From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA86CC4332F for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 16:36:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6CEC61184 for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 16:36:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233159AbhKAQix (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 12:38:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57140 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232946AbhKAQi1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 12:38:27 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52d.google.com (mail-ed1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 11D52C061220; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:35:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id w1so12368994edd.10; Mon, 01 Nov 2021 09:35:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=milzkF1m5zxvSIl79nXaZIe8ZA7L4vAOc37O1pzjxRo=; b=R/scQEdVU7QzVzAohymAe9fVLgkJLIUH3vuirmx0qEBWiwnUzdNa3JS1qVBApwb+aj qso7Cnsv7PjcumA9tQrO3RTl2YRjwnp0HFQE4sQrhoJakWPwBkRjnG825GLkNkJEqGwZ Ces7qgvi2xP7f5pAbnpxqF8j4rDCKjhz5iRZ08c7qxQsc+yUnI1k6jP5n/+JLcig3CVl IEK82Qr4c5GFYe7kmmr+cl096h7P+LjOlwLY5FW9DcTTr4jPQcnIXLDAB34Sy6Xd6+HS fswNuNI6RiBSwFgHjqcRRcnpxzlJ+NkrZ9Zl5zMPUwmsvacmlwKhxBAUX+ejOFewq+Uh 442w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=milzkF1m5zxvSIl79nXaZIe8ZA7L4vAOc37O1pzjxRo=; b=LtoHEgd+2WwocQHop2hd1/Kg5qI15SmzDOPmULdf7ZbyOPxM4sqw1kJqGJBdzRJu5Q 21EAU5uUfBwz+nO8gmLRIW/Ofu66hUgerHb3YDyx8Y6X98EVbZeZM15IjIpEPCYRd/pE rIACOmgUbZ6AivBiEKru0OiOPs2XY1d/tNe3L7OPpfpY65Vz8GqUobNUibs5kNLrVyi8 BN89kAJMyH9xdQy4DKs59kHabFRhQTTlCh/5aeINv+YMOA4VC6YgMhh+d3F6dPO4xPq/ JqQXoKnPagKefpilFoi29kgdZbetTCvmHv1zr+SdX0T5cdY5pxkI2NXP6p/oUAQM6GyL aHrg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5330AmvgEvh3Oet64Ek+OuVw+Rm/IwspUiaYKi2adO4SuRllH41C rq/ryl09a233PbUgQzV6GUA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzfJruF1u3tkaV/lGK46vHolf2zWRPWhvgVOYS6WwSZBbBXp/fFrEvT4eO6mA4wyKOdVwKI1g== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:3e8a:: with SMTP id hs10mr11897159ejc.58.1635784550511; Mon, 01 Nov 2021 09:35:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:f5f:2085:7f25:17c]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f25sm4124583edv.90.2021.11.01.09.35.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 01 Nov 2021 09:35:49 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Shuah Khan , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Eric Dumazet Cc: "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 13/25] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 18:34:48 +0200 Message-Id: <23d0934b85fa00e8f2aa8ebb1af3005fbed5b347.1635784253.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt. Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 7 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 154 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 7360bda20f97..ae7d6a1eab8d 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -101,10 +101,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th); int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req); static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq( struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index c9d201d8f7a7..aef63e35b56f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -799,10 +799,74 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk, out: tcp_authopt_put_kdf_shash(key, kdf_tfm); return err; } +struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data { + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; + __be16 sport; + __be16 dport; + __be32 sisn; + __be32 disn; + __be16 digestbits; +} __packed; + +static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, + __be16 dport, + __be32 sisn, + __be32 disn, + u8 *traffic_key) +{ + int err; + struct crypto_shash *kdf_tfm; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, kdf_tfm); + struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22); + + kdf_tfm = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_shash(key); + if (IS_ERR(kdf_tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(kdf_tfm); + + err = tcp_authopt_setkey(kdf_tfm, key); + if (err) + goto out; + + desc->tfm = kdf_tfm; + err = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (err) + goto out; + + // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 + // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane + err = crypto_shash_update(desc, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + if (err) + return err; + data.saddr = saddr; + data.daddr = daddr; + data.sport = sport; + data.dport = dport; + data.sisn = sisn; + data.disn = disn; + data.digestbits = htons(crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm) * 8); + + err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&data, sizeof(data)); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_shash_final(desc, traffic_key); + if (err) + goto out; + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_kdf_shash(key, kdf_tfm); + return err; +} + static int crypto_shash_update_zero(struct shash_desc *desc, int len) { u8 zero = 0; int i, err; @@ -1205,10 +1269,93 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash); +/** + * tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply - Hash tcp+ipv4 header without SKB + * + * @hash_location: output buffer + * @info: sending socket's tcp_authopt_info + * @key: signing key, from tcp_authopt_select_key. + * @saddr: source address + * @daddr: destination address + * @th: Pointer to TCP header and options + */ +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct crypto_shash *mac_tfm; + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); + __be32 sne = 0; + int err; + + /* Call special code path for computing traffic key without skb + * This can be called from tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack so caching would be + * difficult here. + */ + err = tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(key, saddr, daddr, + th->source, th->dest, + htonl(info->src_isn), htonl(info->dst_isn), + traffic_key); + if (err) + goto out_err_traffic_key; + + /* Init mac shash */ + mac_tfm = tcp_authopt_get_mac_shash(key); + if (IS_ERR(mac_tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(mac_tfm); + err = crypto_shash_setkey(mac_tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + desc->tfm = mac_tfm; + err = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&sne, 4); + if (err) + return err; + + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(desc, saddr, daddr, th->doff * 4); + if (err) + return err; + + // TCP header with checksum set to zero. Caller ensures this. + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(th->check != 0)) + goto out_err; + err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)th, sizeof(*th)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + // TCP options + err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(desc, th, !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + err = crypto_shash_final(desc, macbuf); + if (err) + goto out_err; + memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + + tcp_authopt_put_mac_shash(key, mac_tfm); + return 0; + +out_err: + tcp_authopt_put_mac_shash(key, mac_tfm); +out_err_traffic_key: + memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + return err; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, int recv_id) { -- 2.25.1