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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 081/240] random: make more consistent use of integer types
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:49:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220620124741.148137166@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 04ec96b768c9dd43946b047c3da60dcc66431370 upstream.

We've been using a flurry of int, unsigned int, size_t, and ssize_t.
Let's unify all of this into size_t where it makes sense, as it does in
most places, and leave ssize_t for return values with possible errors.

In addition, keeping with the convention of other functions in this
file, functions that are dealing with raw bytes now take void *
consistently instead of a mix of that and u8 *, because much of the time
we're actually passing some other structure that is then interpreted as
bytes by the function.

We also take the opportunity to fix the outdated and incorrect comment
in get_random_bytes_arch().

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c         |  125 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 include/linux/hw_random.h     |    2 
 include/linux/random.h        |   10 +--
 include/trace/events/random.h |   79 ++++++++++++--------------
 4 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
  *
  * The primary kernel interfaces are:
  *
- *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
  *	u32 get_random_u32()
  *	u64 get_random_u64()
  *	unsigned int get_random_int()
@@ -97,14 +97,14 @@
  * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
  * from the devices are:
  *
- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
  *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
  *                                unsigned int value);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
  *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
- *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
+ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
  * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int crng_init = 0;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
 static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
 	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
 static struct {
 	struct blake2s_state hash;
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	int entropy_count;
+	unsigned int entropy_count;
 } input_pool = {
 	.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
 		    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
@@ -308,18 +308,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(void);
  * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
  * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
 }
 
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
-{
-	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
-}
-
-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -383,18 +377,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
+static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
 {
-	int entropy_count, orig;
+	unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
 
-	if (nbits <= 0)
+	if (!nbits)
 		return;
 
-	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
+	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
 
 	do {
 		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-		entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits);
+		entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
 	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
 
 	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
@@ -441,10 +435,10 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v
  * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
  * bytes processed from cp.
  */
-static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
+static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	u8 *p;
+	const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;
 	size_t ret = 0;
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
@@ -453,10 +447,9 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	p = base_crng.key;
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-		p[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *cp;
-		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
+		base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src;
+		src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
 	}
 	if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
@@ -480,7 +473,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c
  * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very
  * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
  */
-static void crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
+static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct blake2s_state hash;
@@ -654,14 +647,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
 static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
-	ssize_t ret = 0, len;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	size_t len;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
 	if (!nbytes)
 		return 0;
 
-	len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
+	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
 	crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len);
 
 	if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len))
@@ -681,7 +675,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
-		len = min_t(ssize_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
@@ -719,7 +713,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state {
  * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
  * identical devices.
  */
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -747,7 +741,7 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_tim
  * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
  *
  */
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
 {
 	struct {
 		long jiffies;
@@ -791,7 +785,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
 	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
 	 */
-	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
+	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
 }
 
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
@@ -872,8 +866,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
 
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
-		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
-		    crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
+		if (fast_pool->count >= 64 &&
+		    crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
 			fast_pool->count = 0;
 			fast_pool->last = now;
 			if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) {
@@ -891,7 +885,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 		return;
 
 	fast_pool->last = now;
-	__mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
 	spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock);
 
 	fast_pool->count = 0;
@@ -1000,18 +994,18 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
  * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
  * at any point prior.
  */
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	ssize_t len;
+	size_t len;
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
 	if (!nbytes)
 		return;
 
-	len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
+	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
 	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
 	nbytes -= len;
 	buf += len;
@@ -1034,7 +1028,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
 	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 }
 
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	static void *previous;
 
@@ -1195,25 +1189,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback)
 
 /*
  * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available.  The arch-specific hw RNG will
- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
- * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
- * have put in a back door.
- *
- * Return number of bytes filled in.
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
  */
-int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	int left = nbytes;
+	size_t left = nbytes;
 	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
 	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+		size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
@@ -1246,12 +1234,12 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_tr
  */
 int __init rand_initialize(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	size_t i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
 	bool arch_init = true;
 	unsigned long rv;
 
-	for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
@@ -1300,7 +1288,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struc
 
 	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6);
 	ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count);
+	trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1344,19 +1332,18 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file
 	return mask;
 }
 
-static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
 {
-	size_t bytes;
-	u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	const char __user *p = buffer;
-
-	while (count > 0) {
-		bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
-		if (copy_from_user(buf, p, bytes))
+	size_t len;
+	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	while (count) {
+		len = min(count, sizeof(block));
+		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		count -= bytes;
-		p += bytes;
-		mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes);
+		count -= len;
+		ubuf += len;
+		mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
@@ -1366,7 +1353,7 @@ static int write_pool(const char __user
 static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	size_t ret;
+	int ret;
 
