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From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: David =?utf-8?B?SmHFoWE=?= <djasa@redhat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, sandyinchina@gmail.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach
Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2016 18:31:26 +0200
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Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:

Hi Theodore,

> 
> At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a
> hardware RNG.  We can't generate randomness out of thin air.  The only
> thing you really can do requires user space help, which is to generate
> keys lazily, or as late as possible, so you can gather as much entropy
> as you can --- and to feed in measurements from the WiFi (RSSI
> measurements, MAC addresses seen, etc.)  This won't help much if you
> have an FBI van parked outside your house trying to carry out a
> TEMPEST attack, but hopefully it provides some protection against a
> remote attacker who isn't try to carry out an on-premises attack.

All my measurements on such small systems like MIPS or smaller/older ARMs do 
not seem to support that statement :-)

Ciao
Stephan