
+	case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
+		guest = true;
+		fallthrough;
+
 	case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM:
 		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		return xstate_request_perm(idx);
+		return xstate_request_perm(idx, guest);
 
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
index 86ea7c0fa2f6..98a472775c97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -20,10 +20,19 @@ static inline void xstate_init_xcomp_bv(struct xregs_state *xsave, u64 mask)
 		xsave->header.xcomp_bv = mask | XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT;
 }
 
-static inline u64 xstate_get_host_group_perm(void)
+static inline u64 xstate_get_group_perm(bool guest)
 {
+	struct fpu *fpu = &current->group_leader->thread.fpu;
+	struct fpu_state_perm *perm;
+
 	/* Pairs with WRITE_ONCE() in xstate_request_perm() */
-	return READ_ONCE(current->group_leader->thread.fpu.perm.__state_perm);
+	perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm;
+	return READ_ONCE(perm->__state_perm);
+}
+
+static inline u64 xstate_get_host_group_perm(void)
+{
+	return xstate_get_group_perm(false);
 }
 
 enum xstate_copy_mode {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 04143a653a8a..d7bc23589062 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -993,6 +993,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 	case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP:
 	case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM:
 	case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM:
+	case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
+	case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
 		return fpu_xstate_prctl(task, option, arg2);
 	}
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 02/21] x86/fpu: Prepare guest FPU for dynamically enabled FPU features

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

To support dynamically enabled FPU features for guests prepare the guest
pseudo FPU container to keep track of the currently enabled xfeatures and
the guest permissions.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c       | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index 6ddf80637697..c752d0aa23a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -504,6 +504,19 @@ struct fpu {
  * Guest pseudo FPU container
  */
 struct fpu_guest {
+	/*
+	 * @xfeatures:			xfeature bitmap of features which are
+	 *				currently enabled for the guest vCPU.
+	 */
+	u64				xfeatures;
+
+	/*
+	 * @perm:			xfeature bitmap of features which are
+	 *				permitted to be enabled for the guest
+	 *				vCPU.
+	 */
+	u64				perm;
+
 	/*
 	 * @fpstate:			Pointer to the allocated guest fpstate
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index ab19b3d8b2f7..eddeeb4ed2f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -201,6 +201,26 @@ void fpu_reset_from_exception_fixup(void)
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
 static void __fpstate_reset(struct fpstate *fpstate);
 
+static void fpu_init_guest_permissions(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
+{
+	struct fpu_state_perm *fpuperm;
+	u64 perm;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	fpuperm = &current->group_leader->thread.fpu.guest_perm;
+	perm = fpuperm->__state_perm;
+
+	/* First fpstate allocation locks down permissions. */
+	WRITE_ONCE(fpuperm->__state_perm, perm | FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED);
+
+	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+	gfpu->perm = perm & ~FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED;
+}
+
 bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 {
 	struct fpstate *fpstate;
@@ -216,7 +236,11 @@ bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 	fpstate->is_valloc	= true;
 	fpstate->is_guest	= true;
 
-	gfpu->fpstate = fpstate;
+	gfpu->fpstate		= fpstate;
+	gfpu->xfeatures		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
+	gfpu->perm		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
+	fpu_init_guest_permissions(gfpu);
+
 	return true;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 03/21] kvm: x86: Fix xstate_required_size() to follow XSTATE alignment rule

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

CPUID.0xD.1.EBX enumerates the size of the XSAVE area (in compacted
format) required by XSAVES. If CPUID.0xD.i.ECX[1] is set for a state
component (i), this state component should be located on the next
64-bytes boundary following the preceding state component in the
compacted layout.

Fix xstate_required_size() to follow the alignment rule. AMX is the
first state component with 64-bytes alignment to catch this bug.

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-4-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 0b920e12bb6d..f3e6fda6b858 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
 		if (xstate_bv & 0x1) {
 		        u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, offset;
 		        cpuid_count(0xD, feature_bit, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-			offset = compacted ? ret : ebx;
+			/* ECX[1]: 64B alignment in compacted form */
+			if (compacted)
+				offset = (ecx & 0x2) ? ALIGN(ret, 64) : ret;
+			else
+				offset = ebx;
 			ret = max(ret, offset + eax);
 		}
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 04/21] kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in
CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise
a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to
KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a
dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is
required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic
bit.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-5-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 6b683dfea8f2..f4ea5e41a4d0 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -1687,6 +1687,10 @@ userspace capabilities, and with user requirements (for example, the
 user may wish to constrain cpuid to emulate older hardware, or for
 feature consistency across a cluster).
 
+Dynamically-enabled feature bits need to be requested with
+``arch_prctl()`` before calling this ioctl. Feature bits that have not
+been requested are excluded from the result.
+
 Note that certain capabilities, such as KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS, may
 expose cpuid features (e.g. MONITOR) which are not supported by kvm in
 its default configuration. If userspace enables such capabilities, it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index f3e6fda6b858..eb52dde5deec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -815,11 +815,13 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		break;
-	case 0xd:
-		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0;
+	case 0xd: {
+		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
+
+		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0 & guest_perm;
 		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0, false);
 		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
-		entry->edx &= supported_xcr0 >> 32;
+		entry->edx &= (supported_xcr0 & guest_perm) >> 32;
 		if (!supported_xcr0)
 			break;
 
@@ -866,6 +868,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			entry->edx = 0;
 		}
 		break;
+	}
 	case 0x12:
 		/* Intel SGX */
 		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

vCPU threads are different from native tasks regarding to the initial XFD
value. While all native tasks follow a fixed value (init_fpstate::xfd)
established by the FPU core at boot, vCPU threads need to obey the reset
value (i.e. ZERO) defined by the specification, to meet the expectation of
the guest.

Let the caller supply an argument and adjust the host and guest related
invocations accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-6-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index eddeeb4ed2f5..a78bc547fc03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ void fpu_reset_from_exception_fixup(void)
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
-static void __fpstate_reset(struct fpstate *fpstate);
+static void __fpstate_reset(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 xfd);
 
 static void fpu_init_guest_permissions(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 {
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 	if (!fpstate)
 		return false;
 
-	__fpstate_reset(fpstate);
+	/* Leave xfd to 0 (the reset value defined by spec) */
+	__fpstate_reset(fpstate, 0);
 	fpstate_init_user(fpstate);
 	fpstate->is_valloc	= true;
 	fpstate->is_guest	= true;
@@ -454,21 +455,21 @@ void fpstate_init_user(struct fpstate *fpstate)
 		fpstate_init_fstate(fpstate);
 }
 
-static void __fpstate_reset(struct fpstate *fpstate)
+static void __fpstate_reset(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 xfd)
 {
 	/* Initialize sizes and feature masks */
 	fpstate->size		= fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size;
 	fpstate->user_size	= fpu_user_cfg.default_size;
 	fpstate->xfeatures	= fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features;
 	fpstate->user_xfeatures	= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
-	fpstate->xfd		= init_fpstate.xfd;
+	fpstate->xfd		= xfd;
 }
 
 void fpstate_reset(struct fpu *fpu)
 {
 	/* Set the fpstate pointer to the default fpstate */
 	fpu->fpstate = &fpu->__fpstate;
-	__fpstate_reset(fpu->fpstate);
+	__fpstate_reset(fpu->fpstate, init_fpstate.xfd);
 
 	/* Initialize the permission related info in fpu */
 	fpu->perm.__state_perm		= fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 06/21] x86/fpu: Add guest support to xfd_enable_feature()

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Guest support for dynamically enabled FPU features requires a few
modifications to the enablement function which is currently invoked from
the #NM handler:

  1) Use guest permissions and sizes for the update

  2) Update fpu_guest state accordingly

  3) Take into account that the enabling can be triggered either from a
     running guest via XSETBV and MSR_IA32_XFD write emulation or from
     a guest restore. In the latter case the guests fpstate is not the
     current tasks active fpstate.

Split the function and implement the guest mechanics throughout the
callchain.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-7-yang.zhong@intel.com>
[Add 32-bit stub for __xfd_enable_feature. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h |  6 +++
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 5f01d463859d..0c0b2323cdec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1499,29 +1499,6 @@ void fpstate_free(struct fpu *fpu)
 		vfree(fpu->fpstate);
 }
 
-/**
- * fpu_install_fpstate - Update the active fpstate in the FPU
- *
- * @fpu:	A struct fpu * pointer
- * @newfps:	A struct fpstate * pointer
- *
- * Returns:	A null pointer if the last active fpstate is the embedded
- *		one or the new fpstate is already installed;
- *		otherwise, a pointer to the old fpstate which has to
- *		be freed by the caller.
- */
-static struct fpstate *fpu_install_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu,
-					   struct fpstate *newfps)
-{
-	struct fpstate *oldfps = fpu->fpstate;
-
-	if (fpu->fpstate == newfps)
-		return NULL;
-
-	fpu->fpstate = newfps;
-	return oldfps != &fpu->__fpstate ? oldfps : NULL;
-}
-
 /**
  * fpstate_realloc - Reallocate struct fpstate for the requested new features
  *
@@ -1529,6 +1506,7 @@ static struct fpstate *fpu_install_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu,
  *		of that task
  * @ksize:	The required size for the kernel buffer
  * @usize:	The required size for user space buffers
+ * @guest_fpu:	Pointer to a guest FPU container. NULL for host allocations
  *
  * Note vs. vmalloc(): If the task with a vzalloc()-allocated buffer
  * terminates quickly, vfree()-induced IPIs may be a concern, but tasks
@@ -1537,13 +1515,13 @@ static struct fpstate *fpu_install_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu,
  * Returns: 0 on success, -ENOMEM on allocation error.
  */
 static int fpstate_realloc(u64 xfeatures, unsigned int ksize,
-			   unsigned int usize)
+			   unsigned int usize, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu)
 {
 	struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
 	struct fpstate *curfps, *newfps = NULL;
 	unsigned int fpsize;
+	bool in_use;
 
