* [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers David Vernet
` (9 more replies)
0 siblings, 10 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
This is part 2 of https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119235833.2948341-1-void@manifault.com/
Changelog:
----------
v1 -> v2:
- Put back 'static' keyword in bpf_find_btf_id()
(kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
- Surround cpumask kfuncs in __diag() blocks to avoid no-prototype build
warnings (kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
- Enable ___init suffixes to a type definition to signal that a type is
a nocast alias of another type. That is, that when passed to a kfunc
that expects one of the two types, the verifier will reject the other
even if they're equivalent according to the C standard (Kumar and
Alexei)
- Reject NULL for all trusted args, not just PTR_TO_MEM (Kumar)
- Reject both NULL and PTR_MAYBE_NULL for all trusted args (Kumar and
Alexei )
- Improve examples given in cpumask documentation (Alexei)
- Use __success macro for nested_trust test (Alexei)
- Fix comment typo in struct bpf_cpumask comment header.
- Fix another example in the bpf_cpumask doc examples.
- Add documentation for ___init suffix change mentioned above.
David Vernet (9):
bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers
bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs
bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs
bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite
selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs
bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file
bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined
bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init
Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst | 396 +++++++++++++++
Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 76 ++-
include/linux/bpf.h | 8 +
kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 122 +++++
kernel/bpf/cpumask.c | 477 ++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 67 ++-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x | 2 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c | 4 +-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c | 74 +++
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c | 12 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c | 4 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h | 114 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 125 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c | 426 ++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h | 12 +
.../bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c | 33 ++
.../bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c | 31 ++
19 files changed, 1976 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/9] bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs David Vernet
` (8 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
In kfuncs, a "trusted" pointer is a pointer that the kfunc can assume is
safe, and which the verifier will allow to be passed to a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc. Currently, a KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc disallows any
pointer to be passed at a nonzero offset, but sometimes this is in fact
safe if the "nested" pointer's lifetime is inherited from its parent.
For example, the const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr field in a struct task_struct
will remain valid until the task itself is destroyed, and thus would
also be safe to pass to a KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc.
While it would be conceptually simple to enable this by using BTF tags,
gcc unfortunately does not yet support this. In the interim, this patch
enables support for this by using a type-naming convention. A new
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED macro is defined in verifier.c which allows a
developer to specify the nested fields of a type which are considered
trusted if its parent is also trusted. The verifier is also updated to
account for this. A patch with selftests will be added in a follow-on
change, along with documentation for this feature.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 4 +++
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index ae7771c7d750..283e96e5b228 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -2186,6 +2186,10 @@ struct bpf_core_ctx {
const struct btf *btf;
};
+bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off);
+
int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo,
int relo_idx, void *insn);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 4ba749fcce9d..dd05b5f2c1d8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -8227,3 +8227,64 @@ int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo,
}
return err;
}
+
+bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off)
+{
+ struct btf *btf = reg->btf;
+ const struct btf_type *walk_type, *safe_type;
+ const char *tname;
+ char safe_tname[64];
+ long ret, safe_id;
+ const struct btf_member *member, *m_walk = NULL;
+ u32 i;
+ const char *walk_name;
+
+ walk_type = btf_type_by_id(btf, reg->btf_id);
+ if (!walk_type)
+ return false;
+
+ tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, walk_type->name_off);
+
+ ret = snprintf(safe_tname, sizeof(safe_tname), "%s__safe_fields", tname);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ safe_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, safe_tname, BTF_INFO_KIND(walk_type->info));
+ if (safe_id < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ safe_type = btf_type_by_id(btf, safe_id);
+ if (!safe_type)
+ return false;
+
+ for_each_member(i, walk_type, member) {
+ u32 moff;
+
+ /* We're looking for the PTR_TO_BTF_ID member in the struct
+ * type we're walking which matches the specified offset.
+ * Below, we'll iterate over the fields in the safe variant of
+ * the struct and see if any of them has a matching type /
+ * name.
+ */
+ moff = __btf_member_bit_offset(walk_type, member) / 8;
+ if (off == moff) {
+ m_walk = member;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (m_walk == NULL)
+ return false;
+
+ walk_name = __btf_name_by_offset(btf, m_walk->name_off);
+ for_each_member(i, safe_type, member) {
+ const char *m_name = __btf_name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off);
+
+ /* If we match on both type and name, the field is considered trusted. */
+ if (m_walk->type == member->type && !strcmp(walk_name, m_name))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ca7db2ce70b9..7f973847b58e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4755,6 +4755,25 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
return 0;
}
+#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_fields)
+
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct) {
+ const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr;
+};
+
+static bool nested_ptr_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off)
+{
+ /* If its parent is not trusted, it can't regain its trusted status. */
+ if (!is_trusted_reg(reg))
+ return false;
+
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct));
+
+ return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, off);
+}
+
static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
int regno, int off, int size,
@@ -4843,10 +4862,17 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
- /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is
- * no longer trusted except the rcu case below.
+ /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no
+ * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been
+ * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust.
+ *
+ * An RCU-protected pointer can also be deemed trusted if we are in an
+ * RCU read region. This case is handled below.
*/
- flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED;
+ if (nested_ptr_is_trusted(env, reg, off))
+ flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
+ else
+ flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED;
if (flag & MEM_RCU) {
/* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/9] bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/9] bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs David Vernet
` (7 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
When validating BTF types for KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs, the verifier
currently enforces that the top-level type must match when calling
the kfunc. In other words, the verifier does not allow the BPF program
to pass a bitwise equivalent struct, despite it being allowed according
to the C standard.
For example, if you have the following type:
struct nf_conn___init {
struct nf_conn ct;
};
The C standard stipulates that it would be safe to pass a struct
nf_conn___init to a kfunc expecting a struct nf_conn. The verifier
currently disallows this, however, as semantically kfuncs may want to
enforce that structs that have equivalent types according to the C
standard, but have different BTF IDs, are not able to be passed to
kfuncs expecting one or the other. For example, struct nf_conn___init
may not be queried / looked up, as it is allocated but may not yet be
fully initialized.
On the other hand, being able to pass types that are equivalent
according to the C standard will be useful for other types of kfunc /
kptrs enabled by BPF. For example, in a follow-on patch, a series of
kfuncs will be added which allow programs to do bitwise queries on
cpumasks that are either allocated by the program (in which case they'll
be a 'struct bpf_cpumask' type that wraps a cpumask_t as its first
element), or a cpumask that was allocated by the main kernel (in which
case it will just be a straight cpumask_t, as in task->cpus_ptr).
Having the two types of cpumasks allows us to distinguish between the
two for when a cpumask is read-only vs. mutatable. A struct bpf_cpumask
can be mutated by e.g. bpf_cpumask_clear(), whereas a regular cpumask_t
cannot be. On the other hand, a struct bpf_cpumask can of course be
queried in the exact same manner as a cpumask_t, with e.g.
bpf_cpumask_test_cpu().
If we were to enforce that top level types match, then a user that's
passing a struct bpf_cpumask to a read-only cpumask_t argument would
have to cast with something like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() (which itself
would need to be updated to expect the alias, and currently it only
accommodates a single alias per prog type). Additionally, not specifying
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS is not an option, as some kfuncs take one argument as a
struct bpf_cpumask *, and another as a struct cpumask *
(i.e. cpumask_t).
In order to enable this, this patch relaxes the constraint that a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc must have strict type matching, and instead only
enforces strict type matching if a type is observed to be a "no-cast
alias" (i.e., that the type names are equivalent, but one is suffixed
with ___init).
Additionally, in order to try and be conservative and match existing
behavior / expectations, this patch also enforces strict type checking
for acquire kfuncs. We were already enforcing it for release kfuncs, so
this should also improve the consistency of the semantics for kfuncs.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 4 +++
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 283e96e5b228..d01d99127b7b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -2190,6 +2190,10 @@ bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off);
+bool btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
+ const struct btf *reg_btf, u32 reg_id,
+ const struct btf *arg_btf, u32 arg_id);
+
int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo,
int relo_idx, void *insn);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index dd05b5f2c1d8..47b8cb96f2c2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -336,6 +336,12 @@ const char *btf_type_str(const struct btf_type *t)
/* Type name size */
#define BTF_SHOW_NAME_SIZE 80
+/*
+ * The suffix of a type that indicates it cannot alias another type when
+ * comparing BTF IDs for kfunc invocations.
