From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932490AbdJ3Ptw convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Oct 2017 11:49:52 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42748 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932359AbdJ3Pts (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Oct 2017 11:49:48 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 8AD0781DE6 Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=dhowells@redhat.com Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <1509032805.5886.52.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1509032805.5886.52.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171026074243.GM8550@linux-l9pv.suse> <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <150842468754.7923.10037578333644594134.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1508774083.3639.124.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <26694.1509030144@warthog.procyon.org.uk> To: Mimi Zohar Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, joeyli , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com, Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 15:49:44 +0000 Message-ID: <32764.1509378584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Mon, 30 Oct 2017 15:49:48 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Mimi Zohar wrote: > Huh?!  With the "secure_boot" policy enabled on the boot command line, > IMA-appraisal would verify the kexec kernel image, firmware, kernel > modules, and custom IMA policy signatures. What happens if the "secure_boot" policy isn't enabled on the boot command line? Can you sum up both cases in a paragraph I can add to the patch description? > Other patches in this patch series need to be updated as well to check > if IMA-appraisal is enabled. Which exactly? I've added your "!is_ima_appraise_enabled() &&" line to kexec_file() and module_sig_check(). Anything else? David