From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>, Icenowy Zheng <uwu@icenowy.me>,
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Xuefeng Li <lixuefeng@loongson.cn>,
Jianmin Lv <lvjianmin@loongson.cn>,
Xiaotian Wu <wuxiaotian@loongson.cn>,
WANG Rui <wangrui@loongson.cn>,
Miao Wang <shankerwangmiao@gmail.com>,
"loongarch@lists.linux.dev" <loongarch@lists.linux.dev>,
Linux-Arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Chromium sandbox on LoongArch and statx -- seccomp deep argument inspection again?
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 16:40:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240226-sandbank-bewerben-219120323e29@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ef732971-bf70-4d8c-9fe8-3ca163a0c29c@app.fastmail.com>
On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 02:46:49PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 26, 2024, at 14:32, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 10:20:23AM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> >> On Mon, Feb 26, 2024, at 08:09, Xi Ruoyao wrote:
> >
> > What this tells me without knowing the exact reason is that they thought
> > "Oh, if we just return ENOSYS then the workload or glibc will just
> > always be able to fallback to fstat() or fstatat()". Which ultimately is
> > the exact same thing that containers often assume.
> >
> > So really, just skipping on various system calls isn't going to work.
> > You can't just implement new system calls and forget about the rest
> > unless you know exactly what workloads your architecure will run on.
> >
> > Please implement fstat() or fstatat() and stop inventing hacks for
> > statx() to make weird sandboxing rules work, please.
>
> Do you mean we should add fstat64_time64() for all architectures
> then? Would use use the same structure layout as statx for this,
> the 64-bit version of the 'struct stat' layout from
> include/uapi/asm-generic/stat.h, or something new that solves
> the same problems?
>
> I definitely don't want to see a new time32 API added to
> mips64 and the 32-bit architectures, so the existing stat64
> interface won't work as a statx replacement.
I don't specifically care but the same way you don't want to see newer
time32 apis added to architectures I don't want to have hacks in our
system calls that aren't even a clear solution to the problem outlined
in this thread.
Short of adding fstatx() the problem isn't solved by a new flag to
statx() as explained in my other mails. But I'm probably missing
something here because I find this notion of "design system calls for
seccomp and the Chromium sandbox" to be an absurd notion and it makes me
a bit impatient.
And fwiw, once mseal() lands seccomp should be a lot easier to get deep
argument inspection.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-26 15:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-21 6:09 Chromium sandbox on LoongArch and statx -- seccomp deep argument inspection again? WANG Xuerui
2024-02-21 6:31 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-21 10:31 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-21 10:49 ` WANG Xuerui
2024-02-21 12:03 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-24 11:51 ` Huacai Chen
2024-02-25 6:51 ` Icenowy Zheng
2024-02-25 7:32 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-26 6:03 ` Icenowy Zheng
2024-02-26 6:56 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-26 7:09 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-26 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-26 11:57 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-26 12:57 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-26 14:33 ` Rich Felker
2024-02-26 13:32 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-26 13:46 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-26 15:40 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-02-26 16:49 ` Xi Ruoyao
2024-02-26 13:46 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-26 14:00 ` WANG Xuerui
2024-02-26 15:35 ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-26 17:38 ` WANG Xuerui
2024-02-26 8:26 ` Christian Brauner
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