-	curfps = fpu->fpstate;
 	fpsize = ksize + ALIGN(offsetof(struct fpstate, regs), 64);
 
 	newfps = vzalloc(fpsize);
@@ -1553,28 +1531,55 @@ static int fpstate_realloc(u64 xfeatures, unsigned int ksize,
 	newfps->user_size = usize;
 	newfps->is_valloc = true;
 
+	/*
+	 * When a guest FPU is supplied, use @guest_fpu->fpstate
+	 * as reference independent whether it is in use or not.
+	 */
+	curfps = guest_fpu ? guest_fpu->fpstate : fpu->fpstate;
+
+	/* Determine whether @curfps is the active fpstate */
+	in_use = fpu->fpstate == curfps;
+
+	if (guest_fpu) {
+		newfps->is_guest = true;
+		newfps->is_confidential = curfps->is_confidential;
+		newfps->in_use = curfps->in_use;
+		guest_fpu->xfeatures |= xfeatures;
+	}
+
 	fpregs_lock();
 	/*
-	 * Ensure that the current state is in the registers before
-	 * swapping fpstate as that might invalidate it due to layout
-	 * changes.
+	 * If @curfps is in use, ensure that the current state is in the
+	 * registers before swapping fpstate as that might invalidate it
+	 * due to layout changes.
 	 */
-	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+	if (in_use && test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
 		fpregs_restore_userregs();
 
 	newfps->xfeatures = curfps->xfeatures | xfeatures;
 	newfps->user_xfeatures = curfps->user_xfeatures | xfeatures;
 	newfps->xfd = curfps->xfd & ~xfeatures;
 
-	curfps = fpu_install_fpstate(fpu, newfps);
-
 	/* Do the final updates within the locked region */
 	xstate_init_xcomp_bv(&newfps->regs.xsave, newfps->xfeatures);
-	xfd_update_state(newfps);
 
+	if (guest_fpu) {
+		guest_fpu->fpstate = newfps;
+		/* If curfps is active, update the FPU fpstate pointer */
+		if (in_use)
+			fpu->fpstate = newfps;
+	} else {
+		fpu->fpstate = newfps;
+	}
+
+	if (in_use)
+		xfd_update_state(fpu->fpstate);
 	fpregs_unlock();
 
-	vfree(curfps);
+	/* Only free valloc'ed state */
+	if (curfps && curfps->is_valloc)
+		vfree(curfps);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1682,14 +1687,16 @@ static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err)
+int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu)
 {
 	u64 xfd_event = xfd_err & XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
+	struct fpu_state_perm *perm;
 	unsigned int ksize, usize;
 	struct fpu *fpu;
 
 	if (!xfd_event) {
-		pr_err_once("XFD: Invalid xfd error: %016llx\n", xfd_err);
+		if (!guest_fpu)
+			pr_err_once("XFD: Invalid xfd error: %016llx\n", xfd_err);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -1697,14 +1704,16 @@ int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err)
 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 
 	/* If not permitted let it die */
-	if ((xstate_get_host_group_perm() & xfd_event) != xfd_event) {
+	if ((xstate_get_group_perm(!!guest_fpu) & xfd_event) != xfd_event) {
 		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
 
 	fpu = &current->group_leader->thread.fpu;
-	ksize = fpu->perm.__state_size;
-	usize = fpu->perm.__user_state_size;
+	perm = guest_fpu ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm;
+	ksize = perm->__state_size;
+	usize = perm->__user_state_size;
+
 	/*
 	 * The feature is permitted. State size is sufficient.  Dropping
 	 * the lock is safe here even if more features are added from
@@ -1717,10 +1726,16 @@ int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err)
 	 * Try to allocate a new fpstate. If that fails there is no way
 	 * out.
 	 */
-	if (fpstate_realloc(xfd_event, ksize, usize))
+	if (fpstate_realloc(xfd_event, ksize, usize, guest_fpu))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return 0;
 }
+
+int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err)
+{
+	return __xfd_enable_feature(xfd_err, NULL);
+}
+
 #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 static inline int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
index 98a472775c97..67ed6bbc19b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -158,8 +158,14 @@ static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate)
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+extern int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu);
 #else
 static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate) { }
+
+static inline int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu) {
+	return -EPERM;
+}
 #endif
 
 /*
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 07/21] x86/fpu: Provide fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features() for KVM

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Provide a wrapper for expanding the guest fpstate buffer according
to requested xfeatures. KVM wants to call this wrapper to manage
any dynamic xstate used by the guest.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-8-yang.zhong@intel.com>
[Remove unnecessary 32-bit check. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c     | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index d8c222290e68..1ed2a247a84e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ extern inline u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void);
 extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
 extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
 extern int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, bool enter_guest);
+extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures);
 
 extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, unsigned int size, u32 pkru);
 extern int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, u64 xcr0, u32 *vpkru);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index a78bc547fc03..64b2ee39bece 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -261,6 +261,28 @@ void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_free_guest_fpstate);
 
+/*
+  * fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features - Check xfeatures against guest perm and enable
+  * @guest_fpu:         Pointer to the guest FPU container
+  * @xfeatures:         Features requested by guest CPUID
+  *
+  * Enable all dynamic xfeatures according to guest perm and requested CPUID.
+  *
+  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise
+  */
+int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_enabled();
+
+	/* Nothing to do if all requested features are already enabled. */
+	xfeatures &= ~guest_fpu->xfeatures;
+	if (!xfeatures)
+		return 0;
+
+	return __xfd_enable_feature(xfeatures, guest_fpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features);
+
 int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, bool enter_guest)
 {
 	struct fpstate *guest_fps = guest_fpu->fpstate;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 08/21] kvm: x86: Enable dynamic xfeatures at KVM_SET_CPUID2

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

KVM can request fpstate expansion in two approaches:

  1) When intercepting guest updates to XCR0 and XFD MSR;

  2) Before vcpu runs (e.g. at KVM_SET_CPUID2);

The first option doesn't waste memory for legacy guest if it doesn't
support XFD. However doing so introduces more complexity and also
imposes an order requirement in the restoring path, i.e. XCR0/XFD
must be restored before XSTATE.

Given that the agreement is to do the static approach. This is
considered a better tradeoff though it does waste 8K memory for
legacy guest if its CPUID includes dynamically-enabled xfeatures.

Successful fpstate expansion requires userspace VMM to acquire
guest xstate permissions before calling KVM_SET_CPUID2.

Also take the chance to adjust the indent in kvm_set_cpuid().

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-9-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index eb52dde5deec..a0fedf1514ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -84,9 +84,12 @@ static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
+static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
+			   int nent)
 {
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+	u64 xfeatures;
 
 	/*
 	 * The existing code assumes virtual address is 48-bit or 57-bit in the
@@ -100,7 +103,20 @@ static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Exposing dynamic xfeatures to the guest requires additional
+	 * enabling in the FPU, e.g. to expand the guest XSAVE state size.
+	 */
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xd, 0);
+	if (!best)
+		return 0;
+
+	xfeatures = best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32);
+	xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
+	if (!xfeatures)
+		return 0;
+
+	return fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, xfeatures);
 }
 
 static void kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -280,21 +296,21 @@ u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
                         int nent)
 {
-    int r;
+	int r;
 
-    r = kvm_check_cpuid(e2, nent);
-    if (r)
-        return r;
+	r = kvm_check_cpuid(vcpu, e2, nent);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
 
-    kvfree(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries);
-    vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e2;
-    vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = nent;
+	kvfree(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries);
+	vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e2;
+	vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = nent;
 
-    kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(vcpu);
-    kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
-    kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+	kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(vcpu);
+	kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
 
-    return 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* when an old userspace process fills a new kernel module */
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 09/21] x86/fpu: Provide fpu_update_guest_xfd() for IA32_XFD emulation

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>

Guest XFD can be updated either in the emulation path or in the
restore path.

Provide a wrapper to update guest_fpu::fpstate::xfd. If the guest
fpstate is currently in-use, also update the per-cpu xfd cache and
the actual MSR.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-10-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c     | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index 1ed2a247a84e..e4d10155290b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
 extern int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, bool enter_guest);
 extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+extern void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd);
+#else
+static inline void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) { }
+#endif
+
 extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, unsigned int size, u32 pkru);
 extern int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, u64 xcr0, u32 *vpkru);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 64b2ee39bece..271fd5bc043b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -283,6 +283,18 @@ int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd)
+{
+	fpregs_lock();
+	guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd;
+	if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use)
+		xfd_update_state(guest_fpu->fpstate);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd);
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
 int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, bool enter_guest)
 {
 	struct fpstate *guest_fps = guest_fpu->fpstate;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 10/21] kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

Intel's eXtended Feature Disable (XFD) feature allows the software
to dynamically adjust fpstate buffer size for XSAVE features which
have large state.

Because guest fpstate has been expanded for all possible dynamic
xstates at KVM_SET_CPUID2, emulation of the IA32_XFD MSR is
straightforward. For write just call fpu_update_guest_xfd() to
update the guest fpu container once all the sanity checks are passed.
For read simply return the cached value in the container.

Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-11-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a9f1044dd6b2..b18d2838606f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1377,6 +1377,7 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5,
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2,
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD,
 };
 
 static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)];
@@ -3686,6 +3687,19 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			return 1;
 		vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables = data;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~(XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC &
+			     vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0))
+			return 1;
+
+		fpu_update_guest_xfd(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, data);
+		break;
+#endif
 	default:
 		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
 			return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
@@ -4006,6 +4020,15 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	case MSR_K7_HWCR:
 		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd;
+		break;
+#endif
 	default:
 		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index))
 			return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
@@ -6441,6 +6464,10 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 			    min(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, x86_pmu.num_counters_gp))
 				continue;
 			break;
+		case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+			if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+				continue;
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 11/21] x86/fpu: Prepare xfd_err in struct fpu_guest

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

When XFD causes an instruction to generate #NM, IA32_XFD_ERR
contains information about which disabled state components are
being accessed. The #NM handler is expected to check this
information and then enable the state components by clearing
IA32_XFD for the faulting task (if having permission).

If the XFD_ERR value generated in guest is consumed/clobbered
by the host before the guest itself doing so, it may lead to
non-XFD-related #NM treated as XFD #NM in host (due to non-zero
value in XFD_ERR), or XFD-related #NM treated as non-XFD #NM in
guest (XFD_ERR cleared by the host #NM handler).

Introduce a new field in fpu_guest to save the guest xfd_err value.
KVM is expected to save guest xfd_err before interrupt is enabled
and restore it right before entering the guest (with interrupt
disabled).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-12-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index c752d0aa23a4..3795d0573773 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -517,6 +517,11 @@ struct fpu_guest {
 	 */
 	u64				perm;
 
+	/*
+	 * @xfd_err:			Save the guest value.
+	 */
+	u64				xfd_err;
+
 	/*
 	 * @fpstate:			Pointer to the allocated guest fpstate
 	 */
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 12/21] kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

Guest IA32_XFD_ERR is generally modified in two places:

  - Set by CPU when #NM is triggered;
  - Cleared by guest in its #NM handler;

Intercept #NM for the first case when a nonzero value is written
to IA32_XFD. Nonzero indicates that the guest is willing to do
dynamic fpstate expansion for certain xfeatures, thus KVM needs to
manage and virtualize guest XFD_ERR properly. The vcpu exception
bitmap is updated in XFD write emulation according to guest_fpu::xfd.

Save the current XFD_ERR value to the guest_fpu container in the #NM
VM-exit handler. This must be done with interrupt disabled, otherwise
the unsaved MSR value may be clobbered by host activity.

The saving operation is conducted conditionally only when guest_fpu:xfd
includes a non-zero value. Doing so also avoids misread on a platform
which doesn't support XFD but #NM is triggered due to L1 interception.

Queueing #NM to the guest is postponed to handle_exception_nmi(). This
goes through the nested_vmx check so a virtual vmexit is queued instead
when #NM is triggered in L2 but L1 wants to intercept it.

Restore the host value (always ZERO outside of the host #NM
handler) before enabling interrupt.

Restore the guest value from the guest_fpu container right before
entering the guest (with interrupt disabled).

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-13-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c  | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c      |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 6e5de2e2b0da..e325c290a816 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -129,6 +129,11 @@ static inline bool is_machine_check(u32 intr_info)
 	return is_exception_n(intr_info, MC_VECTOR);
 }
 
+static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
+}
+
 /* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
 static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 7b5abe25e1e5..84f6904cdb6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/idtentry.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
@@ -761,6 +762,13 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, match);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Trap #NM if guest xfd contains a non-zero value so guest XFD_ERR
+	 * can be saved timely.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+		eb |= (1u << NM_VECTOR);
+
 	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
 }
 
@@ -1967,6 +1975,12 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
 		vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		/* Update #NM interception according to guest xfd */
+		if (!ret)
+			vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+		break;
 #endif
 	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
 		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
@@ -4798,6 +4812,17 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
 		return 1; /* handled by handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */
 
+	/*
+	 * Queue the exception here instead of in handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
+	 * This ensures the nested_vmx check is not skipped so vmexit can
+	 * be reflected to L1 (when it intercepts #NM) before reaching this
+	 * point.
+	 */
+	if (is_nm_fault(intr_info)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, NM_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
 		return handle_ud(vcpu);
 
@@ -6399,6 +6424,26 @@ static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
 }
 
+static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
+	 * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
+	 * has chance to consume it.
+	 *
+	 * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
+	 * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
+	 * support xfd at all.
+	 *
+	 * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
+	 * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
+	 *
+	 * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+}
+
 static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
 	const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
@@ -6407,6 +6452,9 @@ static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
 	if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
 		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+	/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
+		handle_nm_fault_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu);
 	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
 	else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
 		kvm_machine_check();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index b18d2838606f..bb9534590a3a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9952,6 +9952,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
 		switch_fpu_return();
 
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+
 	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
 		set_debugreg(0, 7);
 		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
@@ -10015,6 +10018,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	static_call(kvm_x86_handle_exit_irqoff)(vcpu);
 
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
+
 	/*
 	 * Consume any pending interrupts, including the possible source of
 	 * VM-Exit on SVM and any ticks that occur between VM-Exit and now.
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 13/21] kvm: x86: Emulate IA32_XFD_ERR for guest

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

Emulate read/write to IA32_XFD_ERR MSR.

Only the saved value in the guest_fpu container is touched in the
emulation handler. Actual MSR update is handled right before entering
the guest (with preemption disabled)

Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-14-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index bb9534590a3a..2475b64cb762 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5,
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2,
 	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5,
-	MSR_IA32_XFD,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
 };
 
 static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)];
@@ -3699,6 +3699,17 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 
 		fpu_update_guest_xfd(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, data);
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~(XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC &
+			     vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err = data;
+		break;
 #endif
 	default:
 		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
@@ -4028,6 +4039,13 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 
 		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err;
+		break;
 #endif
 	default:
 		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index))
@@ -6465,6 +6483,7 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 				continue;
 			break;
 		case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
 			if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
 				continue;
 			break;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 14/21] kvm: x86: Disable RDMSR interception of IA32_XFD_ERR

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

This saves one unnecessary VM-exit in guest #NM handler, given that the
MSR is already restored with the guest value before the guest is resumed.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-15-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 84f6904cdb6e..b8b7f5c7b3df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
 	MSR_FS_BASE,
 	MSR_GS_BASE,
 	MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
 #endif
 	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
 	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
@@ -7288,6 +7289,11 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, MSR_TYPE_R,
+					  !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD));
+
+
 	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
 
 	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 18111368cf85..69dd2f85abdc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
 
 	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
-#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	13
+#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	14
 	struct {
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 15/21] kvm: x86: Add XCR0 support for Intel AMX

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

Two XCR0 bits are defined for AMX to support XSAVE mechanism. Bit 17
is for tilecfg and bit 18 is for tiledata.

The value of XCR0[17:18] is always either 00b or 11b. Also, SDM
recommends that only 64-bit operating systems enable Intel AMX by
setting XCR0[18:17]. 32-bit host kernel never sets the tile bits in
vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0.

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-16-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 2475b64cb762..993eee6451ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static struct kvm_user_return_msrs __percpu *user_return_msrs;
 #define KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0     (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE \
 				| XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS \
 				| XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \
-				| XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)
+				| XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
 
 u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer);
@@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
 		if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) != XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512)
 			return 1;
 	}
+
+	if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) &&
+	    ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) != XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE))
+		return 1;
+
 	vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0;
 
 	if ((xcr0 ^ old_xcr0) & XFEATURE_MASK_EXTEND)
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 16/21] kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

Extend CPUID emulation to support XFD, AMX_TILE, AMX_INT8 and
AMX_BF16. Adding those bits into kvm_cpu_caps finally activates all
previous logics in this series.

Hide XFD on 32bit host kernels. Otherwise it leads to a weird situation
where KVM tells userspace to migrate MSR_IA32_XFD and then rejects
attempts to read/write the MSR.

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-17-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c               | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index d5b5f2ab87a0..da872b6f8d8b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -299,7 +299,9 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_BF16		(18*32+22) /* AMX bf16 Support */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE		(18*32+24) /* AMX tile Support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_INT8		(18*32+25) /* AMX int8 Support */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index a0fedf1514ab..ba4c3d5d2386 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -442,9 +442,11 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	unsigned int f_gbpages = F(GBPAGES);
 	unsigned int f_lm = F(LM);
+	unsigned int f_xfd = F(XFD);
 #else
 	unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
 	unsigned int f_lm = 0;
+	unsigned int f_xfd = 0;
 #endif
 	memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
 
@@ -512,7 +514,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
 		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
 		F(MD_CLEAR) | F(AVX512_VP2INTERSECT) | F(FSRM) |
-		F(SERIALIZE) | F(TSXLDTRK) | F(AVX512_FP16)
+		F(SERIALIZE) | F(TSXLDTRK) | F(AVX512_FP16) |
+		F(AMX_TILE) | F(AMX_INT8) | F(AMX_BF16)
 	);
 
 	/* TSC_ADJUST and ARCH_CAPABILITIES are emulated in software. */
@@ -531,7 +534,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_D_1_EAX,
-		F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES)
+		F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES) | f_xfd
 	);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered(CPUID_12_EAX,
@@ -657,6 +660,8 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
 	case 0x14:
 	case 0x17:
 	case 0x18:
+	case 0x1d:
+	case 0x1e:
 	case 0x1f:
 	case 0x8000001d:
 		entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
@@ -929,6 +934,24 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		break;
+	/* Intel AMX TILE */
+	case 0x1d:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
+			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 0x1e: /* TMUL information */
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
 	case KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE: {
 		const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE;
 		entry->eax = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 17/21] x86/fpu: Add uabi_size to guest_fpu