+ */
+#define NOCAST_ALIAS_SUFFIX "___init"
+
/*
* Common data to all BTF show operations. Private show functions can add
* their own data to a structure containing a struct btf_show and consult it
@@ -8288,3 +8294,58 @@ bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
return false;
}
+
+bool btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
+ const struct btf *reg_btf, u32 reg_id,
+ const struct btf *arg_btf, u32 arg_id)
+{
+ const char *reg_name, *arg_name, *search_needle;
+ const struct btf_type *reg_type, *arg_type;
+ int reg_len, arg_len, cmp_len;
+ size_t pattern_len = sizeof(NOCAST_ALIAS_SUFFIX) - sizeof(char);
+
+ reg_type = btf_type_by_id(reg_btf, reg_id);
+ if (!reg_type)
+ return false;
+
+ arg_type = btf_type_by_id(arg_btf, arg_id);
+ if (!arg_type)
+ return false;
+
+ reg_name = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_type->name_off);
+ arg_name = btf_name_by_offset(arg_btf, arg_type->name_off);
+
+ reg_len = strlen(reg_name);
+ arg_len = strlen(arg_name);
+
+ /* Exactly one of the two type names may be suffixed with ___init, so
+ * if the strings are the same size, they can't possibly be no-cast
+ * aliases of one another. If you have two of the same type names, e.g.
+ * they're both nf_conn___init, it would be improper to return true
+ * because they are _not_ no-cast aliases, they are the same type.
+ */
+ if (reg_len == arg_len)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Either of the two names must be the other name, suffixed with ___init. */
+ if ((reg_len != arg_len + pattern_len) &&
+ (arg_len != reg_len + pattern_len))
+ return false;
+
+ if (reg_len < arg_len) {
+ search_needle = strstr(arg_name, NOCAST_ALIAS_SUFFIX);
+ cmp_len = reg_len;
+ } else {
+ search_needle = strstr(reg_name, NOCAST_ALIAS_SUFFIX);
+ cmp_len = arg_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!search_needle)
+ return false;
+
+ /* ___init suffix must come at the end of the name */
+ if (*(search_needle + pattern_len) != '\0')
+ return false;
+
+ return !strncmp(reg_name, arg_name, cmp_len);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 7f973847b58e..ca5d601fb3cf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8563,9 +8563,37 @@ static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)];
}
- if (is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id))
+ /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring
+ * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_
+ * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default,
+ * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise
+ * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something
+ * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx().
+ *
+ * For example, say we had a type like the following:
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask {
+ * cpumask_t cpumask;
+ * refcount_t usage;
+ * };
+ *
+ * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed
+ * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct
+ * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *.
+ *
+ * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different
+ * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The
+ * only difference here is that we're simply allowing
+ * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and
+ * resolve types.
+ */
+ if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) ||
+ (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) ||
+ btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id))
strict_type_match = true;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off);
+
reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id);
reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off);
if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) {
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/9] bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/9] bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs David Vernet
` (6 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs currently have a subtle and insidious bug in
validating pointers to scalars. Say that you have a kfunc like the
following, which takes an array as the first argument:
bool bpf_cpumask_empty(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_empty(cpumask);
}
...
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_empty, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
...
If a BPF program were to invoke the kfunc with a NULL argument, it would
crash the kernel. The reason is that struct cpumask is defined as a
bitmap, which is itself defined as an array, and is accessed as a memory
address memory by bitmap operations. So when the verifier analyzes the
register, it interprets it as a pointer to a scalar struct, which is an
array of size 8. check_mem_reg() then sees that the register is NULL,
and returns 0, and the kfunc crashes when it passes it down to the
cpumask wrappers.
To fix this, this patch adds a check for KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM which
verifies that the register doesn't contain a possibly-NULL pointer if
the kfunc is KF_TRUSTED_ARGS.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 ++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ca5d601fb3cf..a466887f5334 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8937,6 +8937,12 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) &&
+ (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) {
+ verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) {
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c
index 973f0c5af965..f3bb0e16e088 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgrp_kfunc.c
@@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ static struct {
const char *prog_name;
const char *expected_err_msg;
} failure_tests[] = {
- {"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_untrusted", "R1 must be referenced or trusted"},
+ {"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_untrusted", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_fp", "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_unsafe_kretprobe", "reg type unsupported for arg#0 function"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_trusted_walked", "R1 must be referenced or trusted"},
- {"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_null", "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point"},
+ {"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_null", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_acquire_unreleased", "Unreleased reference"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_get_non_kptr_param", "arg#0 expected pointer to map value"},
{"cgrp_kfunc_get_non_kptr_acquired", "arg#0 expected pointer to map value"},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c
index 18848c31e36f..a4f49e8dc7e8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_kfunc.c
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ static struct {
const char *prog_name;
const char *expected_err_msg;
} failure_tests[] = {
- {"task_kfunc_acquire_untrusted", "R1 must be referenced or trusted"},
+ {"task_kfunc_acquire_untrusted", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0"},
{"task_kfunc_acquire_fp", "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point"},
{"task_kfunc_acquire_unsafe_kretprobe", "reg type unsupported for arg#0 function"},
{"task_kfunc_acquire_trusted_walked", "R1 must be referenced or trusted"},
- {"task_kfunc_acquire_null", "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point"},
+ {"task_kfunc_acquire_null", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0"},
{"task_kfunc_acquire_unreleased", "Unreleased reference"},
{"task_kfunc_get_non_kptr_param", "arg#0 expected pointer to map value"},
{"task_kfunc_get_non_kptr_acquired", "arg#0 expected pointer to map value"},
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/9] bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-25 4:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite David Vernet
` (5 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
Certain programs may wish to be able to query cpumasks. For example, if
a program that is tracing percpu operations may wish to track which
tasks end up running on which CPUs, and it could be useful to associate
that with the tasks' cpumasks. Similarly, a program tracking NUMA
allocations, CPU scheduling domains, etc, would potentially benefit from
being able to see which CPUs a task could be migrated to, etc.
This patch enables these such cases by introducing a series of
bpf_cpumask_* kfuncs. Amongst these kfuncs, there are two separate
"classes" of operations:
1. kfuncs which allow the caller to allocate and mutate their own
cpumasks in the form of a struct bpf_cpumask * object. Such kfuncs
include e.g. bpf_cpumask_create() to allocate the cpumask, and
bpf_cpumask_or() to mutate it. "Regular" cpumasks such as p->cpus_ptr
may not be passed to these kfuncs, and the verifier will ensure this
is the case by comparing BTF IDs.
2. Read-only operations which operate on const struct cpumask *
arguments. For example, bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(), which tests whether a
CPU is set in the cpumask. Any trusted struct cpumask * or struct
bpf_cpumask * may be passed to these kfuncs. The verifier allows
struct bpf_cpumask * even though the kfunc is defined with struct
cpumask * because the first element of a struct bpf_cpumask is a
cpumask_t, so it is safe to cast.
A follow-on patch will add selftests which validate these kfuncs, and
another will document them.
Note that some of the kfuncs that were added would benefit from
additional verification logic. For example, any kfunc taking a CPU
argument that exceeds the number of CPUs on the system, etc. For now, we
silently check for and ignore these cases at runtime. When we have e.g.
per-argument kfunc flags, it might be helpful to add another KF_CPU-type
flag that specifies that the verifier should validate that it's a valid
CPU.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/bpf/cpumask.c | 269 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 270 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
index 3a12e6b400a2..02242614dcc7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF) += sysfs_btf.o
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += cpumask.o
obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD) += preload/
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..92eedc84dbfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta, Inc
+ */
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h>
+#include <linux/btf.h>
+#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct bpf_cpumask - refcounted BPF cpumask wrapper structure
+ * @cpumask: The actual cpumask embedded in the struct.
+ * @usage: Object reference counter. When the refcount goes to 0, the
+ * memory is released back to the BPF allocator, which provides
+ * RCU safety.
+ *
+ * Note that we explicitly embed a cpumask_t rather than a cpumask_var_t. This
+ * is done to avoid confusing the verifier due to the typedef of cpumask_var_t
+ * changing depending on whether CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is defined or not. See
+ * the details in <linux/cpumask.h>. The consequence is that this structure is
+ * likely a bit larger than it needs to be when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is
+ * defined due to embedding the whole NR_CPUS-size bitmap, but the extra memory
+ * overhead is minimal. For the more typical case of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
+ * not being defined, the structure is the same size regardless.
