From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80D99C00140 for ; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 18:39:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238771AbiHOSPi (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Aug 2022 14:15:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58664 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233567AbiHOSOy (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Aug 2022 14:14:54 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DD012AC62; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 11:14:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA81361283; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 18:14:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D21E1C433D6; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 18:14:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1660587255; bh=irsJIKL53q/IUaB0vpdqENRJHPJd0EtL0r96d2ea8dI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IsB0q3z7nkoju83T+hSTbO1JCuRvEOJRV/Y1Pp8VnNNEuy3nqJi9suXhBZERc7Ezn sudMh2Ds6/wfmFcCyxK6YOZ5lvtdbhfXJaoYI/jfvzOzH3wTxHunJIAzjmNf7++QT6 9keH2282C6qWeruRH+yR4JtVNgo82sBGHotoRh8k= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Li , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini Subject: [PATCH 5.15 027/779] KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 19:54:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20220815180338.373688419@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220815180337.130757997@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220815180337.130757997@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson commit c7d855c2aff2d511fd60ee2e356134c4fb394799 upstream. Inject a #UD if L1 attempts VMXON with a CR0 or CR4 that is disallowed per the associated nested VMX MSRs' fixed0/1 settings. KVM cannot rely on hardware to perform the checks, even for the few checks that have higher priority than VM-Exit, as (a) KVM may have forced CR0/CR4 bits in hardware while running the guest, (b) there may incompatible CR0/CR4 bits that have lower priority than VM-Exit, e.g. CR0.NE, and (c) userspace may have further restricted the allowed CR0/CR4 values by manipulating the guest's nested VMX MSRs. Note, despite a very strong desire to throw shade at Jim, commit 70f3aac964ae ("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks") is not to blame for the buggy behavior (though the comment...). That commit only removed the CR0.PE, EFLAGS.VM, and COMPATIBILITY mode checks (though it did erroneously drop the CPL check, but that has already been remedied). KVM may force CR0.PE=1, but will do so only when also forcing EFLAGS.VM=1 to emulate Real Mode, i.e. hardware will still #UD. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216033 Fixes: ec378aeef9df ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMXON and VMXOFF") Reported-by: Eric Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-4-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4952,20 +4952,25 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * | FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; /* - * The Intel VMX Instruction Reference lists a bunch of bits that are - * prerequisite to running VMXON, most notably cr4.VMXE must be set to - * 1 (see vmx_is_valid_cr4() for when we allow the guest to set this). - * Otherwise, we should fail with #UD. But most faulting conditions - * have already been checked by hardware, prior to the VM-exit for - * VMXON. We do test guest cr4.VMXE because processor CR4 always has - * that bit set to 1 in non-root mode. + * Note, KVM cannot rely on hardware to perform the CR0/CR4 #UD checks + * that have higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode + * for VMXON), as KVM must load valid CR0/CR4 values into hardware while + * running the guest, i.e. KVM needs to check the _guest_ values. + * + * Rely on hardware for the other two pre-VM-Exit checks, !VM86 and + * !COMPATIBILITY modes. KVM may run the guest in VM86 to emulate Real + * Mode, but KVM will never take the guest out of those modes. */ - if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE)) { + if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) || + !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) { kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } - /* CPL=0 must be checked manually. */ + /* + * CPL=0 and all other checks that are lower priority than VM-Exit must + * be checked manually. + */ if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); return 1;