From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mm: restrictedmem: Allow userspace to specify mount for memfd_restricted
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 16:58:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230404-engraved-rumble-d871e0403f3b@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230404-amnesty-untying-01de932d4945@brauner>
On Tue, Apr 04, 2023 at 03:53:13PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 31, 2023 at 11:50:39PM +0000, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> > By default, the backing shmem file for a restrictedmem fd is created
> > on shmem's kernel space mount.
> >
> > With this patch, an optional tmpfs mount can be specified via an fd,
> > which will be used as the mountpoint for backing the shmem file
> > associated with a restrictedmem fd.
> >
> > This will help restrictedmem fds inherit the properties of the
> > provided tmpfs mounts, for example, hugepage allocation hints, NUMA
> > binding hints, etc.
> >
> > Permissions for the fd passed to memfd_restricted() is modeled after
> > the openat() syscall, since both of these allow creation of a file
> > upon a mount/directory.
> >
> > Permission to reference the mount the fd represents is checked upon fd
> > creation by other syscalls (e.g. fsmount(), open(), or open_tree(),
> > etc) and any process that can present memfd_restricted() with a valid
> > fd is expected to have obtained permission to use the mount
> > represented by the fd. This behavior is intended to parallel that of
> > the openat() syscall.
> >
> > memfd_restricted() will check that the tmpfs superblock is
> > writable, and that the mount is also writable, before attempting to
> > create a restrictedmem file on the mount.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 +-
> > include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h | 8 ++++
> > mm/restrictedmem.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > index f9e9e0c820c5..a23c4c385cd3 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);
> > asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
> > unsigned long home_node,
> > unsigned long flags);
> > -asmlinkage long sys_memfd_restricted(unsigned int flags);
> > +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_restricted(unsigned int flags, int mount_fd);
> >
> > /*
> > * Architecture-specific system calls
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h b/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..22d6f2285f6d
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> > +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H
> > +#define _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H
> > +
> > +/* flags for memfd_restricted */
> > +#define RMFD_USERMNT 0x0001U
> > +
> > +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H */
> > diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > index c5d869d8c2d8..f7b62364a31a 100644
> > --- a/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > +++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > @@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
> > // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > -#include "linux/sbitmap.h"
> > +#include <linux/namei.h>
> > #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
> > #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
> > #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > #include <uapi/linux/falloc.h>
> > #include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
> > +#include <uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h>
> > #include <linux/restrictedmem.h>
> >
> > struct restrictedmem {
> > @@ -189,19 +190,20 @@ static struct file *restrictedmem_file_create(struct file *memfd)
> > return file;
> > }
> >
> > -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags)
> > +static int restrictedmem_create(struct vfsmount *mount)
> > {
> > struct file *file, *restricted_file;
> > int fd, err;
> >
> > - if (flags)
> > - return -EINVAL;
> > -
> > fd = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
>
> Any reasons the file descriptors aren't O_CLOEXEC by default? I don't
> see any reasons why we should introduce new fdtypes that aren't
> O_CLOEXEC by default. The "don't mix-and-match" train has already left
> the station anyway as we do have seccomp noitifer fds and pidfds both of
> which are O_CLOEXEC by default.
>
> > if (fd < 0)
> > return fd;
> >
> > - file = shmem_file_setup("memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> > + if (mount)
> > + file = shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(mount, "memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> > + else
> > + file = shmem_file_setup("memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> > +
> > if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> > err = PTR_ERR(file);
> > goto err_fd;
> > @@ -223,6 +225,66 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags)
> > return err;
> > }
> >
> > +static bool is_shmem_mount(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> > +{
> > + return mnt && mnt->mnt_sb && mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC;
>
> This can just be if (mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC).
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +static bool is_mount_root(struct file *file)
> > +{
> > + return file->f_path.dentry == file->f_path.mnt->mnt_root;
>
> mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt
> touch /mnt/bla
> touch /mnt/ble
> mount --bind /mnt/bla /mnt/ble
> fd = open("/mnt/ble")
> fd_restricted = memfd_restricted(fd)
>
> IOW, this doesn't restrict it to the tmpfs root. It only restricts it to
> paths that refer to the root of any tmpfs mount. To exclude bind-mounts
> that aren't bind-mounts of the whole filesystem you want:
>
> path->dentry == path->mnt->mnt_root &&
> path->mnt->mnt_root == path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_root
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int restrictedmem_create_on_user_mount(int mount_fd)
> > +{
> > + int ret;
> > + struct fd f;
> > + struct vfsmount *mnt;
> > +
> > + f = fdget_raw(mount_fd);
> > + if (!f.file)
> > + return -EBADF;
> > +
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + if (!is_mount_root(f.file))
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + mnt = f.file->f_path.mnt;
> > + if (!is_shmem_mount(mnt))
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + ret = file_permission(f.file, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
>
> With the current semantics you're asking whether you have write
> permissions on the /mnt/ble file in order to get answer to the question
> whether you're allowed to create an unlinked restricted memory file.