 	ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1462,8 +1449,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fop
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
 		flags)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1478,6 +1463,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 		count = INT_MAX;
 
 	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
+		int ret;
+
 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
@@ -1736,7 +1723,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
  * when our pool is full.
  */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
 				size_t entropy)
 {
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
@@ -1767,7 +1754,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
  * it would be regarded as device data.
  * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
  */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
 		add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct de
 extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
 extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
 /** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
+extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
 
 #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ struct random_ready_callback {
 	struct module *owner;
 };
 
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
-extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t);
+extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne
 				 unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
 
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
 extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
 #ifndef MODULE
 extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_c
 
 /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
  * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/random.h
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
 #include <linux/tracepoint.h>
 
 TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+		__field(size_t,		bytes	)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP	)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
@@ -23,18 +23,18 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
+	TP_printk("bytes %zu caller %pS",
 		__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+		__field(size_t,		bytes	)
+		__field(unsigned long,	IP	)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_byt
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
+	TP_printk("input pool: bytes %zu caller %pS",
 		  __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
 );
@@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
-	TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t bits, size_t entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	bits			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+		__field(size_t,		bits			)
+		__field(size_t,		entropy_count		)
 		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
@@ -75,34 +75,34 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+	TP_printk("input pool: bits %zu entropy_count %zu caller %pS",
 		  __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t input_bits),
 
 	TP_ARGS(input_bits),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
+		__field(size_t,	input_bits		)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
+	TP_printk("input_pool_bits %zu", __entry->input_bits)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
+	TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, size_t input_bits),
 
 	TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	dev_t,	dev			)
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
+		__field(dev_t,		dev			)
+		__field(size_t,		input_bits		)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
@@ -110,17 +110,17 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
 		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
+	TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %zu", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
 		  MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
+		__field(size_t,		nbytes			)
 		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
@@ -129,29 +129,29 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_b
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+	TP_printk("nbytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
 );
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
 
 	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
 
 	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+		__field(  size_t,	nbytes			)
+		__field(  size_t,	entropy_count		)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
@@ -159,37 +159,34 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entr
 		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d",
+	TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu",
 		  __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count)
 );
 
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
 
 	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
+	TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
 
-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
+		__field( size_t,	nbytes		)
+		__field( size_t,	entropy_count	)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
+		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
+		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
-		  "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
-		  __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
+	TP_printk("reading: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu",
+		  __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count)
 );
 
