From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
joao.moreira@intel.com, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2022 13:18:05 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220130211838.8382-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is
enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Yu-cheng v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.
Yu-cheng v24:
- Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.
arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ebe8fc76949a..b9efa0fd906d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
depends on 64BIT
# Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
+ select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
@@ -1940,6 +1941,27 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK
+ prompt "Intel Shadow Stack"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ help
+ Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+ Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
+ processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature
+ increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+ See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-30 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 154+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-30 21:18 [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 01/35] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-02-07 22:39 ` [PATCH 02/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 8:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-08 20:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-08 8:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 03/35] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 22:45 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 20:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-09 1:10 ` Kees Cook
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 04/35] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 22:49 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 20:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 05/35] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 23:28 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 21:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 06/35] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 23:56 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 22:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 07/35] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08 0:13 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 22:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 08/35] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 09/35] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08 1:05 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 10/35] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 16:58 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-11 1:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11 7:13 ` Wang, Zhi A
2022-02-12 1:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 11/35] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 18:00 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 12/35] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 18:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 13/35] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 14/35] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:55 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 15/35] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 19:06 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 16/35] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 17/35] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 18/35] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:23 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 22:38 ` David Laight
2022-02-10 23:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11 9:08 ` David Laight
2022-02-10 22:43 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 23:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-10 23:40 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11 17:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-12 0:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 19/35] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:27 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 20/35] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-09 22:52 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 22:45 ` David Laight
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 21/35] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-10 19:27 ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 22/35] x86/mm: Prevent VM_WRITE shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-11 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12 1:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 23/35] x86/fpu: Add helpers for modifying supervisor xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08 8:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-09 19:55 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-12 0:27 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12 2:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 24/35] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 25/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-11 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12 0:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-12 0:11 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12 0:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 26/35] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08 8:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-11 2:09 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-14 12:33 ` Jann Horn
2022-02-15 1:22 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-15 8:49 ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 27/35] x86/fpu: Add unsafe xsave buffer helpers Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 28/35] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 29/35] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 30/35] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 31/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl elf feature functions Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 32/35] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 33/35] selftests/x86: Add map_shadow_stack syscall test Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-03 22:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-04 1:22 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 34/35] x86/cet/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-31 7:56 ` Florian Weimer
2022-01-31 18:26 ` H.J. Lu
2022-01-31 18:45 ` Florian Weimer
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 35/35] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-03 21:58 ` John Allen
2022-02-03 22:23 ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-04 22:21 ` John Allen
2022-02-03 21:07 ` [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-04 1:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-04 5:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-04 20:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-05 13:26 ` David Laight
2022-02-05 13:29 ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-05 20:15 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-05 20:21 ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-06 13:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-06 13:42 ` David Laight
2022-02-06 13:55 ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-07 10:22 ` Florian Weimer
2022-02-08 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-08 1:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-08 9:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-08 16:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-06 13:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-06 18:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-07 7:20 ` Adrian Reber
2022-02-07 16:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 9:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-08 9:29 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-08 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-08 17:02 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-08 21:54 ` Dmitry Safonov
2022-02-09 6:37 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-09 2:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-09 6:43 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-09 10:53 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-10 2:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-10 2:53 ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-10 13:52 ` Willgerodt, Felix
2022-02-11 7:41 ` avagin
2022-02-11 8:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 20:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 20:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-28 21:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-03 19:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-03 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-04 1:30 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-03-04 19:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-07 18:56 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-07 19:07 ` H.J. Lu
2022-05-31 11:59 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-05-31 16:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-31 16:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-05-31 17:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-31 18:00 ` H.J. Lu
2022-06-01 17:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-01 19:27 ` H.J. Lu
2022-06-01 8:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-06-01 17:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-09 18:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-07 22:21 ` David Laight
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