From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B83F5C433F5 for ; Fri, 4 Mar 2022 09:39:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239233AbiCDJkl (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Mar 2022 04:40:41 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54872 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239216AbiCDJh4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Mar 2022 04:37:56 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0689C1AA04F; Fri, 4 Mar 2022 01:36:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B1900B827B1; Fri, 4 Mar 2022 09:36:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2ECFDC340E9; Fri, 4 Mar 2022 09:36:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1646386585; bh=RysmT+LMcL7CcpTbcFEHYgnbXGPnkMn9nXWQC+7jnwQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=D1Lu1XiBXLAfS47x5JoNRhFXBRxeA60mOqx9qyQskBf/8h4u7xIjYB3IHNe9xpM4z KKndUrIen8ZKb2cIafCmhRx4YWhaAzIAMCqchHdCRogMreJwaMMAR1JVVaUaU/raRT Ew0QQq2jkR31VfRbpKzfKgZ+QtX/SsSRLlfhAj0lSRmxgZPyp9U3To6iKcMY0qDqCY z4SKI6Z86pKsxJmygN/CQwSnq8x5PHhea5bS2GzKctN27+AVy/K3iQQ6i7RbYSkzQD pdXo1YnTLrg1yt0Fvttw70EulSJCI+9M2fCS02jL35LuUbyoSDeGMJagjV+uGC/qNx 5/TF1KdEJxXMw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nathaniel McCallum , Reinette Chatre , Andy Lutomirski , Jarkko Sakkinen , Dave Hansen , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)), "H. Peter Anvin" , Jonathan Corbet , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)), linux-doc@vger.kernel.org (open list:DOCUMENTATION) Subject: [RFC PATCH v2.1 05/30] Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 11:34:59 +0200 Message-Id: <20220304093524.397485-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220304093524.397485-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20220304093524.397485-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Reinette Chatre Provide summary of the various permissions involved in managing access to enclave pages. This summary documents the foundation for additions related to runtime managing of enclave page permissions that is made possible with SGX2. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst index 265568a9292c..89ff924b1480 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst @@ -71,16 +71,34 @@ The processor tracks EPC pages in a hardware metadata structure called the which describes the owning enclave, access rights and page type among the other things. -EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. This prevents the -kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes to -remain read-only. EPCM permissions may only impose additional restrictions on -top of normal x86 page permissions. - For all intents and purposes, the SGX architecture allows the processor to invalidate all EPCM entries at will. This requires that software be prepared to handle an EPCM fault at any time. In practice, this can happen on events like power transitions when the ephemeral key that encrypts enclave memory is lost. +Details about enclave page permissions +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. This prevents the +kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes +to remain read-only. + +Three permission masks are relevant to SGX: + +* EPCM permissions. +* Page Table Entry (PTE) permissions. +* Virtual Memory Area (VMA) permissions. + +An enclave is only able to access an enclave page if all three permission +masks enable it to do so. + +The relationships between the different permission masks are: + +* An SGX VMA can only be created if its permissions are the same or weaker + than the EPCM permissions. +* PTEs are installed to match the EPCM permissions, but not be more + relaxed than the VMA permissions. + Application interface ===================== -- 2.35.1