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Userspace needs to inquire KVM about the buffer size to work
with the new KVM_SET_XSAVE and KVM_GET_XSAVE2. Add the size info
to guest_fpu for KVM to access.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-18-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c       | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c     | 1 +
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index 3795d0573773..eb7cd1139d97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -522,6 +522,11 @@ struct fpu_guest {
 	 */
 	u64				xfd_err;
 
+	/*
+	 * @uabi_size:			Size required for save/restore
+	 */
+	unsigned int			uabi_size;
+
 	/*
 	 * @fpstate:			Pointer to the allocated guest fpstate
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 271fd5bc043b..de8e8c21f355 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
 	gfpu->fpstate		= fpstate;
 	gfpu->xfeatures		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
 	gfpu->perm		= fpu_user_cfg.default_features;
+	gfpu->uabi_size		= fpu_user_cfg.default_size;
 	fpu_init_guest_permissions(gfpu);
 
 	return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 0c0b2323cdec..10fe072f1c92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1545,6 +1545,7 @@ static int fpstate_realloc(u64 xfeatures, unsigned int ksize,
 		newfps->is_confidential = curfps->is_confidential;
 		newfps->in_use = curfps->in_use;
 		guest_fpu->xfeatures |= xfeatures;
+		guest_fpu->uabi_size = usize;
 	}
 
 	fpregs_lock();
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 18/21] kvm: x86: Add support for getting/setting expanded xstate buffer

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>

With KVM_CAP_XSAVE, userspace uses a hardcoded 4KB buffer to get/set
xstate data from/to KVM. This doesn't work when dynamic xfeatures
(e.g. AMX) are exposed to the guest as they require a larger buffer
size.

Introduce a new capability (KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Userspace VMM gets the
required xstate buffer size via KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).
KVM_SET_XSAVE is extended to work with both legacy and new capabilities
by doing properly-sized memdup_user() based on the guest fpu container.
KVM_GET_XSAVE is kept for backward-compatible reason. Instead,
KVM_GET_XSAVE2 is introduced under KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 as the preferred
interface for getting xstate buffer (4KB or larger size) from KVM
(Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/12/15/510)

Also, update the api doc with the new KVM_GET_XSAVE2 ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-19-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 16 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c            |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h            |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |  4 +++
 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index f4ea5e41a4d0..d3791a14eb9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -1569,6 +1569,7 @@ otherwise it will return EBUSY error.
 
   struct kvm_xsave {
 	__u32 region[1024];
+	__u32 extra[0];
   };
 
 This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace.
@@ -1577,7 +1578,7 @@ This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace.
 4.43 KVM_SET_XSAVE
 ------------------
 
-:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2
 :Architectures: x86
 :Type: vcpu ioctl
 :Parameters: struct kvm_xsave (in)
@@ -1588,9 +1589,18 @@ This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace.
 
   struct kvm_xsave {
 	__u32 region[1024];
+	__u32 extra[0];
   };
 
-This ioctl would copy userspace's xsave struct to the kernel.
+This ioctl would copy userspace's xsave struct to the kernel. It copies
+as many bytes as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2),
+when invoked on the vm file descriptor. The size value returned by
+KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2) will always be at least 4096.
+Currently, it is only greater than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been
+enabled with ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+
+The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow the
+contents of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
 
 
 4.44 KVM_GET_XCRS
@@ -5535,6 +5545,34 @@ the trailing ``'\0'``, is indicated by ``name_size`` in the header.
 The Stats Data block contains an array of 64-bit values in the same order
 as the descriptors in Descriptors block.
 
+4.42 KVM_GET_XSAVE2
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xsave (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+
+::
+
+  struct kvm_xsave {
+	__u32 region[1024];
+	__u32 extra[0];
+  };
+
+This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace. It
+copies as many bytes as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+when invoked on the vm file descriptor. The size value returned by
+KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2) will always be at least 4096.
+Currently, it is only greater than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been
+enabled with ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+
+The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow the contents
+of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
+
+
 5. The kvm_run structure
 ========================
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 5a776a08f78c..2da3316bb559 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -373,9 +373,23 @@ struct kvm_debugregs {
 	__u64 reserved[9];
 };
 
-/* for KVM_CAP_XSAVE */
+/* for KVM_CAP_XSAVE and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 */
 struct kvm_xsave {
+	/*
+	 * KVM_GET_XSAVE2 and KVM_SET_XSAVE write and read as many bytes
+	 * as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+	 * respectively, when invoked on the vm file descriptor.
+	 *
+	 * The size value returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+	 * will always be at least 4096. Currently, it is only greater
+	 * than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been enabled with
+	 * ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+	 *
+	 * The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow
+	 * the contents of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
+	 */
 	__u32 region[1024];
+	__u32 extra[0];
 };
 
 #define KVM_MAX_XCRS	16
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index ba4c3d5d2386..c55e57b30e81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
 
-static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
+u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
 {
 	int feature_bit = 0;
 	u32 ret = XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index c99edfff7f82..8a770b481d9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
 	       u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only);
 
+u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted);
+
 int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 993eee6451ea..bde18ca657db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4314,6 +4314,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		else
 			r = 0;
 		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_XSAVE2: {
+		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
+
+		r = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0 & guest_perm, false);
+		if (r < sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
+			r = sizeof(struct kvm_xsave);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -4917,6 +4925,16 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				       vcpu->arch.pkru);
 }
 
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  u8 *state, unsigned int size)
+{
+	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
+		return;
+
+	fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu,
+				       state, size, vcpu->arch.pkru);
+}
+
 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
 {
@@ -5370,6 +5388,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_GET_XSAVE: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size > sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
+			break;
+
 		u.xsave = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xsave), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		r = -ENOMEM;
 		if (!u.xsave)
@@ -5384,7 +5406,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_SET_XSAVE: {
-		u.xsave = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.xsave));
+		int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
+
+		u.xsave = memdup_user(argp, size);
 		if (IS_ERR(u.xsave)) {
 			r = PTR_ERR(u.xsave);
 			goto out_nofree;
@@ -5393,6 +5417,25 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
 		break;
 	}
+
+	case KVM_GET_XSAVE2: {
+		int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
+
+		u.xsave = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.xsave)
+			break;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, u.buffer, size);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, size))
+			break;
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
 	case KVM_GET_XCRS: {
 		u.xcrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		r = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index fbfd70d965c6..9563d294f181 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1132,6 +1132,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE 205
 #define KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM 206
 #define KVM_CAP_VM_GPA_BITS 207
+#define KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 208
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
@@ -1622,6 +1623,9 @@ struct kvm_enc_region {
 #define KVM_S390_NORMAL_RESET	_IO(KVMIO,   0xc3)
 #define KVM_S390_CLEAR_RESET	_IO(KVMIO,   0xc4)
 
+/* Available with KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 */
+#define KVM_GET_XSAVE2		  _IOR(KVMIO,  0xcf, struct kvm_xsave)
+
 struct kvm_s390_pv_sec_parm {
 	__u64 origin;
 	__u64 length;
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 19/21] kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>

When KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 is supported, userspace is expected to allocate
buffer for KVM_GET_XSAVE2 and KVM_SET_XSAVE using the size returned
by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).

Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-20-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h         | 16 ++++-
 tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                |  3 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  2 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  | 10 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 32 +++++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      | 67 ++++++++++++++++++-
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c |  2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c |  2 +-
 .../kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c    |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 5a776a08f78c..2da3316bb559 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -373,9 +373,23 @@ struct kvm_debugregs {
 	__u64 reserved[9];
 };
 
-/* for KVM_CAP_XSAVE */
+/* for KVM_CAP_XSAVE and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 */
 struct kvm_xsave {
+	/*
+	 * KVM_GET_XSAVE2 and KVM_SET_XSAVE write and read as many bytes
+	 * as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+	 * respectively, when invoked on the vm file descriptor.
+	 *
+	 * The size value returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+	 * will always be at least 4096. Currently, it is only greater
+	 * than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been enabled with
+	 * ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+	 *
+	 * The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow
+	 * the contents of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
+	 */
 	__u32 region[1024];
+	__u32 extra[0];
 };
 
 #define KVM_MAX_XCRS	16
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 1daa45268de2..f066637ee206 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1131,6 +1131,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE 204
 #define KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE 205
 #define KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM 206
+#define KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 207
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
@@ -1551,6 +1552,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_XSAVE */
 #define KVM_GET_XSAVE		  _IOR(KVMIO,  0xa4, struct kvm_xsave)
 #define KVM_SET_XSAVE		  _IOW(KVMIO,  0xa5, struct kvm_xsave)
+/* Available with KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 */
+#define KVM_GET_XSAVE2		  _IOR(KVMIO,  0xcf, struct kvm_xsave)
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_XCRS */
 #define KVM_GET_XCRS		  _IOR(KVMIO,  0xa6, struct kvm_xcrs)
 #define KVM_SET_XCRS		  _IOW(KVMIO,  0xa7, struct kvm_xcrs)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 1e5ab6a92848..66775de26952 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ extern const struct vm_guest_mode_params vm_guest_mode_params[];
 int open_path_or_exit(const char *path, int flags);
 int open_kvm_dev_path_or_exit(void);
 int kvm_check_cap(long cap);
+int vm_check_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, long cap);
 int vm_enable_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
 int vcpu_enable_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id,
 		    struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_create_with_vcpus(enum vm_guest_mode mode, uint32_t nr_vcpus,
  *   guest_code - The vCPU's entry point
  */
 void vm_vcpu_add_default(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, void *guest_code);
+void vm_xsave_req_perm(void);
 
 bool vm_is_unrestricted_guest(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
index 05e65ca1c30c..58633e51960f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@
 
