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Date:   Fri, 8 Dec 2023 21:45:01 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc:     Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] rust: file: add `Kuid` wrapper
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On Fri, Dec 08, 2023 at 10:18:47AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:

> Even if we look at the prerequisites for mounting an attack here, we've
> already got things in place to help mitigate arbitrary code execution
> (KCFI, BTI, etc). Nothing is perfect, but speculation gadgets are
> pretty far down on the list of concerns, IMO. We have no real x86 ROP
> defense right now in the kernel, so that's a much lower hanging fruit
> for attackers.

Supervisor shadow stacks, as they exist today, just can't work on Linux.
Should get fixed with FRED, but yeah, this is all somewhat unfortunate.

> As another comparison, on x86 there are so many direct execution gadgets
> present in middle-of-instruction code patterns that worrying about a
> speculation gadget seems silly to me.

FineIBT (or even IBT) limits the middle of function gadgets
significantly.