+ */
+struct bpf_cpumask {
+ cpumask_t cpumask;
+ refcount_t usage;
+};
+
+static struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_cpumask_ma;
+
+static bool cpu_valid(u32 cpu)
+{
+ return cpu < nr_cpu_ids;
+}
+
+__diag_push();
+__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
+ "Global kfuncs as their definitions will be in BTF");
+
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_cpumask_ma, sizeof(*cpumask));
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return NULL;
+
+ memset(cpumask, 0, sizeof(*cpumask));
+ refcount_set(&cpumask->usage, 1);
+
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_acquire(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ refcount_inc(&cpumask->usage);
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(struct bpf_cpumask **cpumaskp)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ /* The BPF memory allocator frees memory backing its caches in an RCU
+ * callback. Thus, we can safely use RCU to ensure that the cpumask is
+ * safe to read.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ cpumask = READ_ONCE(*cpumaskp);
+ if (cpumask && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&cpumask->usage))
+ cpumask = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_release(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return;
+
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cpumask->usage)) {
+ migrate_disable();
+ bpf_mem_free(&bpf_cpumask_ma, cpumask);
+ migrate_enable();
+ }
+}
+
+u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return cpumask_first(cpumask);
+}
+
+u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return cpumask_first_zero(cpumask);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
+ return;
+
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
+ return;
+
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(u32 cpu, const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_setall(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ cpumask_setall((struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_clear(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ cpumask_clear((struct cpumask *)cpumask);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_and(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ return cpumask_and((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_or(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ cpumask_or((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_xor(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ cpumask_xor((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_equal(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ return cpumask_equal(src1, src2);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_intersects(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ return cpumask_intersects(src1, src2);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_subset(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ return cpumask_subset(src1, src2);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_empty(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return cpumask_empty(cpumask);
+}
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_full(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return cpumask_full(cpumask);
+}
+
+void bpf_cpumask_copy(struct bpf_cpumask *dst, const struct cpumask *src)
+{
+ cpumask_copy((struct cpumask *)dst, src);
+}
+
+u32 bpf_cpumask_any(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return cpumask_any(cpumask);
+}
+
+u32 bpf_cpumask_any_and(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
+{
+ return cpumask_any_and(src1, src2);
+}
+
+__diag_pop();
+
+BTF_SET8_START(cpumask_kfunc_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_create, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_release, KF_RELEASE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_acquire, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_kptr_get, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_KPTR_GET | KF_RET_NULL)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first_zero, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_set_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_setall, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_and, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_or, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_xor, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_equal, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_intersects, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_subset, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_empty, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_full, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_copy, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any_and, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_SET8_END(cpumask_kfunc_btf_ids)
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set cpumask_kfunc_set = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .set = &cpumask_kfunc_btf_ids,
+};
+
+BTF_ID_LIST(cpumask_dtor_ids)
+BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_cpumask_release)
+
+static int __init cpumask_kfunc_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const struct btf_id_dtor_kfunc cpumask_dtors[] = {
+ {
+ .btf_id = cpumask_dtor_ids[0],
+ .kfunc_btf_id = cpumask_dtor_ids[1]
+ },
+ };
+
+ ret = bpf_mem_alloc_init(&bpf_cpumask_ma, 0, false);
+ ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, &cpumask_kfunc_set);
+ ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, &cpumask_kfunc_set);
+ return ret ?: register_btf_id_dtor_kfuncs(cpumask_dtors,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cpumask_dtors),
+ THIS_MODULE);
+}
+
+late_initcall(cpumask_kfunc_init);
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs David Vernet
` (4 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
Now that defining trusted fields in a struct is supported, we should add
selftests to verify the behavior. This patch adds a few such testcases.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x | 1 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c | 12 +++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h | 12 +++++++
.../bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
.../bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
index 96e8371f5c2a..1cf5b94cda30 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ map_kptr # failed to open_and_load program: -524
modify_return # modify_return attach failed: -524 (trampoline)
module_attach # skel_attach skeleton attach failed: -524 (trampoline)
mptcp
+nested_trust # JIT does not support calling kernel function
netcnt # failed to load BPF skeleton 'netcnt_prog': -7 (?)
probe_user # check_kprobe_res wrong kprobe res from probe read (?)
rcu_read_lock # failed to find kernel BTF type ID of '__x64_sys_getpgid': -3 (?)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..39886f58924e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/nested_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "nested_trust_failure.skel.h"
+#include "nested_trust_success.skel.h"
+
+void test_nested_trust(void)
+{
+ RUN_TESTS(nested_trust_success);
+ RUN_TESTS(nested_trust_failure);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..83d33931136e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#ifndef _NESTED_TRUST_COMMON_H
+#define _NESTED_TRUST_COMMON_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(unsigned int cpu, const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+
+#endif /* _NESTED_TRUST_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..14aff7676436
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_failure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+#include "nested_trust_common.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+/* Prototype for all of the program trace events below:
+ *
+ * TRACE_EVENT(task_newtask,
+ * TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
+ */
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("R2 must be referenced or trusted")
+int BPF_PROG(test_invalid_nested_user_cpus, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, task->user_cpus_ptr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("R1 must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc")
+int BPF_PROG(test_invalid_nested_offset, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ bpf_cpumask_first_zero(&task->cpus_mask);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..398098d24987
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/nested_trust_success.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+#include "nested_trust_common.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+int pid, err;
+
+static bool is_test_task(void)
+{
+ int cur_pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+
+ return pid == cur_pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(test_read_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, task->cpus_ptr);
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 7/9] bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file David Vernet
` (3 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
A recent patch added a new set of kfuncs for allocating, freeing,
manipulating, and querying cpumasks. This patch adds a new 'cpumask'
selftest suite which verifies their behavior.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x | 1 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c | 74 +++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h | 114 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 125 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c | 426 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 740 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
index 1cf5b94cda30..4c2c58e9c4e5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ cgroup_hierarchical_stats # JIT does not support calling kernel f
cgrp_kfunc # JIT does not support calling kernel function
cgrp_local_storage # prog_attach unexpected error: -524 (trampoline)
core_read_macros # unknown func bpf_probe_read#4 (overlapping)
+cpumask # JIT does not support calling kernel function
d_path # failed to auto-attach program 'prog_stat': -524 (trampoline)
decap_sanity # JIT does not support calling kernel function (kfunc)
deny_namespace # failed to attach: ERROR: strerror_r(-524)=22 (trampoline)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5fbe457c4ebe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cpumask.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "cpumask_failure.skel.h"
+#include "cpumask_success.skel.h"
+
+static const char * const cpumask_success_testcases[] = {
+ "test_alloc_free_cpumask",
+ "test_set_clear_cpu",
+ "test_setall_clear_cpu",
+ "test_first_firstzero_cpu",
+ "test_test_and_set_clear",
+ "test_and_or_xor",
+ "test_intersects_subset",
+ "test_copy_any_anyand",
+ "test_insert_leave",
+ "test_insert_remove_release",
+ "test_insert_kptr_get_release",
+};
+
+static void verify_success(const char *prog_name)
+{
+ struct cpumask_success *skel;
+ struct bpf_program *prog;
+ struct bpf_link *link = NULL;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ int status;
+
+ skel = cpumask_success__open();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "cpumask_success__open"))
+ return;
+
+ skel->bss->pid = getpid();
+ skel->bss->nr_cpus = libbpf_num_possible_cpus();
+
+ cpumask_success__load(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "cpumask_success__load"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(skel->obj, prog_name);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(prog, "bpf_object__find_program_by_name"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ link = bpf_program__attach(prog);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "bpf_program__attach"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ if (!ASSERT_GT(child_pid, -1, "child_pid"))
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (child_pid == 0)
+ _exit(0);
+ waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0);
+ ASSERT_OK(skel->bss->err, "post_wait_err");
+
+cleanup:
+ bpf_link__destroy(link);
+ cpumask_success__destroy(skel);
+}
+
+void test_cpumask(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cpumask_success_testcases); i++) {
+ if (!test__start_subtest(cpumask_success_testcases[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ verify_success(cpumask_success_testcases[i]);
+ }
+
+ RUN_TESTS(cpumask_failure);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ad34f3b602be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#ifndef _CPUMASK_COMMON_H
+#define _CPUMASK_COMMON_H
+
+#include "errno.h"
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+int err;
+
+struct __cpumask_map_value {
+ struct bpf_cpumask __kptr_ref * cpumask;
+};
+
+struct array_map {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, struct __cpumask_map_value);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+} __cpumask_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_release(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_acquire(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(struct bpf_cpumask **cpumask) __ksym;
+u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(u32 cpu, const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_setall(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_clear(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_and(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_or(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_xor(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask,