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <syscall.h>
 
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
 
 #include "../kvm_util.h"
 
@@ -352,6 +354,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_state;
 struct kvm_x86_state *vcpu_save_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid);
 void vcpu_load_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid,
 		     struct kvm_x86_state *state);
+void kvm_x86_state_cleanup(struct kvm_x86_state *state);
 
 struct kvm_msr_list *kvm_get_msr_index_list(void);
 uint64_t kvm_get_feature_msr(uint64_t msr_index);
@@ -443,4 +446,11 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr,
 /* VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP bits */
 #define VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP_AD_BITS       (1ULL << 21)
 
+#define XSTATE_XTILE_CFG_BIT		17
+#define XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_BIT		18
+
+#define XSTATE_XTILE_CFG_MASK		(1ULL << XSTATE_XTILE_CFG_BIT)
+#define XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_MASK		(1ULL << XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_BIT)
+#define XFEATURE_XTILE_MASK		(XSTATE_XTILE_CFG_MASK | \
+					XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_MASK)
 #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index ecc53d108ad8..4a645dc77f34 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -85,6 +85,33 @@ int kvm_check_cap(long cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* VM Check Capability
+ *
+ * Input Args:
+ *   vm - Virtual Machine
+ *   cap - Capability
+ *
+ * Output Args: None
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   On success, the Value corresponding to the capability (KVM_CAP_*)
+ *   specified by the value of cap.  On failure a TEST_ASSERT failure
+ *   is produced.
+ *
+ * Looks up and returns the value corresponding to the capability
+ * (KVM_CAP_*) given by cap.
+ */
+int vm_check_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, long cap)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, cap);
+	TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0, "KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION VM IOCTL failed,\n"
+		"  rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* VM Enable Capability
  *
  * Input Args:
@@ -366,6 +393,11 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_create_with_vcpus(enum vm_guest_mode mode, uint32_t nr_vcpus,
 	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 	int i;
 
+	/*
+	 * Permission needs to be requested before KVM_SET_CPUID2.
+	 */
+	vm_xsave_req_perm();
+
 	/* Force slot0 memory size not small than DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES */
 	if (slot0_mem_pages < DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES)
 		slot0_mem_pages = DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
index eef7b34756d5..f19d6d201977 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
@@ -650,6 +650,45 @@ static void vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vm *vm, int vcpuid)
 	vcpu_sregs_set(vm, vcpuid, &sregs);
 }
 
+#define CPUID_XFD_BIT (1 << 4)
+static bool is_xfd_supported(void)
+{
+	int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	const int leaf = 0xd, subleaf = 0x1;
+
+	__asm__ __volatile__(
+		"cpuid"
+		: /* output */ "=a"(eax), "=b"(ebx),
+		  "=c"(ecx), "=d"(edx)
+		: /* input */ "0"(leaf), "2"(subleaf));
+
+	return !!(eax & CPUID_XFD_BIT);
+}
+
+void vm_xsave_req_perm(void)
+{
+	unsigned long bitmask;
+	long rc;
+
+	if (!is_xfd_supported())
+		return;
+
+	rc = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM,
+		     XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_BIT);
+	/*
+	 * The older kernel version(<5.15) can't support
+	 * ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and directly return.
+	 */
+	if (rc)
+		return;
+
+	rc = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM, &bitmask);
+	TEST_ASSERT(rc == 0, "prctl(ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) error: %ld", rc);
+	TEST_ASSERT(bitmask & XFEATURE_XTILE_MASK,
+		    "prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) failure bitmask=0x%lx",
+		    bitmask);
+}
+
 void vm_vcpu_add_default(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, void *guest_code)
 {
 	struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
@@ -1018,10 +1057,10 @@ void vcpu_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, uint8_t indent)
 }
 
 struct kvm_x86_state {
+	struct kvm_xsave *xsave;
 	struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
 	struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
 	struct kvm_regs regs;
-	struct kvm_xsave xsave;
 	struct kvm_xcrs xcrs;
 	struct kvm_sregs sregs;
 	struct kvm_debugregs debugregs;
@@ -1069,6 +1108,22 @@ struct kvm_msr_list *kvm_get_msr_index_list(void)
 	return list;
 }
 
+static int vcpu_save_xsave_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_x86_state *state)
+{
+	int size;
+
+	size = vm_check_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_XSAVE2);
+	if (!size)
+		size = sizeof(struct kvm_xsave);
+
+	state->xsave = malloc(size);
+	if (size == sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
+		return ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_GET_XSAVE, state->xsave);
+	else
+		return ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_GET_XSAVE2, state->xsave);
+}
+
 struct kvm_x86_state *vcpu_save_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
 {
 	struct vcpu *vcpu = vcpu_find(vm, vcpuid);
@@ -1112,7 +1167,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_state *vcpu_save_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
         TEST_ASSERT(r == 0, "Unexpected result from KVM_GET_REGS, r: %i",
                 r);
 
-	r = ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_GET_XSAVE, &state->xsave);
+	r = vcpu_save_xsave_state(vm, vcpu, state);
         TEST_ASSERT(r == 0, "Unexpected result from KVM_GET_XSAVE, r: %i",
                 r);
 
@@ -1157,7 +1212,7 @@ void vcpu_load_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, struct kvm_x86_state *s
 	struct vcpu *vcpu = vcpu_find(vm, vcpuid);
 	int r;
 
-	r = ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_SET_XSAVE, &state->xsave);
+	r = ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_SET_XSAVE, state->xsave);
         TEST_ASSERT(r == 0, "Unexpected result from KVM_SET_XSAVE, r: %i",
                 r);
 
@@ -1198,6 +1253,12 @@ void vcpu_load_state(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, struct kvm_x86_state *s
 	}
 }
 
+void kvm_x86_state_cleanup(struct kvm_x86_state *state)
+{
+	free(state->xsave);
+	free(state);
+}
+
 bool is_intel_cpu(void)
 {
 	int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c
index 2b46dcca86a8..4c7841dfd481 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void save_restore_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	vcpu_set_hv_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID);
 	vcpu_enable_evmcs(vm, VCPU_ID);
 	vcpu_load_state(vm, VCPU_ID, state);
-	free(state);
+	kvm_x86_state_cleanup(state);
 
 	memset(&regs2, 0, sizeof(regs2));
 	vcpu_regs_get(vm, VCPU_ID, &regs2);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c
index d0fe2fdce58c..2da8eb8e2d96 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		vcpu_set_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID, kvm_get_supported_cpuid());
 		vcpu_load_state(vm, VCPU_ID, state);
 		run = vcpu_state(vm, VCPU_ID);
-		free(state);
+		kvm_x86_state_cleanup(state);
 	}
 
 done:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c
index 32854c1462ad..2e0a92da8ff5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		vcpu_set_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID, kvm_get_supported_cpuid());
 		vcpu_load_state(vm, VCPU_ID, state);
 		run = vcpu_state(vm, VCPU_ID);
-		free(state);
+		kvm_x86_state_cleanup(state);
 
 		memset(&regs2, 0, sizeof(regs2));
 		vcpu_regs_get(vm, VCPU_ID, &regs2);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c
index a07480aed397..ff92e25b6f1e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		vcpu_set_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID, kvm_get_supported_cpuid());
 		vcpu_load_state(vm, VCPU_ID, state);
 		run = vcpu_state(vm, VCPU_ID);
-		free(state);
+		kvm_x86_state_cleanup(state);
 
 		memset(&regs2, 0, sizeof(regs2));
 		vcpu_regs_get(vm, VCPU_ID, &regs2);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 20/21] x86/fpu: Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state()

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

KVM can disable the write emulation for the XFD MSR when the vCPU's fpstate
is already correctly sized to reduce the overhead.

When write emulation is disabled the XFD MSR state after a VMEXIT is
unknown and therefore not in sync with the software states in fpstate and
the per CPU XFD cache.

Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() which has to be invoked after a
VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when write emulation is disabled for the
XFD MSR.

It could be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is enabled
for the price of a pointless MSR read.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-21-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c     | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index e4d10155290b..a467eb80f9ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -142,8 +142,10 @@ extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatu
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 extern void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd);
+extern void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void);
 #else
 static inline void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) { }
+static inline void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void) { }
 #endif
 
 extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, unsigned int size, u32 pkru);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index de8e8c21f355..da51381cb64b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -294,6 +294,30 @@ void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd)
 	fpregs_unlock();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd);
+
+/**
+ * fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state - Synchronize XFD MSR and software state
+ *
+ * Must be invoked from KVM after a VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when
+ * XFD write emulation is disabled. This is required because the guest can
+ * freely modify XFD and the state at VMEXIT is not guaranteed to be the
+ * same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be udpated before
+ * any operation which depends on it can take place.
+ *
+ * Note: It can be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is
+ * enabled for the price of a then pointless MSR read.
+ */
+void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void)
+{
+	struct fpstate *fps = current->thread.fpu.fpstate;
+
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+	if (fpu_state_size_dynamic()) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD, fps->xfd);
+		__this_cpu_write(xfd_state, fps->xfd);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, bool enter_guest)
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 21/21] kvm: x86: Disable interception for IA32_XFD on demand

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>

Always intercepting IA32_XFD causes non-negligible overhead when this
register is updated frequently in the guest.

