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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pjt@google.com, evn@google.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
	kim.phillips@amd.com, alexandre.chartre@oracle.com,
	daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com, corbet@lwn.net, bp@suse.de,
	linyujun809@huawei.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, jmattson@google.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	"José Oliveira" <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>,
	"Rodrigo Branco" <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 07:05:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230227060541.1939092-1-kpsingh@kernel.org> (raw)

When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.

The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.

Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).

Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cf81848b72f4..44e22cda7fb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1133,14 +1133,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
-	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
-	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
 	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
 	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
 }
 
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
 static void __init
 spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
@@ -1203,12 +1207,20 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
-	 * STIBP is not required.
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+	 * is not required.
+	 *
+	 * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+	 * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+	 * implicitly enables cross-thread protections.  However, in legacy IBRS
+	 * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+	 * to userspace. This disables the implicit
+	 * cross-thread protection, so allow for STIBP to be selected in that
+	 * case.
 	 */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
 	    !smt_possible ||
-	    spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -2340,7 +2352,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
-- 
2.39.2.637.g21b0678d19-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2023-02-27  6:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-27  6:05 KP Singh [this message]
2023-02-27  6:05 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP KP Singh
2023-02-27  6:30   ` Greg KH
2023-02-27 19:58   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for KP Singh
2023-02-27  6:29 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS Greg KH

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