+ const struct cpumask *src1,
+ const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_equal(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_intersects(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_subset(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_empty(const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+bool bpf_cpumask_full(const struct cpumask *cpumask) __ksym;
+void bpf_cpumask_copy(struct bpf_cpumask *dst, const struct cpumask *src) __ksym;
+u32 bpf_cpumask_any(const struct cpumask *src) __ksym;
+u32 bpf_cpumask_any_and(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2) __ksym;
+
+static inline const struct cpumask *cast(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
+{
+ return (const struct cpumask *)cpumask;
+}
+
+static inline struct bpf_cpumask *create_cpumask(void)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_create();
+ if (!cpumask) {
+ err = 1;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_empty(cast(cpumask))) {
+ err = 2;
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+static inline struct __cpumask_map_value *cpumask_map_value_lookup(void)
+{
+ u32 key = 0;
+
+ return bpf_map_lookup_elem(&__cpumask_map, &key);
+}
+
+static inline int cpumask_map_insert(struct bpf_cpumask *mask)
+{
+ struct __cpumask_map_value local, *v;
+ long status;
+ struct bpf_cpumask *old;
+ u32 key = 0;
+
+ local.cpumask = NULL;
+ status = bpf_map_update_elem(&__cpumask_map, &key, &local, 0);
+ if (status) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ v = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&__cpumask_map, &key);
+ if (!v) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ old = bpf_kptr_xchg(&v->cpumask, mask);
+ if (old) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(old);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* _CPUMASK_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a6ac7a91e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+#include "cpumask_common.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+/* Prototype for all of the program trace events below:
+ *
+ * TRACE_EVENT(task_newtask,
+ * TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
+ */
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("Unreleased reference")
+int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_no_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+
+ /* cpumask is never released. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0")
+int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_double_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+
+ /* cpumask is released twice. */
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("bpf_cpumask_acquire args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT bpf_cpumask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_acquire_wrong_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ /* Can't acquire a non-struct bpf_cpumask. */
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_acquire((struct bpf_cpumask *)task->cpus_ptr);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("bpf_cpumask_set_cpu args#1 expected pointer to STRUCT bpf_cpumask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_mutate_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ /* Can't set the CPU of a non-struct bpf_cpumask. */
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, (struct bpf_cpumask *)task->cpus_ptr);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("Unreleased reference")
+int BPF_PROG(test_insert_remove_no_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ struct __cpumask_map_value *v;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cpumask_map_insert(cpumask))
+ return 0;
+
+ v = cpumask_map_value_lookup();
+ if (!v)
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_kptr_xchg(&v->cpumask, NULL);
+
+ /* cpumask is never released. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("Unreleased reference")
+int BPF_PROG(test_kptr_get_no_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ struct __cpumask_map_value *v;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cpumask_map_insert(cpumask))
+ return 0;
+
+ v = cpumask_map_value_lookup();
+ if (!v)
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(&v->cpumask);
+
+ /* cpumask is never released. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0")
+int BPF_PROG(test_cpumask_null, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ bpf_cpumask_empty(NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1d38bc65d4b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+#include "cpumask_common.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+int pid, nr_cpus;
+
+static bool is_test_task(void)
+{
+ int cur_pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+
+ return pid == cur_pid;
+}
+
+static bool create_cpumask_set(struct bpf_cpumask **out1,
+ struct bpf_cpumask **out2,
+ struct bpf_cpumask **out3,
+ struct bpf_cpumask **out4)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *mask1, *mask2, *mask3, *mask4;
+
+ mask1 = create_cpumask();
+ if (!mask1)
+ return false;
+
+ mask2 = create_cpumask();
+ if (!mask2) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ err = 3;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ mask3 = create_cpumask();
+ if (!mask3) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ err = 4;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ mask4 = create_cpumask();
+ if (!mask4) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask3);
+ err = 5;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *out1 = mask1;
+ *out2 = mask2;
+ *out3 = mask3;
+ *out4 = mask4;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_free_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_set_clear_cpu, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, cpumask);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, cast(cpumask))) {
+ err = 3;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(0, cpumask);
+ if (bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, cast(cpumask))) {
+ err = 4;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_setall_clear_cpu, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_setall(cpumask);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_full(cast(cpumask))) {
+ err = 3;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_clear(cpumask);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_empty(cast(cpumask))) {
+ err = 4;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_first_firstzero_cpu, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_first(cast(cpumask)) < nr_cpus) {
+ err = 3;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_first_zero(cast(cpumask)) != 0) {
+ bpf_printk("first zero: %d", bpf_cpumask_first_zero(cast(cpumask)));
+ err = 4;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, cpumask);
+ if (bpf_cpumask_first(cast(cpumask)) != 0) {
+ err = 5;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_first_zero(cast(cpumask)) != 1) {
+ err = 6;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_test_and_set_clear, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(0, cpumask)) {
+ err = 3;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(0, cpumask)) {
+ err = 4;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(0, cpumask)) {
+ err = 5;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_and_or_xor, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *mask1, *mask2, *dst1, *dst2;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!create_cpumask_set(&mask1, &mask2, &dst1, &dst2))
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(1, mask2);
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_and(dst1, cast(mask1), cast(mask2))) {
+ err = 6;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_empty(cast(dst1))) {
+ err = 7;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_or(dst1, cast(mask1), cast(mask2));
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, cast(dst1))) {
+ err = 8;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(1, cast(dst1))) {
+ err = 9;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_xor(dst2, cast(mask1), cast(mask2));
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_equal(cast(dst1), cast(dst2))) {
+ err = 10;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst2);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_intersects_subset, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *mask1, *mask2, *dst1, *dst2;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!create_cpumask_set(&mask1, &mask2, &dst1, &dst2))
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(1, mask2);
+ if (bpf_cpumask_intersects(cast(mask1), cast(mask2))) {
+ err = 6;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_or(dst1, cast(mask1), cast(mask2));
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_subset(cast(mask1), cast(dst1))) {
+ err = 7;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_subset(cast(mask2), cast(dst1))) {
+ err = 8;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (bpf_cpumask_subset(cast(dst1), cast(mask1))) {
+ err = 9;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst2);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_copy_any_anyand, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *mask1, *mask2, *dst1, *dst2;
+ u32 cpu;
+
+ if (!is_test_task())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!create_cpumask_set(&mask1, &mask2, &dst1, &dst2))
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(1, mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_or(dst1, cast(mask1), cast(mask2));
+
+ cpu = bpf_cpumask_any(cast(mask1));
+ if (cpu != 0) {
+ err = 6;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ cpu = bpf_cpumask_any(cast(dst2));
+ if (cpu < nr_cpus) {
+ err = 7;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ bpf_cpumask_copy(dst2, cast(dst1));
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_equal(cast(dst1), cast(dst2))) {
+ err = 8;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ cpu = bpf_cpumask_any(cast(dst2));
+ if (cpu > 1) {
+ err = 9;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+ cpu = bpf_cpumask_any_and(cast(mask1), cast(mask2));
+ if (cpu < nr_cpus) {
+ err = 10;
+ goto release_exit;
+ }
+
+release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst2);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_insert_leave, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ struct __cpumask_map_value *v;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cpumask_map_insert(cpumask))
+ err = 3;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_insert_remove_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ struct __cpumask_map_value *v;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cpumask_map_insert(cpumask)) {
+ err = 3;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ v = cpumask_map_value_lookup();
+ if (!v) {
+ err = 4;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cpumask = bpf_kptr_xchg(&v->cpumask, NULL);
+ if (cpumask)
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ else
+ err = 5;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+int BPF_PROG(test_insert_kptr_get_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ struct __cpumask_map_value *v;
+
+ cpumask = create_cpumask();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cpumask_map_insert(cpumask)) {
+ err = 3;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ v = cpumask_map_value_lookup();
+ if (!v) {
+ err = 4;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(&v->cpumask);
+ if (cpumask)
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ else
+ err = 5;
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 7/9] bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 8/9] bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined David Vernet
` (2 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
Now that we've added a series of new cpumask kfuncs, we should document
them so users can easily use them. This patch adds a new cpumasks.rst
file to document them.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst | 393 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 11 +
kernel/bpf/cpumask.c | 208 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 613 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst b/Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..50be4688b1ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/cpumasks.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+.. _cpumasks-header-label:
+
+==================
+BPF cpumask kfuncs
+==================
+
+1. Introduction
+===============
+
+``struct cpumask`` is a bitmap data structure in the kernel whose indices
+reflect the CPUs on the system. Commonly, cpumasks are used to track which CPUs
+a task is affinitized to, but they can also be used to e.g. track which cores
+are associated with a scheduling domain, which cores on a machine are idle,
+etc.
+
+BPF provides programs with a set of :ref:`kfuncs-header-label` that can be
+used to allocate, mutate, query, and free cpumasks.
+
+2. BPF cpumask objects
+======================
+
+There are two different types of cpumasks that can be used by BPF programs.
+
+2.1 ``struct bpf_cpumask *``
+----------------------------
+
+``struct bpf_cpumask *`` is a cpumask that is allocated by BPF, on behalf of a
+BPF program, and whose lifecycle is entirely controlled by BPF. These cpumasks
+are RCU-protected, can be mutated, can be used as kptrs, and can be safely cast
+to a ``struct cpumask *``.