> That doesn't make much sense afaict.
>
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + ret = mnt_want_write(mnt);
> > + if (unlikely(ret))
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + ret = restrictedmem_create(mnt);
> > +
> > + mnt_drop_write(mnt);
> > +out:
> > + fdput(f);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags, int, mount_fd)
> > +{
> > + if (flags & ~RMFD_USERMNT)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (flags == RMFD_USERMNT) {
>
> Why do you even need this flag? It seems that @mount_fd being < 0 is
> sufficient to indicate that a new restricted memory fd is supposed to be
> created in the system instance.
>
> > + if (mount_fd < 0)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + return restrictedmem_create_on_user_mount(mount_fd);
> > + } else {
> > + return restrictedmem_create(NULL);
> > + }
> > +}
>
> I have to say that I'm very confused by all of this the more I look at it.
>
> Effectively memfd restricted functions as a wrapper filesystem around
> the tmpfs filesystem. This is basically a weird overlay filesystem.
> You're allocating tmpfs files that you stash in restrictedmem files.
> I have to say that this seems very hacky. I didn't get this at all at
> first.
>
> So what does the caller get if they call statx() on a restricted memfd?
> Do they get the device number of the tmpfs mount and the inode numbers
> of the tmpfs mount? Because it looks like they would:
>
> static int restrictedmem_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
> u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
> struct restrictedmem *rm = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
> struct file *memfd = rm->memfd;
>
> return memfd->f_inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat,
This is pretty broken btw, because @path refers to a restrictedmem path
which you're passing to a tmpfs iop...
I see that in
return memfd->f_inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, &memfd->f_path, stat,
request_mask, query_flags);
this if fixed but still, this is... not great.
> request_mask, query_flags);
>
> That @memfd would be a struct file allocated in a tmpfs instance, no? So
> you'd be calling the inode operation of the tmpfs file meaning that
> struct kstat will be filled up with the info from the tmpfs instance.
>
> But then if I call statfs() and check the fstype I would get
> RESTRICTEDMEM_MAGIC, no? This is... unorthodox?
>
> I'm honestly puzzled and this sounds really strange. There must be a
> better way to implement all of this.
>
> Shouldn't you try and make this a part of tmpfs proper? Make a really
> separate filesystem and add a memfs library that both tmpfs and
> restrictedmemfs can use? Add a mount option to tmpfs that makes it a
> restricted tmpfs?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-04 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 398+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-31 23:50 [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Providing mount in memfd_restricted() syscall Ackerley Tng
2023-03-31 23:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mm: restrictedmem: Allow userspace to specify mount for memfd_restricted Ackerley Tng
2023-04-03 8:21 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-05 22:29 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-04 8:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-05 22:32 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-04 13:53 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-04 14:58 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2023-04-05 21:58 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-12 9:59 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-13 22:53 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-13 23:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-31 23:50 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: restrictedmem: Check hugepage-ness of shmem file backing restrictedmem fd Ackerley Tng
2023-04-03 8:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-11 1:35 ` Ackerley Tng
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-12-02 6:13 [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM Chao Peng
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] mm: Introduce memfd_restricted system call to create restricted user memory Chao Peng
2022-12-06 14:57 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-07 13:50 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-13 23:49 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-19 7:53 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-19 8:48 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-20 7:22 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-20 8:33 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-21 13:39 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-22 0:37 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-23 8:20 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-23 14:03 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-01-23 15:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-13 14:23 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-01-23 23:01 ` Huang, Kai
2023-01-23 23:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-24 7:51 ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-12-22 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-23 0:50 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-23 8:24 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-23 15:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-13 11:43 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-13 13:10 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-13 21:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-17 12:41 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-17 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-18 8:16 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-18 10:17 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-22 2:07 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-24 5:42 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-30 5:26 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-01-30 6:04 ` Wang, Wei W
2023-02-16 9:51 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-03-20 19:08 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-13 15:25 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Christian Brauner
2023-04-13 22:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-14 22:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-14 23:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-15 0:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-19 8:29 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-20 0:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-20 8:35 ` Christian Brauner
2023-04-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] mm: Introduce memfd_restricted system call to create restricted user memory Ackerley Tng
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] KVM: Introduce per-page memory attributes Chao Peng
2022-12-06 13:34 ` Fabiano Rosas
2022-12-07 14:31 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-06 15:07 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-07 14:51 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-19 8:15 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-19 10:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 7:24 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-28 8:28 ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-01-03 1:39 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-03 3:32 ` Wang, Wei W
2023-01-03 23:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-05 4:39 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-13 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-17 3:21 ` Binbin Wu
2023-01-17 13:30 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-17 17:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-09 7:25 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-10 0:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-13 23:53 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-14 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-19 17:32 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2023-05-19 18:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-19 19:49 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2023-05-19 19:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-23 18:59 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2022-12-05 9:03 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-06 11:53 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-06 12:39 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-07 15:10 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-08 8:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-12-08 11:30 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-13 12:04 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-12-19 7:50 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-19 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 7:43 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-20 9:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 13:42 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-05 11:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-06 9:40 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-09 19:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 9:14 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-10 22:51 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-13 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-17 12:42 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-20 23:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-20 23:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 4/9] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT exit Chao Peng
