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From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH] lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 15:29:47 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221121072947.836672-1-coxu@redhat.com> (raw)

A kernel builder may not enable KEXEC_SIG and some architectures like
ppc64 simply don't have KEXEC_SIG. In these cases, unless both
IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled, lockdown doesn't prevent
unsigned kernel image from being kexec'ed via the kexec_file_load
syscall whereas it could prevent one via the kexec_load syscall. Mandate
signature verification for those cases.

Fixes: 155bdd30af17 ("kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down")
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/kexec_file.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 45637511e0de..04d56b6e6459 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -125,6 +125,20 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	image->image_loader_data = NULL;
 }
 
+static int mandate_signatute_verification(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
+	 * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
+	 * down.
+	 */
+	if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
+	    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
@@ -168,14 +182,9 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 			return ret;
 		}
 
-		/*
-		 * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
-		 * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
-		 * down.
-		 */
-		if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
-		    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
-			return -EPERM;
+		ret = mandate_signatute_verification();
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 
 		pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
 	}
@@ -211,10 +220,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 	ret = kimage_validate_signature(image);
-
+#else
+	ret = mandate_signatute_verification();
+#endif
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
-#endif
+
 	/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
 	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
 		ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, 0, &image->initrd_buf,
-- 
2.38.1


             reply	other threads:[~2022-11-21  7:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-21  7:29 Coiby Xu [this message]
2022-11-21 18:23 ` [PATCH] lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled Mimi Zohar
2022-11-22  2:36   ` Coiby Xu
2022-11-28 17:16     ` Mimi Zohar
2022-12-30  7:00       ` Coiby Xu
2022-11-22  2:28 ` [PATCH v2] " Coiby Xu

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