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From: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>,
	pv-drivers@vmware.com, "Thomas Hellstrom" <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Marek Szyprowski" <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 10:29:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2d7a87c5-a5b2-2df4-5fd6-486fe2df2928@shipmail.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVKg=xjG5qyHbCY7P1H17v8LBV3FmQmqGKsPz_4qovFZQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 9/11/19 8:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>> That distinction is important because if it ever comes to a choice
>> between adding a new lock to protect vm_page_prot (and consequently slow
>> down the whole vm system) and using the WRITE_ONCE solution in TTM, we
>> should know what the implications are. As it turns out previous choices
>> in this area actually seem to have opted for the lockless WRITE_ONCE /
>> READ_ONCE / ptl solution. See __split_huge_pmd_locked() and
>> vma_set_page_prot().
> I think it would be even better if the whole thing could work without
> ever writing to vm_page_prot.  This would be a requirement for vvar in
> the unlikely event that the vvar vma ever supported splittable huge
> pages.  Fortunately, that seems unlikely :)

Yeah, for TTM the situation is different since we want huge vm pages  at 
some point.

But I re-read __split_huge_pmd_locked() and it actually looks like 
vm_page_prot is only accessed for anonymous vmas. For other vmas, it 
appears it just simply zaps the PMD, relying on re-faulting the page 
table enries if necessary (as also suggested by Christian in another 
thread).

So perhaps we should be good never writing to vm_page_prot.

/Thomas



  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-12  8:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-05 10:35 [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 14:15   ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 15:21     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 15:24       ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-05 16:40         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 17:05         ` dma_mmap_fault discussion Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  6:32           ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-06  7:10             ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  7:20               ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  8:37                 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-10 16:11         ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-10 19:26           ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11  4:18             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-11  7:49               ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 18:03                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-12  8:29                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware) [this message]
2019-09-11  9:08             ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 10:10               ` TTM huge page-faults WAS: " Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 14:06                 ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 15:08                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-24 12:03                     ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-05 15:59       ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 16:29         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] dma-mapping: Fix dma_pgprot() for unencrypted coherent pages Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 11:23 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:11   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:25     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)

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