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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gwendal@chromium.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	jarkko@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	apronin@chromium.org, dlunev@google.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	Hao Wu <hao.wu@rubrik.com>, Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>, axelj <axelj@axis.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/10] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 16:24:22 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202209201620.A886373@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220823152108.v2.10.Ifce072ae1ef1ce39bd681fff55af13a054045d9f@changeid>

On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:26PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> The key blob is not secret, and by default the TPM will happily unseal
> it regardless of system state. We can protect against that by sealing
> the secret with a PCR policy - if the current PCR state doesn't match,
> the TPM will refuse to release the secret. For now let's just seal it to
> PCR 23. In the long term we may want a more flexible policy around this,
> such as including PCR 7 for PCs or 0 for Chrome OS.
> 
> Sourced-from: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>

If it's a total rewrite, I'd say use:

Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <...>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/of/what/it/was/based/on

If it's built on an existing patch, I'd say use:

Co-developed-by: Matthew Garrett <...>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <...>

But I defer to what Matthew thinks. :)

Also, if you don't hear from Matthew, maybe ping his mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
address.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-20 23:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-23 22:25 [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-08-26  2:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 17:02     ` Evan Green
2022-09-08  5:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-08-26  3:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 17:03     ` Evan Green
2022-09-13 12:26   ` Stefan Berger
2022-09-20  4:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 15:35       ` Evan Green
2022-09-21 18:02         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 18:05           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 19:02             ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:04   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:22     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-08-24 11:56   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-08-24 17:34     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:06   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:23     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:23     ` Evan Green
2022-09-24  4:31       ` Kees Cook
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:24   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-08-31 18:34 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Limonciello, Mario
2022-09-07 17:03   ` Evan Green
2022-09-20  8:46 ` Pavel Machek
2022-09-20 16:39   ` Evan Green
2022-09-21 18:09   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-09-20 22:52 ` Kees Cook

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