linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	erdemaktas@google.com, Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>,
	David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>,
	chen.bo@intel.com, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>,
	Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
	Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 16:32:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <21e488b6ced77c08d9e6718fcf57e100af409c64.1689893403.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1689893403.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>

All gmem pages are expected to be 'private' as defined by a particular
arch/platform. Platforms like SEV-SNP require additional operations to
move these pages into a private state, so implement a hook that can be
used to prepare this memory prior to mapping it into a guest.

In the case of SEV-SNP, whether or not a 2MB page can be mapped via a
2MB mapping in the guest's nested page table depends on whether or not
any subpages within the range have already been initialized as private
in the RMP table, so this hook will also be used by the KVM MMU to clamp
the maximum mapping size accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612042559.375660-2-michael.roth@amd.com

---
Changes v2 -> v3:
- Newly added
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c             | 12 ++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index c0143906fe6d..a4cb248519cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
 KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
 
 #undef KVM_X86_OP
 #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index e4f2938bb1fc..de7f0dffa135 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1735,6 +1735,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	 * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
 	 */
 	unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+	int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			    kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, u8 *max_level);
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index a73ddb43a2cf..35bb14363828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4352,6 +4352,7 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				   struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	int max_order, r;
+	u8 max_level;
 
 	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot))
 		return kvm_do_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
@@ -4361,8 +4362,15 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	fault->max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order),
-			       fault->max_level);
+	max_level = kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order);
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_gmem_prepare)(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->pfn,
+					      fault->gfn, &max_level);
+	if (r) {
+		kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	fault->max_level = min(max_level, fault->max_level);
 	fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
 	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
 }
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-20 23:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-20 23:32 [RFC PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: guest_memfd(), X86: Common base for SNP and TDX (was KVM: guest memory: Misc enhancement) isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/10] KVM: x86: Add is_vm_type_supported callback isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Guard against collision with KVM-defined PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for the KVM page fault isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/10] KVM: x86: Introduce PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private isaku.yamahata
2023-07-21 14:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  0:52     ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-02-22  2:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: Add new members to struct kvm_gfn_range to operate on isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` isaku.yamahata [this message]
2023-07-21 14:25   ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  0:34     ` Michael Roth
2023-08-18 22:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-26  0:59         ` Michael Roth
2023-08-29 13:27           ` Michael Roth
2023-09-08 23:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating " isaku.yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: x86: Make struct sev_cmd common for KVM_MEM_ENC_OP isaku.yamahata
2023-07-21 14:51   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 18:43     ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-07-25  9:07     ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-07-25 15:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-27  0:37         ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-07-20 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: X86: KVM_MEM_ENC_OP check if unused field (flags, error) is zero isaku.yamahata

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=21e488b6ced77c08d9e6718fcf57e100af409c64.1689893403.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --to=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=ackerleytng@google.com \
    --cc=chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=chen.bo@intel.com \
    --cc=dmatlack@google.com \
    --cc=erdemaktas@google.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@gmail.com \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=sagis@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=vannapurve@google.com \
    --cc=yuan.yao@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).