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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/16] x86/compressed: move startup32_check_sev_cbit() into .text
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:54:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220921145422.437618-14-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220921145422.437618-1-ardb@kernel.org>

Move startup32_check_sev_cbit() into the .text section and turn it into
an ordinary function using the ordinary 32-bit calling convention,
instead of saving/restoring the registers that are known to be live at
the only call site. This improves maintainability, and makes it possible
to move this function out of head_64.S and into a separate compilation
unit that is specific to memory encryption.

Note that this requires the call site to be moved before the mixed mode
check, as %eax will be live otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 35 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index abb5a650a816..639f688e4949 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -251,6 +251,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
 	movl    $__BOOT_TSS, %eax
 	ltr	%ax
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* Check if the C-bit position is correct when SEV is active */
+	call	startup32_check_sev_cbit
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Setup for the jump to 64bit mode
 	 *
@@ -268,8 +273,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
 	leal	rva(startup_64_mixedmode)(%ebp), %eax
 1:
 #endif
-	/* Check if the C-bit position is correct when SEV is active */
-	call	startup32_check_sev_cbit
 
 	pushl	$__KERNEL_CS
 	pushl	%eax
@@ -724,16 +727,17 @@ SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(boot_idt, SYM_L_GLOBAL, boot_idt_end)
  * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
  * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
  */
-	__HEAD
-SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-	pushl	%eax
+	.text
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
 	pushl	%ebx
-	pushl	%ecx
-	pushl	%edx
+	pushl	%ebp
+
+	call	0f
+0:	popl	%ebp
 
 	/* Check for non-zero sev_status */
-	movl	rva(sev_status)(%ebp), %eax
+	movl	(sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax
 	testl	%eax, %eax
 	jz	4f
 
@@ -748,17 +752,18 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
 	jnc	2b
 
 	/* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
-	movl	%eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
-	movl	%ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+	leal	(sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp
+	movl	%eax, 0(%ebp)
+	movl	%ebx, 4(%ebp)
 
 	/* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
 	movl	%cr0, %edx			 /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
 	movl	$(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
 	movl	%ecx, %cr0
 
-	cmpl	%eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
+	cmpl	%eax, 0(%ebp)
 	jne	3f
-	cmpl	%ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+	cmpl	%ebx, 4(%ebp)
 	jne	3f
 
 	movl	%edx, %cr0	/* Restore previous %cr0 */
@@ -770,13 +775,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
 	jmp	3b
 
 4:
-	popl	%edx
-	popl	%ecx
+	popl	%ebp
 	popl	%ebx
-	popl	%eax
-#endif
 	RET
 SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Stack and heap for uncompression
-- 
2.35.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-21 14:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-21 14:54 [PATCH v2 00/16] x86: head_64.S spring cleaning Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: rename efi_thunk_64.S to efi-mixed.S Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: move 32-bit entrypoint code into .text section Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-06 10:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-06 10:56     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-06 11:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-06 11:19         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-06 12:27           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-07  8:56             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: move bootargs parsing out of 32-bit startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-06 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-06 11:29     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-07  9:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: move efi32_pe_entry into .text section Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-17 15:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 16:06     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-17 17:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: move efi32_entry out of head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: move efi32_pe_entry() " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] x86/compressed: efi: merge multiple definitions of image_offset into one Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] x86/compressed: efi-mixed: simplify IDT/GDT preserve/restore Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] x86/compressed: avoid touching ECX in startup32_set_idt_entry() Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] x86/compressed: pull global variable ref up into startup32_load_idt() Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] x86/compressed: move startup32_load_idt() into .text section Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-18 16:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] x86/compressed: move startup32_load_idt() out of head_64.S Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] x86/compressed: move startup32_check_sev_cbit() " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] x86/compressed: adhere to calling convention in get_sev_encryption_bit() Ard Biesheuvel
2022-09-21 14:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] x86/compressed: only build mem_encrypt.S if AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y Ard Biesheuvel
2022-11-18 18:26 ` [PATCH v2 00/16] x86: head_64.S spring cleaning Borislav Petkov
2022-11-18 23:31   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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