+
+2.1.1 ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` lifecycle
+----------------------------------------
+
+A ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` is allocated, acquired, and released, using the
+following functions:
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_create
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_acquire
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_release
+
+For example:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct cpumask_map_value {
+ struct bpf_cpumask __kptr_ref * cpumask;
+ };
+
+ struct array_map {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, struct cpumask_map_value);
+ __uint(max_entries, 65536);
+ } cpumask_map SEC(".maps");
+
+ static int cpumask_map_insert(struct bpf_cpumask *mask, u32 pid)
+ {
+ struct cpumask_map_value local, *v;
+ long status;
+ struct bpf_cpumask *old;
+ u32 key = pid;
+
+ local.cpumask = NULL;
+ status = bpf_map_update_elem(&cpumask_map, &key, &local, 0);
+ if (status) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ v = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&cpumask_map, &key);
+ if (!v) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ old = bpf_kptr_xchg(&v->cpumask, mask);
+ if (old)
+ bpf_cpumask_release(old);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * A sample tracepoint showing how a task's cpumask can be queried and
+ * recorded as a kptr.
+ */
+ SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+ int BPF_PROG(record_task_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+ {
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+ int ret;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_create();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_full(task->cpus_ptr))
+ bpf_printk("task %s has CPU affinity", task->comm);
+
+ bpf_cpumask_copy(cpumask, task->cpus_ptr);
+ return cpumask_map_insert(cpumask, task->pid);
+ }
+
+----
+
+2.1.1 ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` as kptrs
+---------------------------------------
+
+As mentioned and illustrated above, these ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` objects can
+also be stored in a map and used as kptrs. If a ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` is in
+a map, the reference can be removed from the map with bpf_kptr_xchg(), or
+opportunistically acquired with bpf_cpumask_kptr_get():
+
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_kptr_get
+
+Here is an example of a ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` being retrieved from a map:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ /* struct containing the struct bpf_cpumask kptr which is actually stored in the map. */
+ struct cpumasks_kfunc_map_value {
+ struct bpf_cpumask __kptr_ref * bpf_cpumask;
+ };
+
+ /* The map containing struct cpumasks_kfunc_map_value entries. */
+ struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, struct cpumasks_kfunc_map_value);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ } cpumasks_kfunc_map SEC(".maps");
+
+ /* ... */
+
+ /**
+ * A simple example tracepoint program showing how a
+ * struct bpf_cpumask * kptr that is stored in a map can
+ * be acquired using the bpf_cpumask_kptr_get() kfunc.
+ */
+ SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir")
+ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_ancestor_example, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path)
+ {
+ struct bpf_cpumask *kptr;
+ struct cpumasks_kfunc_map_value *v;
+ u32 key = 0;
+
+ /* Assume a bpf_cpumask * kptr was previously stored in the map. */
+ v = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&cpumasks_kfunc_map, &key);
+ if (!v)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /* Acquire a reference to the bpf_cpumask * kptr that's already stored in the map. */
+ kptr = bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(&v->cpumask);
+ if (!kptr)
+ /* If no bpf_cpumask was present in the map, it's because
+ * we're racing with another CPU that removed it with
+ * bpf_kptr_xchg() between the bpf_map_lookup_elem()
+ * above, and our call to bpf_cpumask_kptr_get().
+ * bpf_cpumask_kptr_get() internally safely handles this
+ * race, and will return NULL if the cpumask is no longer
+ * present in the map by the time we invoke the kfunc.
+ */
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ /* Free the reference we just took above. Note that the
+ * original struct bpf_cpumask * kptr is still in the map. It will
+ * be freed either at a later time if another context deletes
+ * it from the map, or automatically by the BPF subsystem if
+ * it's still present when the map is destroyed.
+ */
+ bpf_cpumask_release(kptr);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+----
+
+2.2 ``struct cpumask``
+----------------------
+
+``struct cpumask`` is the object that actually contains the cpumask bitmap
+being queried, mutated, etc. A ``struct bpf_cpumask`` wraps a ``struct
+cpumask``, which is why it's safe to cast it as such (note however that it is
+**not** safe to cast a ``struct cpumask *`` to a ``struct bpf_cpumask *``, and
+the verifier will reject any program that tries to do so).
+
+As we'll see below, any kfunc that mutates its cpumask argument will take a
+``struct bpf_cpumask *`` as that argument. Any argument that simply queries the
+cpumask will instead take a ``struct cpumask *``.
+
+3. cpumask kfuncs
+=================
+
+Above, we described the kfuncs that can be used to allocate, acquire, release,
+etc a ``struct bpf_cpumask *``. This section of the document will describe the
+kfuncs for mutating and querying cpumasks.
+
+3.1 Mutating cpumasks
+---------------------
+
+Some cpumask kfuncs are "read-only" in that they don't mutate any of their
+arguments, whereas others mutate at least one argument (which means that the
+argument must be a ``struct bpf_cpumask *``, as described above).
+
+This section will describe all of the cpumask kfuncs which mutate at least one
+argument. :ref:`cpumasks-querying-label` below describes the read-only kfuncs.
+
+3.1.1 Setting and clearing CPUs
+-------------------------------
+
+bpf_cpumask_set_cpu() and bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu() can be used to set and clear
+a CPU in a ``struct bpf_cpumask`` respectively:
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_set_cpu bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu
+
+These kfuncs are pretty straightforward, and can be used, for example, as
+follows:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ /**
+ * A sample tracepoint showing how a cpumask can be queried.
+ */
+ SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+ int BPF_PROG(test_set_clear_cpu, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+ {
+ struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
+
+ cpumask = bpf_cpumask_create();
+ if (!cpumask)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, cpumask);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, cast(cpumask)))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(0, cpumask);
+ if (bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, cast(cpumask)))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ /* struct cpumask * pointers such as task->cpus_ptr can also be queried. */
+ if (bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, task->cpus_ptr))
+ bpf_printk("task %s can use CPU %d", task->comm, 0);
+
+ release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(cpumask);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+----
+
+bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu() and bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu() are
+analogous kfuncs that allow callers to atomically test and set (or clear) CPUs:
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu
+
+----
+
+We can also set and clear entire ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` objects in one
+operation using bpf_cpumask_setall() and bpf_cpumask_clear():
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_setall bpf_cpumask_clear
+
+3.1.2 Operations between cpumasks
+---------------------------------
+
+In addition to setting and clearing individual CPUs in a single cpumask,
+callers can also perform bitwise operations between multiple cpumasks using
+bpf_cpumask_and(), bpf_cpumask_or(), and bpf_cpumask_xor():
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_and bpf_cpumask_or bpf_cpumask_xor
+
+The following is an example of how they may be used. Note that some of the
+kfuncs shown in this example will be covered in more detail below.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ /**
+ * A sample tracepoint showing how a cpumask can be mutated using
+ bitwise operators (and queried).
+ */
+ SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
+ int BPF_PROG(test_and_or_xor, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
+ {
+ struct bpf_cpumask *mask1, *mask2, *dst1, *dst2;
+
+ mask1 = bpf_cpumask_create();
+ if (!mask1)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ mask2 = bpf_cpumask_create();
+ if (!mask2) {
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ // ...Safely create the other two masks... */
+
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(0, mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(1, mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_and(dst1, (const struct cpumask *)mask1, (const struct cpumask *)mask2);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_empty((const struct cpumask *)dst1))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_or(dst1, (const struct cpumask *)mask1, (const struct cpumask *)mask2);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, (const struct cpumask *)dst1))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(1, (const struct cpumask *)dst1))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ bpf_cpumask_xor(dst2, (const struct cpumask *)mask1, (const struct cpumask *)mask2);
+ if (!bpf_cpumask_equal((const struct cpumask *)dst1,
+ (const struct cpumask *)dst2))
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ goto release_exit;
+
+ release_exit:
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(mask2);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst1);
+ bpf_cpumask_release(dst2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+----
+
+The contents of an entire cpumask may be copied to another using
+bpf_cpumask_copy():
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_copy
+
+----
+
+.. _cpumasks-querying-label:
+
+3.2 Querying cpumasks
+---------------------
+
+In addition to the above kfuncs, there is also a set of read-only kfuncs that
+can be used to query the contents of cpumasks.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_first bpf_cpumask_first_zero bpf_cpumask_test_cpu
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_equal bpf_cpumask_intersects bpf_cpumask_subset
+ bpf_cpumask_empty bpf_cpumask_full
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+ :identifiers: bpf_cpumask_any bpf_cpumask_any_and
+
+----
+
+Some example usages of these querying kfuncs were shown above. We will not
+replicate those exmaples here. Note, however, that all of the aforementioned
+kfuncs are tested in `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c`_, so
+please take a look there if you're looking for more examples of how they can be
+used.