Disable r/w emulation after intercepting the first WRMSR(IA32_XFD)
with a non-zero value.

Disable WRMSR emulation implies that IA32_XFD becomes out-of-sync
with the software states in fpstate and the per-cpu xfd cache. This
leads to two additional changes accordingly:

  - Call fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() after vm-exit to bring
    software states back in-sync with the MSR, before handle_exit_irqoff()
    is called.

  - Always trap #NM once write interception is disabled for IA32_XFD.
    The #NM exception is rare if the guest doesn't use dynamic
    features. Otherwise, there is at most one exception per guest
    task given a dynamic feature.

p.s. We have confirmed that SDM is being revised to say that
when setting IA32_XFD[18] the AMX register state is not guaranteed
to be preserved. This clarification avoids adding mess for a creative
guest which sets IA32_XFD[18]=1 before saving active AMX state to
its own storage.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-22-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 6cbf97a2ebc4..89d1fdb39c46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -647,6 +647,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	u64 smi_count;
 	bool tpr_access_reporting;
 	bool xsaves_enabled;
+	bool xfd_no_write_intercept;
 	u64 ia32_xss;
 	u64 microcode_version;
 	u64 arch_capabilities;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b8b7f5c7b3df..15e30602782b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
 	MSR_FS_BASE,
 	MSR_GS_BASE,
 	MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD,
 	MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
 #endif
 	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
@@ -764,10 +765,11 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Trap #NM if guest xfd contains a non-zero value so guest XFD_ERR
-	 * can be saved timely.
+	 * Disabling xfd interception indicates that dynamic xfeatures
+	 * might be used in the guest. Always trap #NM in this case
+	 * to save guest xfd_err timely.
 	 */
-	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+	if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
 		eb |= (1u << NM_VECTOR);
 
 	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
@@ -1978,9 +1980,21 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
 		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
-		/* Update #NM interception according to guest xfd */
-		if (!ret)
+		/*
+		 * Always intercepting WRMSR could incur non-negligible
+		 * overhead given xfd might be changed frequently in
+		 * guest context switch. Disable write interception
+		 * upon the first write with a non-zero value (indicating
+		 * potential usage on dynamic xfeatures). Also update
+		 * exception bitmap to trap #NM for proper virtualization
+		 * of guest xfd_err.
+		 */
+		if (!ret && data) {
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD,
+						      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+			vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
 			vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+		}
 		break;
 #endif
 	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 69dd2f85abdc..f8fc7441baea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
 
 	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
-#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	14
+#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	15
 	struct {
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
 		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index bde18ca657db..60da2331ec32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10083,6 +10083,14 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
 	smp_wmb();
 
+	/*
+	 * Sync xfd before calling handle_exit_irqoff() which may
+	 * rely on the fact that guest_fpu::xfd is up-to-date (e.g.
+	 * in #NM irqoff handler).
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
+		fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state();
+
 	static_call(kvm_x86_handle_exit_irqoff)(vcpu);
 
 	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Borislav Petkov]

On Fri, Jan 07, 2022 at 01:54:56PM -0500, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> 
> vCPU threads are different from native tasks regarding to the initial XFD
> value. While all native tasks follow a fixed value (init_fpstate::xfd)
> established by the FPU core at boot, vCPU threads need to obey the reset
> value (i.e. ZERO) defined by the specification, to meet the expectation of
> the guest.
> 
> Let the caller supply an argument and adjust the host and guest related
> invocations accordingly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

If Jing is author, then tglx's SOB should come after Jing's to mean,
tglx handled it further.

As it is now, it looks wrong.

Ditto for patches 10, 11, 12, 13.

Also, I wonder if all those Signed-off-by's do mean "handled" or
Co-developed-by but I haven't tracked that particular pile so...

> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-6-yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

RE: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Tian, Kevin]

> From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Sent: Saturday, January 8, 2022 3:44 AM
> 
> On Fri, Jan 07, 2022 at 01:54:56PM -0500, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> >
> > vCPU threads are different from native tasks regarding to the initial XFD
> > value. While all native tasks follow a fixed value (init_fpstate::xfd)
> > established by the FPU core at boot, vCPU threads need to obey the reset
> > value (i.e. ZERO) defined by the specification, to meet the expectation of
> > the guest.
> >
> > Let the caller supply an argument and adjust the host and guest related
> > invocations accordingly.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> If Jing is author, then tglx's SOB should come after Jing's to mean,
> tglx handled it further.
> 
> As it is now, it looks wrong.

Thanks for pointing it out! Actually this is one area which we didn't get
a clear answer from 'submitting-patches.rst' and now possibly a good
chance to get it clarified.

This patch was handled in an interesting way due to Jing's two absences:

Internal version: Jing was the original author

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

--- Jing's first absence ---

v1: Yang was the submitter:

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>

Thomas updated it in his personal branch when reviewing v1:

	From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

--- Jing was back ---

v2-v3: Jing was the submitter:

The open here is whether Jing should change the SoB order:

	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

or just append her name again:

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

The former was selected for this patch.

--- Jing's 2nd absence ---

v4-v5: Yang was the submitter.

SoB order was partially changed (for Yang's SoB) but forgot to make Jing's
SoB as the first. It should be:

	From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>

If the rule is that SoB order should not be changed, then it will be:

	From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>

> 
> Ditto for patches 10, 11, 12, 13.
> 
> Also, I wonder if all those Signed-off-by's do mean "handled" or
> Co-developed-by but I haven't tracked that particular pile so...
> 
> > Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> > Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-6-yang.zhong@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> 
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

RE: [PATCH v6 07/21] x86/fpu: Provide fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features() for KVM

[Tian, Kevin]

Hi, Paolo,

> From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Sent: Saturday, January 8, 2022 2:55 AM
> 
> +/*
> +  * fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features - Check xfeatures against guest perm
> and enable
> +  * @guest_fpu:         Pointer to the guest FPU container
> +  * @xfeatures:         Features requested by guest CPUID
> +  *
> +  * Enable all dynamic xfeatures according to guest perm and requested
> CPUID.
> +  *
> +  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise
> +  */

Just a NIT. This function itself has nothing to do with guest CPUID
which is a caller-side policy. It simply enable xfeatures per request.

Thanks
Kevin

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Borislav Petkov]

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 05:15:44AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> Thanks for pointing it out! Actually this is one area which we didn't get
> a clear answer from 'submitting-patches.rst'

Are you sure?

I see

"Any further SoBs (Signed-off-by:'s) following the author's SoB are from
people handling and transporting the patch, but were not involved in its
development. SoB chains should reflect the **real** route a patch took
as it was propagated to the maintainers and ultimately to Linus, with
the first SoB entry signalling primary authorship of a single author."

Now, when you read that paragraph, what do you think is the answer to
your question and why?

And if that paragraph doesn't make it clear, we would have to improve
it...

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Paolo Bonzini]

On 1/10/22 09:52, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 05:15:44AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> Thanks for pointing it out! Actually this is one area which we didn't get
>> a clear answer from 'submitting-patches.rst'
> 
> Are you sure? I see
> 
> "Any further SoBs (Signed-off-by:'s) following the author's SoB are from
> people handling and transporting the patch, but were not involved in its
> development. SoB chains should reflect the **real** route a patch took
> as it was propagated to the maintainers and ultimately to Linus, with
> the first SoB entry signalling primary authorship of a single author."

Say a patch went A->B->C->A->D and all of {A,B,C} were involved in the 
development at different times.  The above text says "any further SoBs 
are from people not involved in its development", in other words it 
doesn't cover the case of multiple people handling different versions of 
a patch submission.

The only clear thing from the text would be "do not remove/move the 
author's Signed-off-by", but apart from that it's wild wild west and 
there are contradictions everywhere.

For example:

1) checkpatch.pl wants "Co-developed-by" to be immediately followed by 
"Signed-off-by".  Should we imply that all SoB entries preceded by 
Co-developed-by do not exactly reflect the route that the patch took 
(since there could be multiple back and forth)?

2) if the author sends the patches but has co-developers, should they be 
first (because they're the author) or last (because they're the one 
actually sending the patch out)?


Any consistent rules that I could come up with are too baroque to be 
practical:

1) a sequence consisting of {SoB,Co-developed-by,SoB} does not 
necessarily reflect a chain from the first signoff to the second signoff

2) if you are a maintainer committing a patch so that it will go to 
Linus, just add your SoB line.

3) if you pick up someone else's branch or posted series, and you are 
not in the existing SoB chain, you must add a Co-developed-by and SoB 
line for yourself.  Do not use the document the changes in brackets: 
that is only done by the maintainers when they make changes and do not 
repost for review.

The maintainers must already have a bad case of Stockholm syndrome for 
not having automated this kind of routine check, but it would be even 
worse if we were to inflict this on the developers.  In the end, IMHO 
the real rules that matter are:

- there should be a SoB line for the author

- the submitter must always have the last SoB line

- SoB lines shall never be removed

- maintainers should prefer merge commits when moving commits from one 
tree to the other

- merge commits should have a SoB line too

Everything else, including the existence of Co-developed-by lines, is an 
unnecessary complication.

