From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68A15C433F5 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:55:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1343945AbiBNJzT (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Feb 2022 04:55:19 -0500 Received: from mxb-00190b01.gslb.pphosted.com ([23.128.96.19]:33230 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344578AbiBNJvu (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Feb 2022 04:51:50 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 54A8179850; Mon, 14 Feb 2022 01:43:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F2B2EB80DCE; Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:43:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D63B7C340E9; Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:42:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1644831779; bh=fv+WkH1spk8VErTFjZqgX1hkHlHoiWogpK/zEzaVGAA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=OxZj5pUDs4NUgEAIBomLl9I6s7K8sbafCTye5fAKFBR4to6lzbYI6LkKTSRETyMDG 1laKswR/d6MohfLuNYXk/8HusknhXdRJ9Wg4shHJZB/5OVqRnAVrL5gWo1g36tmDy6 X8308ItoQrpdQLfDMmTxcRk8ZN4ZmRhiLoGJP5xs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, Jann Horn Subject: [PATCH 5.10 093/116] net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 10:26:32 +0100 Message-Id: <20220214092501.984699512@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220214092458.668376521@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220214092458.668376521@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Jann Horn commit 57bc3d3ae8c14df3ceb4e17d26ddf9eeab304581 upstream. ax88179_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular: - The metadata array (hdr_off..hdr_off+2*pkt_cnt) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips. - A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack. - A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data. I have tested that this can be used by a malicious USB device to send a bogus ICMPv6 Echo Request and receive an ICMPv6 Echo Reply in response that contains random kernel heap data. It's probably also possible to get OOB writes from this on a little-endian system somehow - maybe by triggering skb_cow() via IP options processing -, but I haven't tested that. Fixes: e2ca90c276e1 ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1467,58 +1467,68 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbne u16 hdr_off; u32 *pkt_hdr; - /* This check is no longer done by usbnet */ - if (skb->len < dev->net->hard_header_len) + /* At the end of the SKB, there's a header telling us how many packets + * are bundled into this buffer and where we can find an array of + * per-packet metadata (which contains elements encoded into u16). + */ + if (skb->len < 4) return 0; - skb_trim(skb, skb->len - 4); rx_hdr = get_unaligned_le32(skb_tail_pointer(skb)); - pkt_cnt = (u16)rx_hdr; hdr_off = (u16)(rx_hdr >> 16); + + if (pkt_cnt == 0) + return 0; + + /* Make sure that the bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB + * (and in front of the counter at the end). + */ + if (pkt_cnt * 2 + hdr_off > skb->len) + return 0; pkt_hdr = (u32 *)(skb->data + hdr_off); - while (pkt_cnt--) { + /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ + skb_trim(skb, hdr_off); + + for (; ; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { u16 pkt_len; le32_to_cpus(pkt_hdr); pkt_len = (*pkt_hdr >> 16) & 0x1fff; - /* Check CRC or runt packet */ - if ((*pkt_hdr & AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR) || - (*pkt_hdr & AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) { - skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8); - pkt_hdr++; - continue; - } - - if (pkt_cnt == 0) { - skb->len = pkt_len; - /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ - skb_pull(skb, 2); - skb_set_tail_pointer(skb, skb->len); - skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); - ax88179_rx_checksum(skb, pkt_hdr); - return 1; - } + if (pkt_len > skb->len) + return 0; - ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (ax_skb) { + /* Check CRC or runt packet */ + if (((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) == 0) && + pkt_len >= 2 + ETH_HLEN) { + bool last = (pkt_cnt == 0); + + if (last) { + ax_skb = skb; + } else { + ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ax_skb) + return 0; + } ax_skb->len = pkt_len; /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); skb_set_tail_pointer(ax_skb, ax_skb->len); ax_skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); + + if (last) + return 1; + usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); - } else { - return 0; } - skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8); - pkt_hdr++; + /* Trim this packet away from the SKB */ + if (!skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8)) + return 0; } - return 1; } static struct sk_buff *