From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26380C433EF for ; Sat, 21 May 2022 02:46:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1354379AbiEUCql (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 May 2022 22:46:41 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39182 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239378AbiEUCqh (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 May 2022 22:46:37 -0400 Received: from mail.hallyn.com (mail.hallyn.com [178.63.66.53]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BBFAB5B895; Fri, 20 May 2022 19:46:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 26D073F4; Fri, 20 May 2022 21:46:33 -0500 (CDT) Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 21:46:33 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Stefan Berger Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, jpenumak@redhat.com, Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 04/26] ima: Move arch_policy_entry into ima_namespace Message-ID: <20220521024633.GB9107@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20220420140633.753772-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20220420140633.753772-5-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220420140633.753772-5-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:11AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > The architecture-specific policy rules, currently defined for EFI and > powerpc, require the kexec kernel image and kernel modules to be > validly signed and measured, based on the system's secure boot and/or > trusted boot mode and the IMA_ARCH_POLICY Kconfig option being enabled. > > To avoid special-casing init_ima_ns as much as possible, move the > arch_policy_entry into the ima_namespace. > > When freeing the arch_policy_entry set the pointer to NULL. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger > Acked-by: Christian Brauner > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ > 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 9bcde1a24e74..2305bf223a98 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ struct ima_namespace { > > struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules; /* Pointer to the current policy */ > int ima_policy_flag; > + > + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ > + struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry; > } __randomize_layout; > extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c > index c919a456b525..ae33621c3955 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ static int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns) > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ima_temp_rules); > ns->ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ns->ima_default_rules); > ns->ima_policy_flag = 0; > + ns->arch_policy_entry = NULL; > > return 0; > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 69b19f4d5fee..0a7c61ca3265 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -228,9 +228,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { > {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, > }; > > -/* An array of architecture specific rules */ > -static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; > - > static int ima_policy __initdata; > > static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) > @@ -859,9 +856,10 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) > for (rules = arch_rules; *rules != NULL; rules++) > arch_entries++; > > - arch_policy_entry = kcalloc(arch_entries + 1, > - sizeof(*arch_policy_entry), GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!arch_policy_entry) > + ns->arch_policy_entry = kcalloc(arch_entries + 1, > + sizeof(*ns->arch_policy_entry), > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!ns->arch_policy_entry) > return 0; > > /* Convert each policy string rules to struct ima_rule_entry format */ > @@ -871,13 +869,13 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) > > result = strscpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule)); > > - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list); > - result = ima_parse_rule(ns, rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->arch_policy_entry[i].list); > + result = ima_parse_rule(ns, rule, &ns->arch_policy_entry[i]); > if (result) { > pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n", > rule); > - memset(&arch_policy_entry[i], 0, > - sizeof(*arch_policy_entry)); > + memset(&ns->arch_policy_entry[i], 0, > + sizeof(ns->arch_policy_entry[i])); > continue; > } > i++; > @@ -925,7 +923,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) > if (!arch_entries) > pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); > else > - add_rules(ns, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, > + add_rules(ns, ns->arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, > IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); > > /* > @@ -1005,7 +1003,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns) > * on boot. After loading a custom policy, free the > * architecture specific rules stored as an array. > */ > - kfree(arch_policy_entry); > + kfree(ns->arch_policy_entry); > + ns->arch_policy_entry = NULL; So the thing that prevents multiple racing occurances of the above two lines is that ima_open_policy() sets IMA_FS_BUSY (or returns EBUSY) and then removes this file before clearing the flag, right? Seems good. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn > } > ima_update_policy_flags(ns); > > -- > 2.34.1