2022-12-06 15:47 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-07 15:11 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-13 23:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] KVM: Use gfn instead of hva for mmu_notifier_retry Chao Peng
2022-12-05 9:23 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-06 11:56 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-06 15:48 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-09 6:24 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-07 6:34 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-12-07 15:14 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] KVM: Unmap existing mappings when change the memory attributes Chao Peng
2022-12-07 8:13 ` Yuan Yao
2022-12-08 11:20 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-09 5:43 ` Yuan Yao
2022-12-07 17:16 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-08 11:13 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-09 8:57 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-12 7:22 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-13 23:51 ` Huang, Kai
2022-12-19 7:54 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-13 22:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] KVM: Update lpage info when private/shared memory are mixed Chao Peng
2022-12-05 22:49 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-12-06 12:02 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-07 6:42 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-12-08 11:17 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-13 23:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-13 23:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-28 13:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-12-08 2:29 ` Yuan Yao
2022-12-08 11:23 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-09 5:45 ` Yuan Yao
2022-12-09 9:01 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-12-12 7:23 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-13 23:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-02 6:13 ` [PATCH v10 9/9] KVM: Enable and expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Chao Peng
2022-12-09 9:11 ` Fuad Tabba
2023-01-05 20:38 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-01-06 4:13 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-14 0:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-17 13:12 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-17 19:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-18 8:23 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-28 14:00 ` Chao Peng
2023-03-08 0:13 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-03-08 7:40 ` Chao Peng
2023-03-23 0:41 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-24 2:10 ` Chao Peng
2023-03-24 2:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-03-28 10:41 ` Chao Peng
2023-04-14 21:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-18 23:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-25 23:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-07 19:14 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-03-07 20:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM Sean Christopherson
2023-01-16 13:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-17 13:19 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-17 14:32 ` Fuad Tabba
2023-01-19 11:13 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-01-19 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-19 22:37 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-01-24 1:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-08 12:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-13 13:01 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-21 12:11 ` Chao Peng
2023-03-23 1:27 ` Michael Roth
2023-03-24 2:13 ` Chao Peng
2023-04-12 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-17 14:37 ` Chao Peng
2023-04-17 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-24 16:08 ` Liam Merwick
2023-01-25 0:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-25 12:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-25 16:01 ` Liam Merwick
2023-04-13 1:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-13 16:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-16 5:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-02-16 9:41 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-22 21:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-17 15:40 ` Rename restrictedmem => guardedmem? (was: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM) Sean Christopherson
2023-04-17 15:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-17 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-17 17:09 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-17 19:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-18 8:53 ` Fuad Tabba
2023-04-18 9:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-19 0:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-19 7:21 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-19 15:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-19 15:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-22 1:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 19:39 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-05-06 0:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-06 1:17 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-05-15 23:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-13 22:46 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-07-14 19:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-14 23:09 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-07-15 0:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-09 12:44 ` Chao Peng
2023-05-10 17:26 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-05-10 20:23 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-05-10 21:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-10 23:03 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-05-11 20:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-19 1:07 ` Vishal Annapurve
2023-05-12 0:21 ` Michael Roth
2023-05-12 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 13:50 ` Michael Roth
2023-05-22 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-22 23:58 ` Michael Roth
2023-05-23 0:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-06 19:14 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-06-06 23:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-08 17:13 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-17 17:11 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-17 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-18 17:01 ` Ackerley Tng
2023-04-23 13:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-05 20:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-05-06 7:44 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-05-06 9:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-04-23 13:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-07-06 8:20 [PATCH v7 00/14] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 01/14] mm: Add F_SEAL_AUTO_ALLOCATE seal to memfd Chao Peng
2022-07-21 9:44 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-07-21 9:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-07-21 15:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 13:46 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-21 10:27 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-25 13:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-25 14:49 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-25 13:42 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-05 17:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-08-05 18:06 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10 9:40 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-10 9:38 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-17 23:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-08-18 9:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-08-23 7:36 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-24 10:20 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-26 15:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-08-29 15:18 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 02/14] selftests/memfd: Add tests for F_SEAL_AUTO_ALLOCATE Chao Peng
