From: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 18:48:39 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3befcee7-0b65-c312-1f14-daa56afeb176@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87r2aj1ayf.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
On 4/3/19 10:21 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Hi Claudio,
>
> Thanks for posting this.
>
> Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> writes:
>> This patch set is part of a series that implements secure boot on
>> PowerNV systems.
>>
>> In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV, secure boot requires X.509
>> certificates trusted by the platform, the secure boot modes, and several
>> other pieces of information. These are stored in secure variables
>> controlled by OPAL, also known as OPAL secure variables.
>>
>> This patch set adds the following features:
>>
>> 1. Enable efivarfs by selecting CONFIG_EFI in the CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR
>> introduced in this patch set. With CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS, userspace tools can
>> be used to manage the secure variables.
>> 2. Add support for OPAL secure variables by overwriting the EFI hooks
>> (get_variable, get_next_variable, set_variable and query_variable_info)
>> with OPAL call wrappers. There is probably a better way to add this
>> support, for example, we are investigating if we could register the
>> efivar_operations rather than overwriting the EFI hooks. In this patch
>> set, CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR selects CONFIG_EFI. If, instead, we registered
>> efivar_operations, CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS would need to depend on
>> CONFIG_EFI|| CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR. Comments or suggestions on the
>> preferred technique would be greatly appreciated.
> I am *very* reluctant to start selecting CONFIG_EFI on powerpc.
>
> Simply because we don't actually have EFI, and I worry we're going to
> both break assumptions in the EFI code as well as impose requirements on
> the powerpc code that aren't really necessary.
Yes, we agree. We are working on the v2 and it is not going to depend on
CONFIG_EFI. Rather, the IMA arch policies will make the OPAL calls directly.
>
> So I'd definitely prefer we go the route of enabling efivarfs with an
> alternate backend.
Right, I'm investigating how we can do that, but it looks like we should
post that as a separate patchset to avoid delaying upstreaming signature
verification based on the secure boot variables.
Thanks,
Claudio
>
> Better still would be a generic secure variable interface as Matt
> suggests, if the userspace tools can be relatively easily adapted to use
> that interface.
>
> cheers
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-03 21:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-02 18:15 [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 1/4] powerpc/include: Override unneeded early ioremap functions Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 2/4] powerpc/powernv: Add support for OPAL secure variables Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 3/4] powerpc/powernv: Detect the secure boot mode of the system Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 18:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 19:36 ` [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems Matthew Garrett
2019-04-02 21:11 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-02 21:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-02 23:31 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-03 22:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-05 21:11 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-05 22:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-09 22:55 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-04-10 17:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-10 21:31 ` Claudio Carvalho
2019-05-13 22:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 13:21 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-03 21:48 ` Claudio Carvalho [this message]
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