From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 0/7] Support nested SNP KVM guests on Hyper-V
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 10:33:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230213103402.1189285-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
This patch series enables SNP-host support when running on Hyper-V, which
allows launching SNP guests while running as a nested hypervisor. This works
with SNP guest side support that was merged in v5.19, and the snp capable qemu
from AMD.
In this scenario the L0 hypervisor is Hyper-V, L1 is KVM, and L2 is an SNP
guest. The code from this patchset runs in L1. L1 is not an SNP guest itself,
SNP guests are not capable of supporting virtualization.
Patch 1 deals with allocating an RMP table which is not provided by
firmware/hypervisor, but is needed by the kernel to keep track of page
assignment to guests and rmp page size. Patch 2 implements MSR-based
rmpupdate/psmash instructions which are meant for virtualized environments.
Patch 3 containts the logic to update the rmp table when rmpupdate/psmash is
issued. Patch 4 makes sure that the kernel does not disable SNP support during
early CPU init. Patch 5 allows SNP initialization to proceed when no iommus
are available. Patch 6 adds a quirk in psp command buffer handling, because of
differences in SNP firmware spec interpretation. Patch 7 adds handling for RMP
faults which occur as NPF and the L0 is not able to resolve the address that
the fault occurred at.
This series depends on:
- "Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support" (applies on top of RFC v7)
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221214194056.161492-1-michael.roth@amd.com/
- "Support ACPI PSP on Hyper-V"
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213092429.1167812-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com/
Changes since v1:
* added handling for rmp page faults that occur during copy_to_user() that
don't come with a proper fault address when running nested.
* fold IS_ENABLED() test into hv_needs_snp_rmp(), and use CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
* introduce snp_soft_rmptable() wrapper to remove core dependency on hyperv
specific code
* use msr_set_bit for SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT bit instead of open coding
Jeremi Piotrowski (7):
x86/hyperv: Allocate RMP table during boot
x86/sev: Add support for NestedVirtSnpMsr
x86/sev: Maintain shadow rmptable on Hyper-V
x86/amd: Configure necessary MSRs for SNP during CPU init when running
as a guest
iommu/amd: Don't fail snp_enable when running virtualized
crypto: ccp - Introduce quirk to always reclaim pages after SEV-legacy
commands
x86/fault: Handle RMP faults with 0 address when nested
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 47 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 14 +++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 6 +-
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h | 4 +
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-platform.c | 1 +
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 6 ++
14 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.25.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-02-13 10:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-13 10:33 Jeremi Piotrowski [this message]
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/7] x86/hyperv: Allocate RMP table during boot Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/7] x86/sev: Add support for NestedVirtSnpMsr Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/7] x86/sev: Maintain shadow rmptable on Hyper-V Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/7] x86/amd: Configure necessary MSRs for SNP during CPU init when running as a guest Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/7] iommu/amd: Don't fail snp_enable when running virtualized Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccp - Introduce quirk to always reclaim pages after SEV-legacy commands Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/7] x86/fault: Handle RMP faults with 0 address when nested Jeremi Piotrowski
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