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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>, "Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>,
	"Daniel Bristot de Oliveira" <bristot@redhat.com>,
	"Phil Auld" <pauld@redhat.com>,
	"Wenjie Li" <wenjieli@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	"David Wang 王标" <wangbiao3@xiaomi.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH-tip] sched: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 12:54:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221213125404.GD5719@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e9c7a920-4801-59fd-2429-361c54523d8e@redhat.com>

On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 09:30:56AM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 12/2/22 05:18, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 12:03:39PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
> > > On 12/1/22 08:44, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 08:44:41PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
> > > > > Since commit 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be
> > > > > restricted on asymmetric systems"), the setting and clearing of
> > > > > user_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,
> > > > > dup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock
> > > > > protection. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
> > > > > __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and
> > > > > double-free in arm64 kernel.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Commit 8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested
> > > > > cpumask") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never
> > > > > be cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced
> > > > > in commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in
> > > > > do_set_cpus_allowed()") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
> > > > > do_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Fix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly
> > > > > cloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the
> > > > > user_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Note to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.
> > > > > Just copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Fixes: 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems")
> > > > > Fixes: 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed()")
> > > > > CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > > > Reported-by: David Wang 王标 <wangbiao3@xiaomi.com>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >    kernel/sched/core.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > > > >    1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > > > As per my comments on the previous version of this patch:
> > > > 
> > > > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221201133602.GB28489@willie-the-truck/T/#t
> > > > 
> > > > I think there are other issues to fix when racing affinity changes with
> > > > fork() too.
> > > It is certainly possible that there are other bugs hiding somewhere:-)
> > Right, but I actually took the time to hit the same race for the other
> > affinity mask field so it seems a bit narrow-minded for us just to fix the
> > one issue.
> 
> I focused on this particular one because of a double-free bug report from
> David. What other fields have you found to be subjected to data race?

See my other report linked above where we race on 'task_struct::cpus_mask'.

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-13 12:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-28  1:44 [PATCH-tip] sched: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr() Waiman Long
2022-11-28 13:34 ` 答复: [External Mail][PATCH-tip] " David Wang 王标
2022-11-28 15:43   ` Waiman Long
2022-11-29  3:11     ` 答复: " David Wang 王标
2022-12-01 13:44 ` [PATCH-tip] " Will Deacon
2022-12-01 17:03   ` Waiman Long
2022-12-02 10:18     ` Will Deacon
2022-12-02 14:30       ` Waiman Long
2022-12-13 12:54         ` Will Deacon [this message]
2022-12-13 15:54           ` Waiman Long

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