Paolo

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Borislav Petkov]

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 03:18:26PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Say a patch went A->B->C->A->D and all of {A,B,C} were involved in the
> development at different times.  The above text says "any further SoBs are
> from people not involved in its development", in other words it doesn't
> cover the case of multiple people handling different versions of a patch
> submission.

Well, if I'm reading Kevin's mail correctly, it sounds like Thomas
updated it (and I'm pretty sure he doesn't care about Co-developed-by)
and the rest of the folks simply handled it.

In the interest of remaining practical, I'd say one doesn't have to add
Co-developed-by when one is doing contextual changes or addressing minor
review feedback, or, of course, simply handling the patch as part of a
series.

> The only clear thing from the text would be "do not remove/move the
> author's Signed-off-by", but apart from that it's wild wild west and
> there are contradictions everywhere.

The main point in that paragraph is that the SOB chain needs to denote
how that patch went upstream and who handled it on the way. So you can't
simply shorten or reorder the SOBs.

What is more, even if you cherry-pick a patch which doesn't have your
SOB at the end - for example, tglx applies a patch and I cherry-pick it
into a different branch - I must add my SOB because, well, I handled it.

> For example:
> 
> 1) checkpatch.pl wants "Co-developed-by" to be immediately followed by
> "Signed-off-by".  Should we imply that all SoB entries preceded by
> Co-developed-by do not exactly reflect the route that the patch took (since
> there could be multiple back and forth)?

Co-developed-by is to express multiple-people's authorship. And that
rule checkpatch enforces is already in submitting-patches:

"Since Co-developed-by: denotes authorship, every Co-developed-by:
must be immediately followed by a Signed-off-by: of the associated
co-author."

> 
> 2) if the author sends the patches but has co-developers, should they be
> first (because they're the author) or last (because they're the one actually
> sending the patch out)?

That is also explained there:

"Standard sign-off procedure applies, i.e. the ordering of
Signed-off-by: tags should reflect the chronological history of
the patch insofar as possible, regardless of whether the author
is attributed via From: or Co-developed-by:. Notably, the last
Signed-off-by: must always be that of the developer submitting the
patch."

> Any consistent rules that I could come up with are too baroque to be
> practical:
> 
> 1) a sequence consisting of {SoB,Co-developed-by,SoB} does not necessarily
> reflect a chain from the first signoff to the second signoff

Right, if you want to attribute co-authorship too - at least I think
this is what you mean - then you can do that according to the last
snippet I pasted. IOW, you'd need to do:

Co-developed-by: A
SOB: A
Co-developed-by: B
SOB: B
SOB: C

etc.

Or remain practical and do only an SOB chain. But it all depends
on who has co-authored what and what kind of attribution the
co-authors/handlers prefer.

> 2) if you are a maintainer committing a patch so that it will go to Linus,
> just add your SoB line.

Ack.

> 3) if you pick up someone else's branch or posted series, and you are not in
> the existing SoB chain, you must add a Co-developed-by and SoB line for
> yourself.

Just SOB, as stated above. Because you handled the patch.

> The maintainers must already have a bad case of Stockholm syndrome for not
> having automated this kind of routine check, but it would be even worse if
> we were to inflict this on the developers.

Well, usually, the SOB chain is pretty simple and straight-forward.

In this particular case, I'd simply add my SOB when I've handled the
patch. If I've done big changes and I think I'd like to be listed as an
author, I'd do Co-developed but other than that, just the SOB.

> In the end, IMHO the real rules
> that matter are:
> 
> - there should be a SoB line for the author

Yap.

> - the submitter must always have the last SoB line

Yap.

> - SoB lines shall never be removed

And their order should be kept too as the path upstream is important,
obviously.

> - maintainers should prefer merge commits when moving commits from one tree
> to the other

It depends.

> - merge commits should have a SoB line too

Yap, we do that in the tip tree and document the reason for the merge
commit.

> Everything else, including the existence of Co-developed-by lines, is an
> unnecessary complication.

See above.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Paolo Bonzini]

On 1/10/22 16:25, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> "Standard sign-off procedure applies, i.e. the ordering of
> Signed-off-by: tags should reflect the chronological history of
> the patch insofar as possible, regardless of whether the author
> is attributed via From: or Co-developed-by:. Notably, the last
> Signed-off-by: must always be that of the developer submitting the
> patch."

So this means that "the author must be the first SoB" is not an absolute 
rule.  In the case of this patch we had:

From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
...
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>


and the possibilities could be:

1) have two SoB lines for Jing (before and after Thomas)

2) add a Co-developed-by for Thomas as the first line

3) do exactly what the gang did ("remain practical and do only an SOB 
chain")

Paolo

Re: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Borislav Petkov]

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 04:55:01PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> So this means that "the author must be the first SoB" is not an absolute
> rule.  In the case of this patch we had:
> 
> From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> ...
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>

Looking at Kevin's explanation, that should be:

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>		# author
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>	# v1 submitter
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>	# handler/reviewer
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>		# v2-v3 submitter
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>	# v4-v5 submitter

> and the possibilities could be:
> 
> 1) have two SoB lines for Jing (before and after Thomas)
> 
> 2) add a Co-developed-by for Thomas as the first line

If Thomas would prefer. But then it becomes:

Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>           # author
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>        # v1 submitter
Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>	# co-author
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>     # handler/reviewer
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>           # v2-v3 submitter
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>        # v4-v5 submitter

and that means, Thomas worked on that patch *after* Yang submitted v1.
Which is the exact chronological order, as Kevin writes.

> 3) do exactly what the gang did ("remain practical and do only an SOB
> chain")

Yes, but not change the SOB order.

Because if you do that, then it doesn't state what the exact path was
the patch took and how it ended up upstream. And due to past fun stories
with SCO, we want to track exactly how a patch ended up upstream. And I
think this is the most important aspect of those SOB chains.

IMNSVHO.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

RE: [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/fpu: Make XFD initialization in __fpstate_reset() a function argument

[Tian, Kevin]

> From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2022 2:19 AM
> 
> On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 04:55:01PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > So this means that "the author must be the first SoB" is not an absolute
> > rule.  In the case of this patch we had:
> >
> > From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> > ...
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> 
> Looking at Kevin's explanation, that should be:
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>		# author
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>	# v1 submitter
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>	# handler/reviewer
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>		# v2-v3 submitter
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>	# v4-v5 submitter
> 
> > and the possibilities could be:
> >
> > 1) have two SoB lines for Jing (before and after Thomas)
> >
> > 2) add a Co-developed-by for Thomas as the first line
> 
> If Thomas would prefer. But then it becomes:
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>           # author
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>        # v1 submitter
> Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>	# co-author
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>     # handler/reviewer
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>           # v2-v3 submitter
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>        # v4-v5 submitter
> 
> and that means, Thomas worked on that patch *after* Yang submitted v1.
> Which is the exact chronological order, as Kevin writes.
> 
> > 3) do exactly what the gang did ("remain practical and do only an SOB
> > chain")
> 
> Yes, but not change the SOB order.
> 
> Because if you do that, then it doesn't state what the exact path was
> the patch took and how it ended up upstream. And due to past fun stories
> with SCO, we want to track exactly how a patch ended up upstream. And I
> think this is the most important aspect of those SOB chains.
> 

This is exactly what we'd like to get clarified in this very special case.

Since Thomas didn't put a Co-developed-by in the first place, I prefer to
respecting his choice i.e.:

	From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>

	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
	Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
	Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>

Following this rule then the SoB order in all other patches also need
be fixed, e.g. both Jing's name and Yang's name will occur twice
to reflect the chronological order in most patches. But I'm not sure 
what's the best way to handle it since Paolo already puts the entire 
series in his tip. 

Can this series gets an exempt given all participated names already
have their SoB in this special case?

If must be fixed we can certainly provide updated SoB history for
every patch. The burden might be on Paolo's side and if it does happen
I really want to say sorry here for not getting this open clarified earlier...

Thanks
Kevin

Re: [PATCH v6 19/21] kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2

[Janis Schoetterl-Glausch]

On 1/7/22 19:55, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
> 
> When KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 is supported, userspace is expected to allocate
> buffer for KVM_GET_XSAVE2 and KVM_SET_XSAVE using the size returned
> by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-20-yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h         | 16 ++++-
>  tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                |  3 +
>  .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  2 +
>  .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  | 10 +++
>  tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    | 32 +++++++++
>  .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      | 67 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/evmcs_test.c |  2 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/smm_test.c |  2 +-
>  .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/state_test.c |  2 +-
>  .../kvm/x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test.c    |  2 +-
>  10 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 

[...]

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> index 1e5ab6a92848..66775de26952 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
> @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ extern const struct vm_guest_mode_params vm_guest_mode_params[];
>  int open_path_or_exit(const char *path, int flags);
>  int open_kvm_dev_path_or_exit(void);
>  int kvm_check_cap(long cap);
> +int vm_check_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, long cap);
>  int vm_enable_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
>  int vcpu_enable_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id,
>  		    struct kvm_enable_cap *cap);
> @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_create_with_vcpus(enum vm_guest_mode mode, uint32_t nr_vcpus,
>   *   guest_code - The vCPU's entry point
>   */
>  void vm_vcpu_add_default(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid, void *guest_code);
> +void vm_xsave_req_perm(void);
> 
>  bool vm_is_unrestricted_guest(struct kvm_vm *vm);
> 

[...]

