From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50AB5C433EF for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:36:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234124AbiFWRgD (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:36:03 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33572 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234032AbiFWRfb (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:35:31 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D96038C589; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 10:06:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E64DCB824B7; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:06:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 47B99C3411B; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:06:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1656003969; bh=GoEe6sEIejN07r76UrMEbjmS/kd7QaLhqOXxbNOh0xI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Q9qv1hrv5ZCHaWXqh4EF35YbmwQEVZpQpsWlkFS5QPJxf9CxQUlGinMnobabBsG/2 nAPZ7CyAyxQw6mHvZtXwIpUSVhQJb3hDvn8Zh84bdJisks0namQWl/7Vm3f9ePjt/a Ea4k1PNQ1BYj5fxDcYymQ/VgQXXCIR8LT0neo8/s= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Stafford Horne , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.14 147/237] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:43:01 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164347.384416064@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit fe222a6ca2d53c38433cba5d3be62a39099e708e upstream. Currently time_init() is called after rand_initialize(), but rand_initialize() makes use of the timer on various platforms, and sometimes this timer needs to be initialized by time_init() first. In order for random_get_entropy() to not return zero during early boot when it's potentially used as an entropy source, reverse the order of these two calls. The block doing random initialization was right before time_init() before, so changing the order shouldn't have any complicated effects. Cc: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Stafford Horne Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- init/main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -607,11 +607,13 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k hrtimers_init(); softirq_init(); timekeeping_init(); + time_init(); /* * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after: * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize() + * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy * - adding command line entropy @@ -621,7 +623,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line)); boot_init_stack_canary(); - time_init(); sched_clock_postinit(); printk_safe_init(); perf_event_init();