From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05837C32788 for ; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:33:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65F87214E0 for ; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:33:30 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 65F87214E0 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727343AbeKULFY (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 06:05:24 -0500 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:30246 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727239AbeKULFW (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Nov 2018 06:05:22 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Nov 2018 16:33:26 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,259,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="93650220" Received: from skl-02.jf.intel.com ([10.54.74.62]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 20 Nov 2018 16:33:26 -0800 From: Tim Chen To: Jiri Kosina , Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tim Chen , Linus Torvalds , Tom Lendacky , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Josh Poimboeuf , Andrea Arcangeli , David Woodhouse , Andi Kleen , Dave Hansen , Casey Schaufler , Asit Mallick , Arjan van de Ven , Jon Masters , Waiman Long , Greg KH , Dave Stewart , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [Patch v6 10/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:00:02 -0800 Message-Id: <3b20131a0ca572aa476cdf7fc7885580f5376ef7.1542757030.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.9.4 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Create PRCTL interface to restrict an application's indirect branch speculation. This will protect the application against spectre v2 attack from another application. Invocations: Check indirect branch speculation status with - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); Enable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); Disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); Force disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen --- Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 9 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/sched.h | 9 ++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 100 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst index 32f3d55..8a4e268 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); + +- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes + (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes) + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 387de54..26e1a87 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -771,12 +771,69 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) return 0; } +static void set_task_restrict_indir_branch(struct task_struct *tsk, bool restrict_on) +{ + bool update = false; + + if (restrict_on) + update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH); + else + update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH); + + if (tsk == current && update) + speculation_ctrl_update_current(); +} + +static int indir_branch_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + switch (ctrl) { + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE) + return 0; + /* + * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in + * strict mode. + */ + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT) + return -EPERM; + task_clear_spec_indir_branch_disable(task); + set_task_restrict_indir_branch(task, false); + break; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + /* + * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when + * mitigation is force disabled. + */ + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE) + return -EPERM; + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT) + return 0; + task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task); + set_task_restrict_indir_branch(task, true); + break; + case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE) + return -EPERM; + if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT) + return 0; + task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task); + task_set_spec_indir_branch_force_disable(task); + set_task_restrict_indir_branch(task, true); + break; + default: + return -ERANGE; + } + return 0; +} + int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl) { switch (which) { case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl); + case PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: + return indir_branch_prctl_set(task, ctrl); default: return -ENODEV; } @@ -809,11 +866,34 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) } } +static int indir_branch_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + + switch (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE: + return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_PRCTL: + if (task_spec_indir_branch_force_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; + if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + case SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT: + return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + default: + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + } +} + int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) { switch (which) { case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return ssb_prctl_get(task); + case PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: + return indir_branch_prctl_get(task); default: return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index a51c13c..e92e4bf 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1453,6 +1453,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void) #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB 2 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */ #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE 3 /* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */ #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE 4 /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/ +#define PFA_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted in apps */ +#define PFA_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_FORCE_DISABLE 6 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted in apps forced */ #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \ static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \ @@ -1484,6 +1486,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable) TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) +TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable) +TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable) +TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_disable) + +TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_force_disable) +TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_indir_branch_force_disable) + static inline void current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags) { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index c0d7ea0..577f2ca 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 /* Speculation control variants */ # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +# define PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH 1 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index c0d7ea0..577f2ca 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 /* Speculation control variants */ # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +# define PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH 1 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) -- 2.9.4