From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>,
Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
David Gow <davidgow@google.com>,
tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>,
Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
Seth Jenkins <sethjenkins@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>,
Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/6] panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 12:00:47 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221109200050.3400857-4-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221109194404.gonna.558-kees@kernel.org>
Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/panic.h | 1 +
kernel/kcsan/report.c | 3 +--
kernel/panic.c | 9 +++++++--
kernel/sched/core.c | 3 +--
lib/ubsan.c | 3 +--
mm/kasan/report.c | 4 ++--
mm/kfence/report.c | 3 +--
7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/panic.h b/include/linux/panic.h
index c7759b3f2045..1702aeb74927 100644
--- a/include/linux/panic.h
+++ b/include/linux/panic.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
__printf(1, 2)
void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *reason);
extern void oops_enter(void);
extern void oops_exit(void);
extern bool oops_may_print(void);
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/report.c b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
index 67794404042a..e95ce7d7a76e 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/report.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/report.c
@@ -492,8 +492,7 @@ static void print_report(enum kcsan_value_change value_change,
dump_stack_print_info(KERN_DEFAULT);
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ check_panic_on_warn("KCSAN");
}
static void release_report(unsigned long *flags, struct other_info *other_info)
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 129936511380..3afd234767bc 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -201,6 +201,12 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(bool console_flush)
ftrace_dump(DUMP_ALL);
}
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", reason);
+}
+
/**
* panic - halt the system
* @fmt: The text string to print
@@ -619,8 +625,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
if (regs)
show_regs(regs);
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
if (!regs)
dump_stack();
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 5800b0623ff3..285ef8821b4f 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -5729,8 +5729,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
pr_err("Preemption disabled at:");
print_ip_sym(KERN_ERR, preempt_disable_ip);
}
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("scheduling while atomic\n");
+ check_panic_on_warn("scheduling while atomic");
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index 36bd75e33426..60c7099857a0 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -154,8 +154,7 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
current->in_ubsan--;
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ check_panic_on_warn("UBSAN");
}
void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index df3602062bfd..cc98dfdd3ed2 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, void *addr)
(unsigned long)addr);
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
- if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+ check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
if (kasan_arg_fault == KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC)
panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 7e496856c2eb..110c27ca597d 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
lockdep_on();
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ check_panic_on_warn("KFENCE");
/* We encountered a memory safety error, taint the kernel! */
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-09 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-09 20:00 [PATCH next v2 0/6] exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP Kees Cook
2022-11-09 21:48 ` Bill Wendling
2022-11-10 0:02 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-11-14 9:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks Marco Elver
2022-11-17 23:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] panic: Introduce warn_limit Kees Cook
2022-11-14 9:48 ` Marco Elver
2022-11-17 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-09 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs Kees Cook
2022-11-09 21:16 ` [PATCH next v2 0/6] exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops Luis Chamberlain
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