From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 48/89] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:11:22 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220722091136.055625548@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220722091133.320803732@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream.
Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.
[jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5335,6 +5335,7 @@
eibrs - enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+ ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
};
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -1037,11 +1038,12 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spect
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
static void __init
@@ -1106,12 +1108,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
- * required.
+ * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
+ * STIBP is not required.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -1143,6 +1145,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_str
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
};
static const struct {
@@ -1160,6 +1163,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
{ "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false },
};
static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@@ -1222,6 +1226,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
mitigation_options[i].secure);
return cmd;
@@ -1261,6 +1283,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
break;
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+ }
+
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
@@ -1277,6 +1307,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
@@ -1293,7 +1327,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
- if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
@@ -1304,6 +1338,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+ break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
@@ -1330,17 +1368,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/*
- * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
- * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
- * supported.
+ * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
+ * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
+ * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
+ * enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
@@ -2082,7 +2120,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_stat
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-22 9:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/89] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/89] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/89] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/89] objtool: Classify symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/89] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/89] objtool: Shrink struct instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/89] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/89] objtool: Introduce CFI hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/89] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/89] x86/asm: Fix register order Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/89] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/89] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/89] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/89] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/89] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/89] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/89] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/89] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/89] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/89] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/89] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/89] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/89] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/89] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/89] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/89] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/89] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/89] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/89] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/89] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/89] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/89] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/89] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/89] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/89] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/89] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/89] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/89] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/89] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/89] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/89] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/89] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/89] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/89] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/89] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/89] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/89] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 50/89] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/89] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/89] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/89] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/89] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/89] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/89] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 57/89] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/89] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 59/89] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 60/89] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 61/89] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 62/89] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 63/89] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 64/89] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 65/89] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 66/89] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 67/89] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 68/89] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 69/89] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 70/89] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 71/89] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 72/89] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 73/89] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 74/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 75/89] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 76/89] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 77/89] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 78/89] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 79/89] x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 80/89] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 81/89] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 83/89] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 84/89] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 85/89] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 86/89] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 87/89] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 88/89] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 89/89] x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 12:14 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-22 17:58 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-07-22 19:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-23 4:21 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-23 8:55 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
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