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Shutemov" To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Dave Hansen Subject: [PATCHv7 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 18:30:35 +0300 Message-Id: <20220318153048.51177-18-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220318153048.51177-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20220318153048.51177-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan TDX hypervisors cannot emulate instructions directly. This includes port I/O which is normally emulated in the hypervisor. All port I/O instructions inside TDX trigger the #VE exception in the guest and would be normally emulated there. Use a hypercall to emulate port I/O. Extend the tdx_handle_virt_exception() and add support to handle the #VE due to port I/O instructions. String I/O operations are not supported in TDX. Unroll them by declaring CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO confidential computing attribute. == Userspace Implications == The ioperm() facility allows userspace access to I/O instructions like inb/outb. Among other things, this allows writing userspace device drivers. This series has no special handling for ioperm(). Users will be able to successfully request I/O permissions but will induce a #VE on their first I/O instruction which leads SIGSEGV. If this is undesirable users can enable kernel lockdown feature with 'lockdown=integrity' kernel command line option. It makes ioperm() fail. More robust handling of this situation (denying ioperm() in all TDX guests) will be addressed in follow-on work. Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 7 +++- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index 3f3008783e05..df08edc94f9b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -18,7 +18,12 @@ static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init; static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) { - return false; + switch (attr) { + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO: + return true; + default: + return false; + } } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index ab10bc73a7c5..e47e2ed6b03e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ #define EPT_READ 0 #define EPT_WRITE 1 +/* Port I/O direction */ +#define PORT_READ 0 +#define PORT_WRITE 1 + +/* See Exit Qualification for I/O Instructions in VMX documentation */ +#define VE_IS_IO_IN(e) ((e) & BIT(3)) +#define VE_GET_IO_SIZE(e) (((e) & GENMASK(2, 0)) + 1) +#define VE_GET_PORT_NUM(e) ((e) >> 16) +#define VE_IS_IO_STRING(e) ((e) & BIT(4)) + /* * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from * return code. @@ -341,6 +351,73 @@ static bool handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve) return true; } +static bool handle_in(struct pt_regs *regs, int size, int port) +{ + struct tdx_hypercall_args args = { + .r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD, + .r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION), + .r12 = size, + .r13 = PORT_READ, + .r14 = port, + }; + u64 mask = GENMASK(BITS_PER_BYTE * size, 0); + bool success; + + /* + * Emulate the I/O read via hypercall. More info about ABI can be found + * in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) section titled + * "TDG.VP.VMCALL". + */ + success = !__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT); + + /* Update part of the register affected by the emulated instruction */ + regs->ax &= ~mask; + if (success) + regs->ax |= args.r11 & mask; + + return success; +} + +static bool handle_out(struct pt_regs *regs, int size, int port) +{ + u64 mask = GENMASK(BITS_PER_BYTE * size, 0); + + /* + * Emulate the I/O write via hypercall. More info about ABI can be found + * in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) section titled + * "TDG.VP.VMCALL". + */ + return !_tdx_hypercall(hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION), size, + PORT_WRITE, port, regs->ax & mask); +} + +/* + * Emulate I/O using hypercall. + * + * Assumes the IO instruction was using ax, which is enforced + * by the standard io.h macros. + * + * Return True on success or False on failure. + */ +static bool handle_io(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 exit_qual) +{ + int size, port; + bool in; + + if (VE_IS_IO_STRING(exit_qual)) + return false; + + in = VE_IS_IO_IN(exit_qual); + size = VE_GET_IO_SIZE(exit_qual); + port = VE_GET_PORT_NUM(exit_qual); + + + if (in) + return handle_in(regs, size, port); + else + return handle_out(regs, size, port); +} + void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve) { struct tdx_module_output out; @@ -397,6 +474,8 @@ static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve) return handle_cpuid(regs); case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION: return handle_mmio(regs, ve); + case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION: + return handle_io(regs, ve->exit_qual); default: pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason); return false; -- 2.34.1