linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Double-check to avoid buffer overflow
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 10:36:50 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220118183650.3386989-1-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)

When building with -Warray-bounds, this warning was emitted:

In function 'memset',
    inlined from 'vtpm_proxy_fops_read' at drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c:102:2:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:43:33: warning: '__builtin_memset' pointer overflow between offset 164 and size [2147483648, 4294967295]
[-Warray-bounds]
   43 | #define __underlying_memset     __builtin_memset
      |                                 ^

There was no checking of the req_len value. To keep this code robust,
and to silence the compiler warning, check the size before attempting
a memset().

Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4b59d305-6858-1514-751a-37853ad777be@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220113002727.3709495-1-keescook@chromium.org
v2: make commit log more accurate, add Reviewed-by
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
index 91c772e38bb5..5c865987ba5c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 	len = proxy_dev->req_len;
 
-	if (count < len) {
+	if (count < len || len > sizeof(proxy_dev->buffer)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&proxy_dev->buf_lock);
 		pr_debug("Invalid size in recv: count=%zd, req_len=%zd\n",
 			 count, len);
-- 
2.30.2


             reply	other threads:[~2022-01-18 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-18 18:36 Kees Cook [this message]
2022-01-18 19:32 ` [PATCH v2] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Double-check to avoid buffer overflow Jann Horn
2022-01-18 19:39   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-01-18 21:20     ` Kees Cook
2022-01-18 23:33       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-01-19  0:42       ` Jann Horn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220118183650.3386989-1-keescook@chromium.org \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
    --cc=stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).