+
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_success.c
+
+
+4. Adding BPF cpumask kfuncs
+============================
+
+The set of supported BPF cpumask kfuncs are not (yet) a 1-1 match with the
+cpumask operations in include/linux/cpumask.h. Any of those cpumask operations
+could easily be encapsulated in a new kfunc if and when required. If you'd like
+to support a new cpumask operation, please feel free to submit a patch. If you
+do add a new cpumask kfunc, please document it here, and add any relevant
+selftest testcases to the cpumask selftest suite.
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
index b81533d8b061..dbb39e8f9889 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ that goes into great technical depth about the BPF Architecture.
syscall_api
helpers
kfuncs
+ cpumasks
programs
maps
bpf_prog_run
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
index 9fd7fb539f85..a74f9e74087b 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+.. _kfuncs-header-label:
+
=============================
BPF Kernel Functions (kfuncs)
=============================
@@ -420,3 +424,10 @@ the verifier. bpf_cgroup_ancestor() can be used as follows:
bpf_cgroup_release(parent);
return 0;
}
+
+3.3 struct cpumask * kfuncs
+---------------------------
+
+BPF provides a set of kfuncs that can be used to query, allocate, mutate, and
+destroy struct cpumask * objects. Please refer to :ref:`cpumasks-header-label`
+for more details.
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
index 92eedc84dbfc..985bfb6f5c81 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumask.c
@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ __diag_push();
__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
"Global kfuncs as their definitions will be in BTF");
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_create() - Create a mutable BPF cpumask.
+ *
+ * Allocates a cpumask that can be queried, mutated, acquired, and released by
+ * a BPF program. The cpumask returned by this function must either be embedded
+ * in a map as a kptr, or freed with bpf_cpumask_release().
+ *
+ * bpf_cpumask_create() allocates memory using the BPF memory allocator, and
+ * will not block. It may return NULL if no memory is available.
+ */
struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void)
{
struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
@@ -53,12 +63,31 @@ struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void)
return cpumask;
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_acquire() - Acquire a reference to a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask being acquired. The cpumask must be a trusted
+ * pointer.
+ *
+ * Acquires a reference to a BPF cpumask. The cpumask returned by this function
+ * must either be embedded in a map as a kptr, or freed with
+ * bpf_cpumask_release().
+ */
struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_acquire(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
refcount_inc(&cpumask->usage);
return cpumask;
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_kptr_get() - Attempt to acquire a reference to a BPF cpumask
+ * stored in a map.
+ * @cpumaskp: A pointer to a BPF cpumask map value.
+ *
+ * Attempts to acquire a reference to a BPF cpumask stored in a map value. The
+ * cpumask returned by this function must either be embedded in a map as a
+ * kptr, or freed with bpf_cpumask_release(). This function may return NULL if
+ * no BPF cpumask was found in the specified map value.
+ */
struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(struct bpf_cpumask **cpumaskp)
{
struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
@@ -77,6 +106,14 @@ struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_kptr_get(struct bpf_cpumask **cpumaskp)
return cpumask;
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_release() - Release a previously acquired BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being released.
+ *
+ * Releases a previously acquired reference to a BPF cpumask. When the final
+ * reference of the BPF cpumask has been released, it is subsequently freed in
+ * an RCU callback in the BPF memory allocator.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_release(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpumask)
@@ -89,16 +126,36 @@ void bpf_cpumask_release(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
}
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_first() - Get the index of the first nonzero bit in the cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being queried.
+ *
+ * Find the index of the first nonzero bit of the cpumask. A struct bpf_cpumask
+ * pointer may be safely passed to this function.
+ */
u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_first(cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_first_zero() - Get the index of the first unset bit in the
+ * cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being queried.
+ *
+ * Find the index of the first unset bit of the cpumask. A struct bpf_cpumask
+ * pointer may be safely passed to this function.
+ */
u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_first_zero(cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_set_cpu() - Set a bit for a CPU in a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpu: The CPU to be set in the cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask in which a bit is being set.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
@@ -107,6 +164,11 @@ void bpf_cpumask_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu() - Clear a bit for a CPU in a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpu: The CPU to be cleared from the cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask in which a bit is being cleared.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
@@ -115,6 +177,15 @@ void bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_test_cpu() - Test whether a CPU is set in a cpumask.
+ * @cpu: The CPU being queried for.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being queried for containing a CPU.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @cpu is set in the cpumask
+ * * false - @cpu was not set in the cpumask, or @cpu is an invalid cpu.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(u32 cpu, const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
@@ -123,6 +194,15 @@ bool bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(u32 cpu, const struct cpumask *cpumask)
return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu() - Atomically test and set a CPU in a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpu: The CPU being set and queried for.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask being set and queried for containing a CPU.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @cpu is set in the cpumask
+ * * false - @cpu was not set in the cpumask, or @cpu is invalid.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
@@ -131,6 +211,16 @@ bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
return cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu() - Atomically test and clear a CPU in a BPF
+ * cpumask.
+ * @cpu: The CPU being cleared and queried for.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask being cleared and queried for containing a CPU.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @cpu is set in the cpumask
+ * * false - @cpu was not set in the cpumask, or @cpu is invalid.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
if (!cpu_valid(cpu))
@@ -139,16 +229,36 @@ bool bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(u32 cpu, struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
return cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, (struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_setall() - Set all of the bits in a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask having all of its bits set.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_setall(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
cpumask_setall((struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_clear() - Clear all of the bits in a BPF cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The BPF cpumask being cleared.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_clear(struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask)
{
cpumask_clear((struct cpumask *)cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_and() - AND two cpumasks and store the result.
+ * @dst: The BPF cpumask where the result is being stored.
+ * @src1: The first input.
+ * @src2: The second input.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @dst has at least one bit set following the operation
+ * * false - @dst is empty following the operation
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_and(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
const struct cpumask *src1,
const struct cpumask *src2)
@@ -156,6 +266,14 @@ bool bpf_cpumask_and(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
return cpumask_and((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_or() - OR two cpumasks and store the result.
+ * @dst: The BPF cpumask where the result is being stored.
+ * @src1: The first input.
+ * @src2: The second input.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_or(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
const struct cpumask *src1,
const struct cpumask *src2)
@@ -163,6 +281,14 @@ void bpf_cpumask_or(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
cpumask_or((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_xor() - XOR two cpumasks and store the result.
+ * @dst: The BPF cpumask where the result is being stored.
+ * @src1: The first input.
+ * @src2: The second input.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_xor(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
const struct cpumask *src1,
const struct cpumask *src2)
@@ -170,41 +296,123 @@ void bpf_cpumask_xor(struct bpf_cpumask *dst,
cpumask_xor((struct cpumask *)dst, src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_equal() - Check two cpumasks for equality.
+ * @src1: The first input.
+ * @src2: The second input.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @src1 and @src2 have the same bits set.
+ * * false - @src1 and @src2 differ in at least one bit.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_equal(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
{
return cpumask_equal(src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_intersects() - Check two cpumasks for overlap.
+ * @src1: The first input.
+ * @src2: The second input.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - @src1 and @src2 have at least one of the same bits set.
+ * * false - @src1 and @src2 don't have any of the same bits set.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_intersects(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
{
return cpumask_intersects(src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_subset() - Check if a cpumask is a subset of another.
+ * @src1: The first cpumask being checked as a subset.
+ * @src2: The second cpumask being checked as a superset.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - All of the bits of @src1 are set in @src2.
+ * * false - At least one bit in @src1 is not set in @src2.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_subset(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
{
return cpumask_subset(src1, src2);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_empty() - Check if a cpumask is empty.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being checked.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - None of the bits in @cpumask are set.
+ * * false - At least one bit in @cpumask is set.
+ *
+ * A struct bpf_cpumask pointer may be safely passed to @cpumask.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_empty(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_empty(cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_full() - Check if a cpumask has all bits set.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being checked.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * true - All of the bits in @cpumask are set.
+ * * false - At least one bit in @cpumask is cleared.
+ *
+ * A struct bpf_cpumask pointer may be safely passed to @cpumask.
+ */
bool bpf_cpumask_full(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_full(cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_copy() - Copy the contents of a cpumask into a BPF cpumask.
+ * @dst: The BPF cpumask being copied into.
+ * @src: The cpumask being copied.
+ *
+ * A struct bpf_cpumask pointer may be safely passed to @src.