 #endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-20 13:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 249+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-20 12:48 [PATCH 5.4 000/240] 5.4.200-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 001/240] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 002/240] bpf: Fix incorrect memory charge cost calculation in stack_map_alloc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 003/240] nfc: st21nfca: fix incorrect sizing calculations in EVT_TRANSACTION Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 004/240] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 005/240] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 006/240] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 007/240] compat_ioctl: remove /dev/random commands Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 008/240] random: dont forget compat_ioctl on urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 009/240] random: Dont wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 010/240] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 011/240] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 012/240] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 013/240] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 014/240] random: remove the blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 015/240] random: delete code to pull data into pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 016/240] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 017/240] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 018/240] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 019/240] random: Add and use pr_fmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 020/240] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 021/240] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 022/240] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 023/240] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 024/240] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 025/240] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 026/240] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 027/240] linux/random.h: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 028/240] linux/random.h: Use false with bool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 029/240] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 030/240] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 031/240] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 032/240] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 033/240] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 034/240] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 035/240] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 036/240] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 037/240] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 038/240] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 039/240] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 040/240] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 041/240] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 042/240] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 043/240] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 044/240] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 045/240] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 046/240] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 047/240] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 048/240] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 049/240] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 050/240] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 051/240] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 052/240] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 053/240] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 054/240] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 055/240] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 056/240] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 057/240] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 058/240] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 059/240] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 060/240] random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 061/240] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 062/240] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 063/240] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 064/240] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 065/240] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 066/240] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 067/240] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 068/240] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 069/240] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 070/240] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 071/240] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 072/240] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 073/240] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 074/240] random: get rid of secondary crngs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 075/240] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 076/240] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 077/240] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 078/240] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 079/240] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 080/240] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 082/240] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 083/240] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 084/240] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 085/240] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 086/240] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 087/240] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 088/240] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 089/240] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 090/240] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 091/240] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 092/240] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 093/240] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 094/240] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 095/240] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 096/240] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 097/240] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:49 ` [PATCH 5.4 098/240] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 099/240] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 100/240] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 101/240] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 102/240] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 103/240] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 104/240] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 105/240] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 106/240] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 107/240] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 108/240] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 109/240] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 110/240] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 111/240] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 112/240] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 113/240] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 114/240] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 115/240] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 116/240] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 117/240] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 118/240] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 119/240] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 120/240] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 121/240] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 122/240] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 123/240] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 124/240] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 125/240] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 126/240] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 127/240] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 128/240] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 129/240] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 130/240] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 131/240] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 132/240] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 133/240] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 134/240] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 135/240] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 136/240] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 137/240] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 138/240] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 139/240] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 140/240] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 141/240] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 142/240] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 143/240] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 144/240] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 145/240] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 146/240] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 147/240] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 148/240] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 149/240] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 150/240] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 151/240] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 152/240] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 153/240] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 154/240] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 155/240] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 156/240] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 157/240] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:50 ` [PATCH 5.4 158/240] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 159/240] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 160/240] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 161/240] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 162/240] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 163/240] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 164/240] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 165/240] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 166/240] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 167/240] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 168/240] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 169/240] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 170/240] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 171/240] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 172/240] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant noise source Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 173/240] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 174/240] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 175/240] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 176/240] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 177/240] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 178/240] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 179/240] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 180/240] random: account for arch randomness in bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 181/240] powerpc/kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in __get_wchan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 182/240] ASoC: nau8822: Add operation for internal PLL off and on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 183/240] dma-debug: make things less spammy under memory pressure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 184/240] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 185/240] ASoC: cs35l36: Update digital volume TLV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 186/240] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 187/240] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 188/240] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 189/240] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 190/240] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 191/240] ASoC: es8328: Fix event generation for deemphasis control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 192/240] ASoC: wm_adsp: Fix event generation for wm_adsp_fw_put() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 193/240] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 194/240] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 195/240] scsi: lpfc: Allow reduced polling rate for nvme_admin_async_event cmd completion Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 196/240] scsi: ipr: Fix missing/incorrect resource cleanup in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 197/240] scsi: pmcraid: Fix missing " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 198/240] ALSA: hda/realtek - Add HW8326 support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 199/240] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 200/240] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 201/240] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 202/240] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 203/240] netfs: gcc-12: temporarily disable -Wattribute-warning for now Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 204/240] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 205/240] pNFS: Dont keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 206/240] clocksource: hyper-v: unexport __init-annotated hv_init_clocksource() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 207/240] i40e: Fix adding ADQ filter to TC0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 208/240] i40e: Fix calculating the number of queue pairs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 209/240] i40e: Fix call trace in setup_tx_descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 210/240] tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 211/240] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 212/240] mlxsw: spectrum_cnt: Reorder counter pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 213/240] net: bgmac: Fix an erroneous kfree() in bgmac_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 214/240] arm64: ftrace: fix branch range checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 215/240] certs/blacklist_hashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 216/240] faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures, the sequel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 217/240] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:51 ` [PATCH 5.4 218/240] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix error handling in gic_populate_ppi_partitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 219/240] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix refcount leak " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 220/240] i2c: designware: Use standard optional ref clock implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 221/240] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 222/240] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 223/240] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 224/240] usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 225/240] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 226/240] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 227/240] dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 228/240] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 229/240] ext4: make variable "count" signed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 230/240] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 231/240] ALSA: hda/realtek: fix mute/micmute LEDs for HP 440 G8 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 232/240] ALSA: hda/realtek: fix right sounds and mute/micmute LEDs for HP machine Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 233/240] virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 234/240] net/sched: act_police: more accurate MTU policing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 235/240] net: openvswitch: fix misuse of the cached connection on tuple changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 236/240] net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 237/240] arm64: kprobes: Use BRK instead of single-step when executing instructions out-of-line Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 238/240] RISC-V: fix barrier() use in <vdso/processor.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 239/240] riscv: Less inefficient gcc tishift helpers (and export their symbols) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 12:52 ` [PATCH 5.4 240/240] powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-20 17:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 000/240] 5.4.200-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-21  0:46 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-21  7:59 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-21  9:44 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-21 12:36 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-21 13:36 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-21 13:42   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-21 21:49 ` Shuah Khan

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