From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 17:22:36 +0000 Message-ID: <20240.1509643356@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1509130095.3716.13.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Hi Mimi, I've altered this patch to allow for IMA appraisal on finit_module(). See the attached. David --- commit c0d5336356004e7543314e388755a00e725521da Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed May 24 14:56:01 2017 +0100 Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify or that IMA can validate the file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index de66ec825992..0ce29c8aa75a 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <uapi/linux/module.h> #include "module-internal.h" @@ -2757,7 +2758,8 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, + bool can_do_ima_check) { int err = -ENOKEY; const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; @@ -2781,13 +2783,16 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) } /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ - if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) + if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && + (!can_do_ima_check || !is_ima_appraise_enabled()) && + !kernel_is_locked_down("Loading of unsigned modules")) err = 0; return err; } #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, + bool can_do_ima_check) { return 0; } @@ -3630,13 +3635,13 @@ static int unknown_module_param_cb(char *param, char *val, const char *modname, /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs, - int flags) + int flags, bool can_do_ima_check) { struct module *mod; long err; char *after_dashes; - err = module_sig_check(info, flags); + err = module_sig_check(info, flags, can_do_ima_check); if (err) goto free_copy; @@ -3830,7 +3835,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod, if (err) return err; - return load_module(&info, uargs, 0); + return load_module(&info, uargs, 0, false); } SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags) @@ -3857,7 +3862,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags) info.hdr = hdr; info.len = size; - return load_module(&info, uargs, flags); + return load_module(&info, uargs, flags, true); } static inline int within(unsigned long addr, void *start, unsigned long size)
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap 2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells 2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells [this message] 2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells 2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli 2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox 2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli 2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells 2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee 2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee 2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells 2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells 2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells 2017-10-19 22:39 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-23 14:34 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao 2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:01 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:04 ` Firmware signing -- " David Howells 2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells 2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek 2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2019-02-28 21:28 [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Matthew Garrett 2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett 2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-03-06 23:58 [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett 2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-03-08 23:00 ` James Morris 2019-03-08 23:30 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-09 4:45 ` James Morris
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