+ */
void bpf_cpumask_copy(struct bpf_cpumask *dst, const struct cpumask *src)
{
cpumask_copy((struct cpumask *)dst, src);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_any() - Return a random set CPU from a cpumask.
+ * @cpumask: The cpumask being queried.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * A random set bit within [0, num_cpus) if at least one bit is set.
+ * * >= num_cpus if no bit is set.
+ *
+ * A struct bpf_cpumask pointer may be safely passed to @src.
+ */
u32 bpf_cpumask_any(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_any(cpumask);
}
+/**
+ * bpf_cpumask_any_and() - Return a random set CPU from the AND of two
+ * cpumasks.
+ * @src1: The first cpumask.
+ * @src2: The second cpumask.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * A random set bit within [0, num_cpus) if at least one bit is set.
+ * * >= num_cpus if no bit is set.
+ *
+ * struct bpf_cpumask pointers may be safely passed to @src1 and @src2.
+ */
u32 bpf_cpumask_any_and(const struct cpumask *src1, const struct cpumask *src2)
{
return cpumask_any_and(src1, src2);
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 8/9] bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 7/9] bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 9/9] bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init David Vernet
2023-01-25 4:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
A prior change defined a new BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED macro in the verifier
which allows developers to specify when a pointee field in a struct type
should inherit its parent pointer's trusted status. This patch updates
the kfuncs documentation to specify this macro and how it can be used.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
index a74f9e74087b..560f4ede3a9f 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ KF_ACQUIRE and KF_RET_NULL flags.
The KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag is used for kfuncs taking pointer arguments. It
indicates that the all pointer arguments are valid, and that all pointers to
BTF objects have been passed in their unmodified form (that is, at a zero
-offset, and without having been obtained from walking another pointer).
+offset, and without having been obtained from walking another pointer, with one
+exception described below).
There are two types of pointers to kernel objects which are considered "valid":
@@ -180,6 +181,25 @@ KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs, and may have a non-zero offset.
The definition of "valid" pointers is subject to change at any time, and has
absolutely no ABI stability guarantees.
+As mentioned above, a nested pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is
+no longer trusted, with one exception. If a struct type has a field that is
+guaranteed to be valid as long as its parent pointer is trusted, the
+``BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED`` macro can be used to express that to the verifier as
+follows:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct) {
+ const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr;
+ };
+
+In other words, you must:
+
+1. Wrap the trusted pointer type in the ``BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED`` macro.
+
+2. Specify the type and name of the trusted nested field. This field must match
+ the field in the original type definition exactly.
+
2.4.6 KF_SLEEPABLE flag
-----------------------
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 9/9] bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 8/9] bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined David Vernet
@ 2023-01-20 19:25 ` David Vernet
2023-01-25 4:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-20 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
When comparing BTF IDs for pointers being passed to kfunc arguments, the
verifier will allow pointer types that are equivalent according to the C
standard. For example, for:
struct bpf_cpumask {
cpumask_t cpumask;
refcount_t usage;
};
The verifier will allow a struct bpf_cpumask * to be passed to a kfunc
that takes a const struct cpumask * (cpumask_t is a typedef of struct
cpumask). The exception to this rule is if a type is suffixed with
___init, such as:
struct nf_conn___init {
struct nf_conn ct;
};
The verifier will _not_ allow a struct nf_conn___init * to be passed to
a kfunc that expects a struct nf_conn *. This patch documents this
behavior in the kfuncs documentation page.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
---
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
index 560f4ede3a9f..7bdce4955a1b 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
@@ -247,6 +247,49 @@ type. An example is shown below::
}
late_initcall(init_subsystem);
+2.6 Specifying no-cast aliases with ___init
+--------------------------------------------
+
+The verifier will always enforce that the BTF type of a pointer passed to a
+kfunc by a BPF program, matches the type of pointer specified in the kfunc
+definition. The verifier, does, however, allow types that are equivalent
+according to the C standard to be passed to the same kfunc arg, even if their
+BTF_IDs differ .
+
+For example, for the following type definition:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct bpf_cpumask {
+ cpumask_t cpumask;
+ refcount_t usage;
+ };
+
+The verifier would allow a ``struct bpf_cpumask *`` to be passed to a kfunc
+taking a ``cpumask_t *`` (which is a typedef of ``struct cpumask *``). For
+instance, both ``struct cpumask *`` and ``struct bpf_cpmuask *`` can be passed
+to bpf_cpumask_test_cpu().
+
+In some cases, this type-aliasing behavior is not desired. ``struct
+nf_conn___init`` is one such example:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct nf_conn___init {
+ struct nf_conn ct;
+ };
+
+The C standard would consider these types to be equivalent, but it would not
+always be safe to pass either type to a trusted kfunc. ``struct
+nf_conn___init`` represents an allocated ``struct nf_conn`` object that has
+*not yet been initialized*, so it would therefore be unsafe to pass a ``struct
+nf_conn___init *`` to a kfunc that's expecting a fully initialized ``struct
+nf_conn *`` (e.g. ``bpf_ct_change_timeout()``).
+
+In order to accommodate such requirements, the verifier will enforce strict
+PTR_TO_BTF_ID type matching if two types have the exact same name, with one
+being suffixed with ``___init``.
+
3. Core kfuncs
==============
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs David Vernet
@ 2023-01-25 4:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-01-25 5:36 ` David Vernet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2023-01-25 4:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Vernet
Cc: bpf, ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 01:25:18PM -0600, David Vernet wrote:
> +
> +/**
> + * struct bpf_cpumask - refcounted BPF cpumask wrapper structure
> + * @cpumask: The actual cpumask embedded in the struct.
> + * @usage: Object reference counter. When the refcount goes to 0, the
> + * memory is released back to the BPF allocator, which provides
> + * RCU safety.
> + *
> + * Note that we explicitly embed a cpumask_t rather than a cpumask_var_t. This
> + * is done to avoid confusing the verifier due to the typedef of cpumask_var_t
> + * changing depending on whether CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is defined or not. See
> + * the details in <linux/cpumask.h>. The consequence is that this structure is
> + * likely a bit larger than it needs to be when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is
> + * defined due to embedding the whole NR_CPUS-size bitmap, but the extra memory
> + * overhead is minimal. For the more typical case of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
> + * not being defined, the structure is the same size regardless.
> + */
> +struct bpf_cpumask {
> + cpumask_t cpumask;
> + refcount_t usage;
> +};
> +
> +static struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_cpumask_ma;
> +
> +static bool cpu_valid(u32 cpu)
> +{
> + return cpu < nr_cpu_ids;
> +}
> +
> +__diag_push();
> +__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
> + "Global kfuncs as their definitions will be in BTF");
> +
> +struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void)
> +{
> + struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
> +
> + cpumask = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_cpumask_ma, sizeof(*cpumask));
> + if (!cpumask)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + memset(cpumask, 0, sizeof(*cpumask));
> + refcount_set(&cpumask->usage, 1);
> +
> + return cpumask;
> +}
Applied patches 1 and 2. Patch 3 doesn't apply anymore. Pls rebase.
I'm fine with existing bpf_cpumask proposal, but can we do better?
This is so close to be a bitmap template.
Can we generalize it as
struct bpf_bitmap {
refcount_t refcnt;
int num_bits;
u64 bits[];
};
struct bpf_bitmap *bpf_bitmap_create(int bits)
{
bitmap = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_cpumask_ma, sizeof(*bitmap) + BITS_TO_LONGS(bits) * sizeof(u64));
bitmap->num_bits = bits;
}
and special case few custom kfuncs in the verifier that allow
type cast from bpf_bitmap with to 'struct cpumask *' ? Like
struct cpumask *bpf_bitmap_cast_to_cpumask(struct bpf_bitmap *bitmap)
{
if (bitmap->num_bits == nr_cpu_ids)
return bitmap->bits;
return NULL;
}
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_bitmap_cast_to_cpumask, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_RET_NULL)
The UX will be a bit worse, since bpf prog would need to do !=NULL check
but with future bpf_assert() we may get rid of !=NULL check.
We can keep direct cpumask accessors as kfuncs:
u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
and add bpf_find_first_bit() and the rest of bit manipulations.
Since all of the bpf_cpumask do run-time cpu_valid() check we're not
sacrificing performance.
Feels more generic with wider applicability at the expense of little bit worse UX.
