From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Billy Laws <blaws05@gmail.com>
Cc: krisman@collabora.com, gofmanp@gmail.com, hpa@zytor.com,
keescook@chromium.org, kernel@collabora.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, wad@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 06:59:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3691744C-F4BC-49C6-9450-52E31DD14A92@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFUUQHO57YpWJv6oGmxXsOBxCzRG1ti_Q1QBDw8FU+4vBOPgBw@mail.gmail.com>
> On Jun 1, 2020, at 2:23 AM, Billy Laws <blaws05@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On May 30, 2020, at 5:26 PM, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> wrote:
>>
>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> writes:
>>
>>>>>> On May 29, 2020, at 11:00 PM, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Modern Windows applications are executing system call instructions
>>>>> directly from the application's code without going through the WinAPI.
>>>>> This breaks Wine emulation, because it doesn't have a chance to
>>>>> intercept and emulate these syscalls before they are submitted to Linux.
>>>>>
>>>>> In addition, we cannot simply trap every system call of the application
>>>>> to userspace using PTRACE_SYSEMU, because performance would suffer,
>>>>> since our main use case is to run Windows games over Linux. Therefore,
>>>>> we need some in-kernel filtering to decide whether the syscall was
>>>>> issued by the wine code or by the windows application.
>>>
>>> Do you really need in-kernel filtering? What if you could have
>>> efficient userspace filtering instead? That is, set something up so
>>> that all syscalls, except those from a special address, are translated
>>> to CALL thunk where the thunk is configured per task. Then the thunk
>>> can do whatever emulation is needed.
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I suggested something similar to my customer, by using
>> libsyscall-intercept. The idea would be overwritting the syscall
>> instruction with a call to the entry point. I'm not a specialist on the
>> specifics of Windows games, (cc'ed Paul Gofman, who can provide more
>> details on that side), but as far as I understand, the reason why that
>> is not feasible is that the anti-cheat protection in games will abort
>> execution if the binary region was modified either on-disk or in-memory.
>>
>> Is there some mechanism to do that without modiyfing the application?
>
> Hi,
>
> I work on an emulator for the Nintendo Switch that uses a similar technique,
> in our testing it works very well and is much more performant than even
> PTRACE_SYSEMU.
>
> To work around DRM reading the memory contents I think mprotect could
> be used, after patching the syscall a copy of the original code could be
> kept somewhere in memory and the patched region mapped --X.
> With this, any time the DRM attempts to read to the patched region and
> perform integrity checks it will cause a segfault and a branch to the
> signal handler. This handler can then return the contents of the original,
> unpatched region to satisfy them checks.
>
> Are memory contents checked by DRM solutions too often for this to be
> performant?
A bigger issue is that hardware support for —X is quite spotty. There is no x86 CPU that can do it cleanly in a bare metal setup, and client CPUs that can do it at all without hypervisor help may be nonexistent. I don’t know if the ARM situation is much better.
> --
> Billy Laws
>>
>>> Getting the details and especially the interaction with any seccomp
>>> filters that may be installed right could be tricky, but the performance
>>> should be decent, at least on non-PTI systems.
>>>
>>> (If we go this route, I suspect that the correct interaction with
>>> seccomp is that this type of redirection takes precedence over seccomp
>>> and seccomp filters are not invoked for redirected syscalls. After all,
>>> a redirected syscall is, functionally, not a syscall at all.)
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-01 13:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-01 9:23 [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas Billy Laws
2020-06-01 13:59 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-06-01 17:48 ` hpa
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-05-30 5:59 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-05-30 17:30 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-31 5:56 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-05-31 12:39 ` Paul Gofman
2020-05-31 16:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-05-31 17:10 ` Paul Gofman
2020-05-31 17:31 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-05-31 18:01 ` Paul Gofman
2020-06-01 17:54 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-06-01 17:53 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-05-30 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-31 0:26 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-05-31 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-31 12:56 ` Paul Gofman
2020-05-31 18:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-31 18:36 ` Paul Gofman
2020-05-31 18:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-31 19:37 ` Paul Gofman
2020-05-31 21:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-01 18:06 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-06-01 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-01 23:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-11 19:38 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-05-31 23:33 ` Brendan Shanks
2020-06-01 1:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-25 23:14 ` Robert O'Callahan
2020-06-25 23:48 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-06-26 1:03 ` Robert O'Callahan
2020-06-05 6:06 ` Sargun Dhillon
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