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Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C Received: from SATLEXMB04.amd.com (165.204.84.17) by MN1PEPF0000F0E0.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.167.242.38) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.20.6838.22 via Frontend Transport; Mon, 16 Oct 2023 13:49:25 +0000 Received: from localhost (10.180.168.240) by SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.27; Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:49:25 -0500 From: Michael Roth To: CC: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:27:35 -0500 Message-ID: <20231016132819.1002933-7-michael.roth@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20231016132819.1002933-1-michael.roth@amd.com> References: <20231016132819.1002933-1-michael.roth@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: MN1PEPF0000F0E0:EE_|SJ2PR12MB8956:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: ee9467dc-b333-407f-a278-08dbce4eb746 X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; 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X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 16 Oct 2023 13:49:25.4906 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: ee9467dc-b333-407f-a278-08dbce4eb746 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: MN1PEPF0000F0E0.namprd04.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SJ2PR12MB8956 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Brijesh Singh The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. APM2 section 15.36 details a number of steps needed to detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host: - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access restrictions - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR - Configure IOMMU RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by processor. It is defined by the PPR. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader compatibility. SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag, which may be enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT. Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh [mdr: rework commit message to be clearer about what patch does, squash in early_rmptable_check() handling from Tom] Signed-off-by: Michael Roth --- arch/x86/Kbuild | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 +- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 19 ++ arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile | 3 + arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 239 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 2 +- include/linux/amd-iommu.h | 2 +- 9 files changed, 288 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kbuild b/arch/x86/Kbuild index 5a83da703e87..6a1f36df6a18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kbuild +++ b/arch/x86/Kbuild @@ -28,5 +28,7 @@ obj-y += net/ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += purgatory/ +obj-y += virt/svm/ + # for cleaning subdir- += boot tools diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 702d93fdd10e..83efd407033b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ #define DISABLE_IBT (1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -141,7 +147,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 (DISABLE_IBT) -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SEV_SNP) #define DISABLED_MASK20 0 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 1d111350197f..2be74afb4cbd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -589,6 +589,8 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT) #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT) #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132 +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133 /* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */ #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3) @@ -690,7 +692,14 @@ #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 -#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT 19 +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT) + #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 5b4a1ce3d368..b05fcd0ab7e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -243,4 +243,10 @@ static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; } static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV +bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len); +#else +static inline bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len) { return false; } +#endif + #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 14ee7f750cc7..6cc2074fcea3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 # include @@ -618,6 +619,20 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) resctrl_cpu_detect(c); } +static bool early_rmptable_check(void) +{ + u64 rmp_base, rmp_size; + + /* + * For early BSP initialization, max_pfn won't be set up yet, wait until + * it is set before performing the RMP table calculations. + */ + if (!max_pfn) + return true; + + return snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size); +} + static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 msr; @@ -659,6 +674,9 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK)) goto clear_sev; + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) && !early_rmptable_check()) + goto clear_snp; + return; clear_all: @@ -666,6 +684,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_sev: setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES); +clear_snp: setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); } } diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ef2a31bdcc70 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) += sev.o diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8b9ed72489e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support. + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Ashish Kalra + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * The RMP entry format is not architectural. The format is defined in PPR + * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor. + */ +struct rmpentry { + u64 assigned : 1, + pagesize : 1, + immutable : 1, + rsvd1 : 9, + gpa : 39, + asid : 10, + vmsa : 1, + validated : 1, + rsvd2 : 1; + u64 rsvd3; +} __packed; + +/* + * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the + * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup. + */ +#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000 + +static struct rmpentry *rmptable_start __ro_after_init; +static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init; + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt + +static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu) +{ + u64 val; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM; + + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + return 0; +} + +static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg) +{ + __mfd_enable(smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu) +{ + u64 val; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; + + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + return 0; +} + +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) +{ + __snp_enable(smp_processor_id()); +} + +#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13) + +bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len) +{ + u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base); + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end); + + if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) { + pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); + return false; + } + + if (rmp_base > rmp_end) { + pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); + return false; + } + + rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; + + /* + * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to + * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself + * must also be covered. + */ + max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn; + if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn) + max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end); + + calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + + if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) { + pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n", + calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz); + return false; + } + + *start = rmp_base; + *len = rmp_sz; + + return true; +} + +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void) +{ + u64 rmp_base, rmp_size; + void *rmp_start; + u64 val; + + if (!snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size)) + return 1; + + pr_info("RMP table physical address [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", + rmp_base, rmp_base + rmp_size - 1); + + rmp_start = memremap(rmp_base, rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!rmp_start) { + pr_err("Failed to map RMP table addr 0x%llx size 0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_size); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of + * kexec boot. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) + goto skip_enable; + + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ + memset(rmp_start, 0, rmp_size); + + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */ + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); + + /* MFDM must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */ + on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1); + + /* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */ + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); + +skip_enable: + rmp_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + rmp_size -= RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + + rmptable_start = (struct rmpentry *)rmp_start; + rmptable_max_pfn = rmp_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) +{ + int family, model; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + family = boot_cpu_data.x86; + model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model; + + /* + * RMP table entry format is not architectural and it can vary by processor and + * is defined by the per-processor PPR. Restrict SNP support on the known CPU + * model and family for which the RMP table entry format is currently defined for. + */ + if (family != 0x19 || model > 0xaf) + goto nosnp; + + if (amd_iommu_snp_enable()) + goto nosnp; + + if (__snp_rmptable_init()) + goto nosnp; + + cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL); + + return 0; + +nosnp: + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); + return -ENOSYS; +} + +/* + * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because amd_iommu_snp_enable() + * is called to ensure the IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature, which can only be + * called after subsys_initcall(). + * + * NOTE: IOMMU is enforced by SNP to ensure that hypervisor cannot program DMA + * directly into guest private memory. In case of SNP, the IOMMU ensures that + * the page(s) used for DMA are hypervisor owned. + */ +fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index 45efb7e5d725..1c9924de607a 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3802,7 +3802,7 @@ int amd_iommu_pc_set_reg(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u8 bank, u8 cntr, u8 fxn, u64 return iommu_pc_get_set_reg(iommu, bank, cntr, fxn, value, true); } -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV int amd_iommu_snp_enable(void) { /* diff --git a/include/linux/amd-iommu.h b/include/linux/amd-iommu.h index 99a5201d9e62..55fc03cb3968 100644 --- a/include/linux/amd-iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/amd-iommu.h @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int amd_iommu_pc_get_reg(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u8 bank, u8 cntr, u8 fxn, u64 *value); struct amd_iommu *get_amd_iommu(unsigned int idx); -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV int amd_iommu_snp_enable(void); #endif -- 2.25.1