From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH] x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 17:35:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXH4U7X3_xgwhYUgbWqVfnzL5Dx0QaUhb_5TpZGQEh=_8g@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Feb 01, 2024 at 05:15:51PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> OK, I'll remove it in the next rev.
Considering how it simplifies sme_enable() even more, I'd like to
expedite this one.
Thx.
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 17:29:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +---
Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 -------------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 11 +----------
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 31b3a25680d0..2cb70a384af8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3320,9 +3320,7 @@
mem_encrypt= [X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control
Valid arguments: on, off
- Default (depends on kernel configuration option):
- on (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y)
- off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n)
+ Default: off
mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 07caa8fff852..414bc7402ae7 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
kernel is non-zero).
SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
-activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
-not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS
-merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
-memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
-by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
-not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
-if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
-is specified.
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it
+will not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support.
+
+If the BIOS merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG),
+then memory encryption can be enabled by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the
+kernel command line. However, if BIOS does not enable SME, then Linux
+will not be able to activate memory encryption, even if configured to do
+so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter is specified.
Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
==========================
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5edec175b9bf..58d3593bc4f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1539,19 +1539,6 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
Encryption (SME).
-config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
- bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
- depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- help
- Say yes to have system memory encrypted by default if running on
- an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
-
- If set to Y, then the encryption of system memory can be
- deactivated with the mem_encrypt=off command line option.
-
- If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
- activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
-
# Common NUMA Features
config NUMA
bool "NUMA Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 7f72472a34d6..efe9f217fcf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch");
static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
-static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
@@ -504,7 +503,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
- const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+ const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on;
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned long feature_mask;
unsigned long me_mask;
@@ -587,12 +586,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
: "=r" (cmdline_on)
: "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
- asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
- : "=r" (cmdline_off)
- : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
- sme_me_mask = me_mask;
cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
@@ -602,8 +595,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)))
sme_me_mask = me_mask;
- else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)))
- sme_me_mask = 0;
out:
if (sme_me_mask) {
--
2.43.0
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-02 16:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-29 18:05 [PATCH v3 00/19] x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 01/19] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt= Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 7:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 16:23 ` Kevin Loughlin
2024-02-01 16:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 02/19] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 8:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-31 9:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 9:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-31 9:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-01 14:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-01 16:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-02 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2024-02-02 16:47 ` [PATCH] x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-03 10:50 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 03/19] x86/startup_64: Drop long return to initial_code pointer Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 13:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-31 13:57 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 14:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-31 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-31 18:14 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 04/19] x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-05 10:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 05/19] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-06 18:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-07 10:38 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 06/19] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-07 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-09 13:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-10 10:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-11 22:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 07/19] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-07 14:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 08/19] x86/head64: Replace pointer fixups with PIE codegen Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-12 10:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-12 11:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-12 14:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 09/19] x86/head64: Simplify GDT/IDT initialization code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-12 14:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-12 15:23 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 10/19] asm-generic: Add special .pi.text section for position independent code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 11/19] x86: Move return_thunk to __pitext section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 12/19] x86/head64: Move early startup code into __pitext Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 13/19] modpost: Warn about calls from __pitext into other text sections Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 14/19] x86/coco: Make cc_set_mask() static inline Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-30 23:16 ` Kevin Loughlin
2024-01-30 23:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 15/19] x86/sev: Make all code reachable from 1:1 mapping __pitext Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 16/19] x86/sev: Avoid WARN() in early code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 17/19] x86/sev: Use PIC codegen for early SEV startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 18/19] x86/sev: Drop inline asm LEA instructions for RIP-relative references Ard Biesheuvel
2024-01-29 18:05 ` [PATCH v3 19/19] x86/startup_64: Don't bother setting up GS before the kernel is mapped Ard Biesheuvel
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