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> index ecc53d108ad8..4a645dc77f34 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
> @@ -85,6 +85,33 @@ int kvm_check_cap(long cap)
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 
> +/* VM Check Capability
> + *
> + * Input Args:
> + *   vm - Virtual Machine
> + *   cap - Capability
> + *
> + * Output Args: None
> + *
> + * Return:
> + *   On success, the Value corresponding to the capability (KVM_CAP_*)
> + *   specified by the value of cap.  On failure a TEST_ASSERT failure
> + *   is produced.
> + *
> + * Looks up and returns the value corresponding to the capability
> + * (KVM_CAP_*) given by cap.
> + */
> +int vm_check_cap(struct kvm_vm *vm, long cap)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, cap);
> +	TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0, "KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION VM IOCTL failed,\n"
> +		"  rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  /* VM Enable Capability
>   *
>   * Input Args:
> @@ -366,6 +393,11 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_create_with_vcpus(enum vm_guest_mode mode, uint32_t nr_vcpus,
>  	struct kvm_vm *vm;
>  	int i;
> 
> +	/*
> +	 * Permission needs to be requested before KVM_SET_CPUID2.
> +	 */
> +	vm_xsave_req_perm();
> +

Since

79e06c4c4950 (Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm)

on s390x I'm getting:

/usr/bin/ld: tools/testing/selftests/kvm/libkvm.a(kvm_util.o): in function `vm_create_with_vcpus':
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c:399: undefined reference to `vm_xsave_req_perm'
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make: *** [../lib.mk:146: tools/testing/selftests/kvm/s390x/memop] Error 1

Looks like it only exists for x86.
v2 had a comment about unconditional enablement:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/e20f590b-b9d9-237d-3b9c-77dd82a24b40@redhat.com/

Thanks for having a look.

>  	/* Force slot0 memory size not small than DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES */
>  	if (slot0_mem_pages < DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES)
>  		slot0_mem_pages = DEFAULT_GUEST_PHY_PAGES;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
> index eef7b34756d5..f19d6d201977 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
> @@ -650,6 +650,45 @@ static void vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vm *vm, int vcpuid)
>  	vcpu_sregs_set(vm, vcpuid, &sregs);
>  }
> 
> +#define CPUID_XFD_BIT (1 << 4)
> +static bool is_xfd_supported(void)
> +{
> +	int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	const int leaf = 0xd, subleaf = 0x1;
> +
> +	__asm__ __volatile__(
> +		"cpuid"
> +		: /* output */ "=a"(eax), "=b"(ebx),
> +		  "=c"(ecx), "=d"(edx)
> +		: /* input */ "0"(leaf), "2"(subleaf));
> +
> +	return !!(eax & CPUID_XFD_BIT);
> +}
> +
> +void vm_xsave_req_perm(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long bitmask;
> +	long rc;
> +
> +	if (!is_xfd_supported())
> +		return;
> +
> +	rc = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM,
> +		     XSTATE_XTILE_DATA_BIT);
> +	/*
> +	 * The older kernel version(<5.15) can't support
> +	 * ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and directly return.
> +	 */
> +	if (rc)
> +		return;
> +
> +	rc = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM, &bitmask);
> +	TEST_ASSERT(rc == 0, "prctl(ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) error: %ld", rc);
> +	TEST_ASSERT(bitmask & XFEATURE_XTILE_MASK,
> +		    "prctl(ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) failure bitmask=0x%lx",
> +		    bitmask);
> +}
> +

[...]

RE: [PATCH v6 19/21] kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2

[Wang, Wei W]

On Tuesday, January 18, 2022 12:51 AM, Janis Schoetterl-Glausch wrote:
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Permission needs to be requested before KVM_SET_CPUID2.
> > +	 */
> > +	vm_xsave_req_perm();
> > +
> 
> Since
> 
> 79e06c4c4950 (Merge tag 'for-linus' of
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm)
> 
> on s390x I'm getting:
> 
> /usr/bin/ld: tools/testing/selftests/kvm/libkvm.a(kvm_util.o): in function
> `vm_create_with_vcpus':
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c:399: undefined reference to
> `vm_xsave_req_perm'
> collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
> make: *** [../lib.mk:146: tools/testing/selftests/kvm/s390x/memop] Error 1
> 
> Looks like it only exists for x86.
> v2 had a comment about unconditional enablement:
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/e20f590b-b9d9-237d-3b9c-77dd82a24b40@redh
> at.com/
> 
> Thanks for having a look.
> 


OK, we made it conditionally enabled at runtime, but this one requires conditionally compiled. I'll get you a patch to test soon.

Thanks,
Wei

Re: [PATCH v6 04/21] kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID

[Like Xu]

On 8/1/2022 2:54 am, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> 
> KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in
> CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise
> a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to
> KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a
> dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is
> required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic
> bit.
> 
> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-5-yang.zhong@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>   Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 4 ++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           | 9 ++++++---
>   2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> index 6b683dfea8f2..f4ea5e41a4d0 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> @@ -1687,6 +1687,10 @@ userspace capabilities, and with user requirements (for example, the
>   user may wish to constrain cpuid to emulate older hardware, or for
>   feature consistency across a cluster).
>   
> +Dynamically-enabled feature bits need to be requested with
> +``arch_prctl()`` before calling this ioctl. Feature bits that have not
> +been requested are excluded from the result.
> +
>   Note that certain capabilities, such as KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS, may
>   expose cpuid features (e.g. MONITOR) which are not supported by kvm in
>   its default configuration. If userspace enables such capabilities, it
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index f3e6fda6b858..eb52dde5deec 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -815,11 +815,13 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
>   				goto out;
>   		}
>   		break;
> -	case 0xd:
> -		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0;
> +	case 0xd: {
> +		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
> +
> +		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0 & guest_perm;
>   		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0, false);

If we choose to exclude unpermitted xfeatures in the entry->eax, why do
we choose to expose the size of unpermitted xfeatures in ebx and ecx?

This seems to be an inconsistency, how about:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 1bd4d560cbdd..193cbf56a5fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -888,12 +888,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array 
*array, u32 function)
  		}
  		break;
  	case 0xd: {
-		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
+		u64 supported_xcr0 = supported_xcr0 & xstate_get_guest_group_perm();

-		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0 & guest_perm;
+		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0;
  		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0, false);
  		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
-		entry->edx &= (supported_xcr0 & guest_perm) >> 32;
+		entry->edx &= supported_xcr0 >> 32;
  		if (!supported_xcr0)
  			break;

It also helps to fix the CPUID_D_1_EBX and later for (i = 2; i < 64; ++i);

Is there anything I've missed ?

>   		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
> -		entry->edx &= supported_xcr0 >> 32;
> +		entry->edx &= (supported_xcr0 & guest_perm) >> 32;
>   		if (!supported_xcr0)
>   			break;
>   
> @@ -866,6 +868,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
>   			entry->edx = 0;
>   		}
>   		break;
> +	}
>   	case 0x12:
>   		/* Intel SGX */
>   		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {

RE: [PATCH v6 04/21] kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID

[Tian, Kevin]

> From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
> Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 2:22 PM
> 
> On 8/1/2022 2:54 am, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > From: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> >
> > KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in
> > CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise
> > a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to
> > KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a
> > dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is
> > required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic
> > bit.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
> > Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-5-yang.zhong@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >   Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 4 ++++
> >   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           | 9 ++++++---
> >   2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> > index 6b683dfea8f2..f4ea5e41a4d0 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> > @@ -1687,6 +1687,10 @@ userspace capabilities, and with user
> requirements (for example, the
> >   user may wish to constrain cpuid to emulate older hardware, or for
> >   feature consistency across a cluster).
> >
> > +Dynamically-enabled feature bits need to be requested with
> > +``arch_prctl()`` before calling this ioctl. Feature bits that have not
> > +been requested are excluded from the result.
> > +
> >   Note that certain capabilities, such as KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS, may
> >   expose cpuid features (e.g. MONITOR) which are not supported by kvm in
> >   its default configuration. If userspace enables such capabilities, it
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > index f3e6fda6b858..eb52dde5deec 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > @@ -815,11 +815,13 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
> kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
> >   				goto out;
> >   		}
> >   		break;
> > -	case 0xd:
> > -		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0;
> > +	case 0xd: {
> > +		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
> > +
> > +		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0 & guest_perm;
> >   		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0, false);
> 
> If we choose to exclude unpermitted xfeatures in the entry->eax, why do
> we choose to expose the size of unpermitted xfeatures in ebx and ecx?
> 
> This seems to be an inconsistency, how about:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 1bd4d560cbdd..193cbf56a5fa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -888,12 +888,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
> kvm_cpuid_array
> *array, u32 function)
>   		}
>   		break;
>   	case 0xd: {
> -		u64 guest_perm = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
> +		u64 supported_xcr0 = supported_xcr0 &
> xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
> 
> -		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0 & guest_perm;
> +		entry->eax &= supported_xcr0;
>   		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported_xcr0, false);
>   		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
> -		entry->edx &= (supported_xcr0 & guest_perm) >> 32;
> +		entry->edx &= supported_xcr0 >> 32;
>   		if (!supported_xcr0)
>   			break;
> 
> It also helps to fix the CPUID_D_1_EBX and later for (i = 2; i < 64; ++i);
> 
> Is there anything I've missed ?

No, you are correct. Would you please send out a formal fix?

> 
> >   		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
> > -		entry->edx &= supported_xcr0 >> 32;
> > +		entry->edx &= (supported_xcr0 & guest_perm) >> 32;
> >   		if (!supported_xcr0)
> >   			break;
> >
> > @@ -866,6 +868,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
> kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
> >   			entry->edx = 0;
> >   		}
> >   		break;
> > +	}
> >   	case 0x12:
> >   		/* Intel SGX */
> >   		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {