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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
	Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] hardening updates for v5.18-rc1
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 08:03:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202203210755.C56A4CD5@keescook> (raw)

Hi Linus,

Please pull these hardening updates for v5.18-rc1. A notable change is
support for arm64 Shadow Call Stack under GCC 12, which was originally
proposed[1] as a kernel-specific gcc plugin, but was instead implemented
in upstream[2] GCC.

Thanks!

-Kees

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/1632069436-25075-1-git-send-email-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com/
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e

The following changes since commit 26291c54e111ff6ba87a164d85d4a4e134b7315c:

  Linux 5.17-rc2 (2022-01-30 15:37:07 +0200)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git tags/hardening-v5.18-rc1

for you to fetch changes up to afcf5441b9ff22ac57244cd45ff102ebc2e32d1a:

  arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support (2022-03-10 09:22:09 -0800)

----------------------------------------------------------------
hardening updates for v5.18-rc1

- Add arm64 Shadow Call Stack support for GCC 12 (Dan Li)
- Avoid memset with stack offset randomization under Clang (Marco Elver)
- Clean up stackleak plugin to play nice with .noinstr (Kees Cook)
- Check stack depth for greater usercopy hardening coverage (Kees Cook)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Li (1):
      arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support

Kees Cook (6):
      gcc-plugins/stackleak: Provide verbose mode
      gcc-plugins/stackleak: Exactly match strings instead of prefixes
      gcc-plugins/stackleak: Ignore .noinstr.text and .entry.text
      usercopy: Check valid lifetime via stack depth
      xtensa: Implement "current_stack_pointer"
      m68k: Implement "current_stack_pointer"

Marco Elver (2):
      stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
      stack: Constrain and fix stack offset randomization with Clang builds

 arch/Kconfig                           | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 arch/arm/Kconfig                       |  1 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                     |  3 ++-
 arch/m68k/Kconfig                      |  1 +
 arch/m68k/include/asm/current.h        |  4 +++-
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                   |  1 +
 arch/s390/Kconfig                      |  1 +
 arch/sh/Kconfig                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                       |  1 +
 arch/xtensa/Kconfig                    |  1 +
 arch/xtensa/include/asm/current.h      |  2 ++
 arch/xtensa/include/asm/stacktrace.h   |  8 +++----
 arch/xtensa/kernel/irq.c               |  3 +--
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h           |  4 ++++
 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h       | 21 +++++++++++++++--
 init/main.c                            |  2 +-
 mm/Kconfig                             |  9 +++++++
 mm/usercopy.c                          | 23 ++++++++++++++++--
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins           |  2 ++
 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----
 security/Kconfig.hardening             | 10 ++++++++
 21 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

-- 
Kees Cook

             reply	other threads:[~2022-03-21 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-21 15:03 Kees Cook [this message]
2022-03-22  3:06 ` [GIT PULL] hardening updates for v5.18-rc1 pr-tracker-bot

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