I haven't thought about acq/rel consequences.
wdyt?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 9/9] bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init David Vernet
@ 2023-01-25 4:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
9 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2023-01-25 4:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Vernet
Cc: bpf, ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
Hello:
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>:
On Fri, 20 Jan 2023 13:25:14 -0600 you wrote:
> This is part 2 of https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119235833.2948341-1-void@manifault.com/
>
> Changelog:
> ----------
> v1 -> v2:
> - Put back 'static' keyword in bpf_find_btf_id()
> (kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
> - Surround cpumask kfuncs in __diag() blocks to avoid no-prototype build
> warnings (kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
> - Enable ___init suffixes to a type definition to signal that a type is
> a nocast alias of another type. That is, that when passed to a kfunc
> that expects one of the two types, the verifier will reject the other
> even if they're equivalent according to the C standard (Kumar and
> Alexei)
> - Reject NULL for all trusted args, not just PTR_TO_MEM (Kumar)
> - Reject both NULL and PTR_MAYBE_NULL for all trusted args (Kumar and
> Alexei )
> - Improve examples given in cpumask documentation (Alexei)
> - Use __success macro for nested_trust test (Alexei)
> - Fix comment typo in struct bpf_cpumask comment header.
> - Fix another example in the bpf_cpumask doc examples.
> - Add documentation for ___init suffix change mentioned above.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,v2,1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/57539b1c0ac2
- [bpf-next,v2,2/9] bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/b613d335a743
- [bpf-next,v2,3/9] bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,5/9] selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,6/9] selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,7/9] bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,8/9] bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined
(no matching commit)
- [bpf-next,v2,9/9] bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init
(no matching commit)
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
2023-01-25 4:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2023-01-25 5:36 ` David Vernet
2023-01-25 5:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Vernet @ 2023-01-25 5:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: bpf, ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, song, yhs, john.fastabend,
kpsingh, sdf, haoluo, jolsa, linux-kernel, kernel-team, tj,
memxor
On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 08:36:02PM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 01:25:18PM -0600, David Vernet wrote:
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * struct bpf_cpumask - refcounted BPF cpumask wrapper structure
> > + * @cpumask: The actual cpumask embedded in the struct.
> > + * @usage: Object reference counter. When the refcount goes to 0, the
> > + * memory is released back to the BPF allocator, which provides
> > + * RCU safety.
> > + *
> > + * Note that we explicitly embed a cpumask_t rather than a cpumask_var_t. This
> > + * is done to avoid confusing the verifier due to the typedef of cpumask_var_t
> > + * changing depending on whether CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is defined or not. See
> > + * the details in <linux/cpumask.h>. The consequence is that this structure is
> > + * likely a bit larger than it needs to be when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is
> > + * defined due to embedding the whole NR_CPUS-size bitmap, but the extra memory
> > + * overhead is minimal. For the more typical case of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
> > + * not being defined, the structure is the same size regardless.
> > + */
> > +struct bpf_cpumask {
> > + cpumask_t cpumask;
> > + refcount_t usage;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_cpumask_ma;
> > +
> > +static bool cpu_valid(u32 cpu)
> > +{
> > + return cpu < nr_cpu_ids;
> > +}
> > +
> > +__diag_push();
> > +__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
> > + "Global kfuncs as their definitions will be in BTF");
> > +
> > +struct bpf_cpumask *bpf_cpumask_create(void)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
> > +
> > + cpumask = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_cpumask_ma, sizeof(*cpumask));
> > + if (!cpumask)
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > + memset(cpumask, 0, sizeof(*cpumask));
> > + refcount_set(&cpumask->usage, 1);
> > +
> > + return cpumask;
> > +}
>
> Applied patches 1 and 2. Patch 3 doesn't apply anymore. Pls rebase.
Ack, will rebase for v3.
> I'm fine with existing bpf_cpumask proposal, but can we do better?
> This is so close to be a bitmap template.
Agreed that they're close, but I'm not a fan of the UX taxes for what we
get out of it. More below.
> Can we generalize it as
> struct bpf_bitmap {
> refcount_t refcnt;
> int num_bits;
> u64 bits[];
> };
>
> struct bpf_bitmap *bpf_bitmap_create(int bits)
> {
> bitmap = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_cpumask_ma, sizeof(*bitmap) + BITS_TO_LONGS(bits) * sizeof(u64));
> bitmap->num_bits = bits;
> }
+1 that having bitmap kfuncs would be nice to expose, and should be
pretty easy to add. Happy to do so in a follow-on patch set.
>
> and special case few custom kfuncs in the verifier that allow
> type cast from bpf_bitmap with to 'struct cpumask *' ? Like
> struct cpumask *bpf_bitmap_cast_to_cpumask(struct bpf_bitmap *bitmap)
> {
> if (bitmap->num_bits == nr_cpu_ids)
> return bitmap->bits;
> return NULL;
> }
> BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_bitmap_cast_to_cpumask, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_RET_NULL)
This I'm not a huge fan of though. It seems like we're removing a useful
abstraction and adding a UX tax just to avoid defining and exporting an
additional small set of kfuncs for allocating, and acquire/releasing a
struct bpf_cpumask. That logic is very minimal, just around 100 lines of
code including doxygen comments.
It's kind of unfortunate that cpumask is so close to bitmap, but that's
nothing new -- <linux/cpumask.h> in the kernel is little more than a
thin wrapper around a bitmap that simply provides some more ergonomic
APIs, along with some magic that makes it safe to access cpumask_var_t
on the stack regardless of NR_CPUS. The latter doesn't apply to BPF, but
the former does.
> The UX will be a bit worse, since bpf prog would need to do !=NULL check
> but with future bpf_assert() we may get rid of !=NULL check.
>
> We can keep direct cpumask accessors as kfuncs:
>
> u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
> u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
>
> and add bpf_find_first_bit() and the rest of bit manipulations.
Worth noting as well is that I think struct bpf_bitmap is going to be
treated somewhat differently than struct bpf_cpumask and struct cpumask.
There is no type-safety for bitmaps in the kernel. They're just
represented as unsigned long *, so I don't we'll be able to allow
programs to pass bitmaps allocated elsewhere in the kernel to read-only
bitmap kfuncs like we do for struct cpumask *, as the verifier will just
interpret them as pointers to statically sized scalars.
> Since all of the bpf_cpumask do run-time cpu_valid() check we're not
> sacrificing performance.
>
> Feels more generic with wider applicability at the expense of little bit worse UX.
> I haven't thought about acq/rel consequences.
The TL;DR from me is that I agree that having bitmap kfuncs is a great
idea, but I don't see the need to tie the two at the hip at the cost of
a worse UX. I'd prefer to push the extra complexity into the BPF backend
in favor of a simpler programming front-end for users.
Thoughts?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
2023-01-25 5:36 ` David Vernet
@ 2023-01-25 5:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2023-01-25 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Vernet
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend,
KP Singh, Stanislav Fomichev, Hao Luo, Jiri Olsa, LKML,
Kernel Team, Tejun Heo, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 9:36 PM David Vernet <void@manifault.com> wrote:
>
> > The UX will be a bit worse, since bpf prog would need to do !=NULL check
> > but with future bpf_assert() we may get rid of !=NULL check.
> >
> > We can keep direct cpumask accessors as kfuncs:
> >
> > u32 bpf_cpumask_first(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
> > u32 bpf_cpumask_first_zero(const struct cpumask *cpumask);
> >
> > and add bpf_find_first_bit() and the rest of bit manipulations.
>
> Worth noting as well is that I think struct bpf_bitmap is going to be
> treated somewhat differently than struct bpf_cpumask and struct cpumask.
> There is no type-safety for bitmaps in the kernel. They're just
> represented as unsigned long *, so I don't we'll be able to allow
> programs to pass bitmaps allocated elsewhere in the kernel to read-only
> bitmap kfuncs like we do for struct cpumask *, as the verifier will just
> interpret them as pointers to statically sized scalars.
That's a good point. That's where run-time and verification-time
safety hurts UX too much.
> > Since all of the bpf_cpumask do run-time cpu_valid() check we're not
> > sacrificing performance.
> >
> > Feels more generic with wider applicability at the expense of little bit worse UX.
> > I haven't thought about acq/rel consequences.
>
> The TL;DR from me is that I agree that having bitmap kfuncs is a great
> idea, but I don't see the need to tie the two at the hip at the cost of
> a worse UX. I'd prefer to push the extra complexity into the BPF backend
> in favor of a simpler programming front-end for users.
>
> Thoughts?
Fair enough. Let's proceed with what you have.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-01-25 5:43 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-01-20 19:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/9] bpf: Enable annotating trusted nested pointers David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/9] bpf: Allow trusted args to walk struct when checking BTF IDs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/9] bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/9] bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs David Vernet
2023-01-25 4:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-01-25 5:36 ` David Vernet
2023-01-25 5:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 7/9] bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 8/9] bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined David Vernet
2023-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 9/9] bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init David Vernet
2023-01-25 4:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/9] Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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