2022-08-05 13:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 03/14] mm: Introduce memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-08-05 13:22 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10 9:22 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-10 10:05 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10 14:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-11 12:27 ` Quentin Perret
2022-08-11 13:39 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 04/14] mm/shmem: Support memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-07-12 18:02 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-13 7:44 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-13 10:01 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-13 23:49 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-14 4:15 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-05 13:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10 9:25 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 05/14] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Chao Peng
2022-08-05 13:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-10 9:37 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-10 9:55 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-11 13:17 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-07 16:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 06/14] KVM: Rename KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS to KVM_INTERNAL_MEM_SLOTS Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 07/14] KVM: Use gfn instead of hva for mmu_notifier_retry Chao Peng
2022-07-15 11:36 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-18 13:29 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-18 15:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-19 14:02 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-04 7:10 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-10 8:19 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 08/14] KVM: Rename mmu_notifier_* Chao Peng
2022-07-29 19:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-03 10:13 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-05 19:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-08-10 8:09 ` Chao Peng
2023-05-23 7:19 ` Kautuk Consul
2023-05-23 14:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 6:12 ` Kautuk Consul
2023-05-24 20:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 20:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-24 21:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-25 8:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-25 3:52 ` Kautuk Consul
2023-05-24 20:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 09/14] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2022-07-29 19:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-03 10:08 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-03 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 10/14] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT exit Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 11/14] KVM: Register/unregister the guest private memory regions Chao Peng
2022-07-19 8:00 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-19 14:08 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-19 14:23 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-20 15:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-20 15:31 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-20 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-20 17:41 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-21 7:34 ` Wei Wang
2022-07-21 9:29 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-21 17:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 13:04 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-29 19:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-02 0:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-02 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-03 9:48 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-03 15:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-04 7:58 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-20 16:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-21 9:37 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-19 19:37 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-08-24 10:37 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-26 15:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-08-29 15:21 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 12/14] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-07-29 20:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-03 9:52 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 13/14] KVM: Enable and expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Chao Peng
2022-07-19 9:55 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-19 14:12 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-06 8:20 ` [PATCH v7 14/14] memfd_create.2: Describe MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Chao Peng
2022-08-01 14:40 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-03 9:53 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-13 3:58 ` [PATCH v7 00/14] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-13 7:57 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-13 10:35 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-13 23:59 ` Chao Peng
2022-07-14 4:39 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-14 5:06 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-14 4:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-07-14 5:13 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-11 10:02 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-11 11:30 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-11 13:32 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-11 17:28 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-12 3:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-11 17:18 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-11 23:02 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-12 6:02 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-12 7:18 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-12 8:48 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-12 9:33 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-15 13:04 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-16 4:28 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-08-16 11:33 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-16 12:24 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-08-16 13:03 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-16 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-17 15:27 ` Michael Roth
2022-08-23 1:25 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-23 17:41 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-08-18 5:40 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-08-18 13:24 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-08-19 0:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-19 3:38 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-08-19 22:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-23 7:55 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-08-23 16:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-24 9:41 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-09 4:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-08-19 3:00 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-08-20 0:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-08-21 5:15 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-08-31 14:24 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-09-02 10:27 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-02 12:30 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-09-08 1:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-13 9:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-13 13:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-13 14:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-13 16:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-13 16:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-09-09 4:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-09-09 14:32 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-09-09 19:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-09-09 23:02 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-08-21 10:27 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-08-24 10:27 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-09 4:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-08-26 15:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-08-29 15:17 ` Chao Peng
2022-08-31 9:12 ` Fuad Tabba
2022-09-02 10:19 ` Chao Peng
2022-09-09 15:35 ` Michael Roth
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