From: David Howells <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: Petko Manolov <email@example.com>
Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com,
Mimi Zohar <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 11:18:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <email@example.com> (raw)
Petko Manolov <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> > > Well, I for one do not explicitly trust these keys. I may even want to
> > > completely remove or replace them.
> > Fine be me. However, if you remove them all I would guess that you cannot
> > perform a secure boot.
> Maybe not on PC, but there's plenty of other architectures out there. What
> if i replace all UEFI keys with my own?
Then I would imagine that you can do a secure boot, but that you have to sign
your own shim, grub, kernel, etc..
> > Note that it's to be expected that the keys being loaded from the UEFI
> > database cannot have their signatures checked - which is why they would
> > have to be implicitly trusted. For the same reason, the kernel does not
> > check the signatures on the keys compiled into the kernel image.
> I build all kernels that matter to me and i _do_ trust myself.
> Unfortunately i can't say the same for any corporation out there.
> Trusting a key because your vendor shipped the HW with it so that you have no
> way to verify the signature is pretty weak argument IMHO.
I'm not making an argument there. There is a reason I think that I can't
check them. Well, possibly I could *if* those keys are actually signed *and*
I have certs built into the kernel by which I can verify all those keys in
UEFI variables. I don't know whether this is actually practical.
> > You can argue this either way. There's a config option to allow you to
> > turn this on or off. Arguably, this should be split in two: one for the
> > whitelist (db, MokListRT) and one for the blacklist (dbx).
> I did not see the config option. There is one?
See patch 8 where these variables are actually parsed. CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
is available there.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-17 11:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring David Howells
2016-11-17 6:41 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 9:56 ` David Howells
2016-11-17 10:22 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 11:18 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-21 14:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43 ` Mat Martineau
2016-11-17 9:44 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:25 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-24 19:22 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
2016-11-21 16:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:26 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:05 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
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