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Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Dominik Brodowski , Sultan Alsawaf , Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , Theodore Ts'o Subject: [PATCH] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 19:55:11 +0100 Message-Id: <20220223185511.628452-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here. But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak fast_mix() function. The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: Sultan Alsawaf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 536237a0f073..9fb06fc298d3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -443,10 +443,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than * nothing. * - * There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one - * hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply - * xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. - * * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be @@ -455,19 +451,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, - bool fast, bool account) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) { static int crng_init_cnt = 0; + struct blake2s_state hash; unsigned long flags; - if (fast) { - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags)) - return 0; - } else { - spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); - } + blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); return 0; @@ -476,21 +468,9 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, if (account) len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - if (fast) { - const u8 *src = input; - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) - base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % - sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; - } else { - struct blake2s_state hash; - - blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); - blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); - blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); - } + blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); + blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key); if (account) { crng_init_cnt += len; @@ -1040,7 +1020,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) unsigned long flags; if (crng_init == 0 && size) - crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false); + crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); @@ -1157,7 +1137,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, false, true); + size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret; @@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) local_irq_enable(); mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_entropy_bits(1); + + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) + crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true); + else + credit_entropy_bits(1); + memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); } @@ -1331,24 +1316,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_mix(fast_pool->pool32); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - if (new_count >= 64 && - crng_pre_init_inject(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32), - true, true) > 0) { - fast_pool->count = 0; - fast_pool->last = now; - if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) { - _mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)); - spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock); - } - } - return; - } - if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if (new_count < 64 && (!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ) || + unlikely(crng_init == 0))) return; if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) -- 2.35.1