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From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rientjes@google.com,
	srutherford@google.com, luto@kernel.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 01/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 06:19:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f90333959fd49bed184d45a761cc338424bf614.1585548051.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1585548051.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com>

The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  27 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                            | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/psp-sev.h                       |   8 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  12 ++
 4 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index c3129b9ba5cb..4fd34fc5c7a7 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -263,6 +263,33 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
                 __u32 trans_len;
         };
 
+10. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
+outgoing guest encryption context.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+        struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+                __u32 policy;                 /* guest policy */
+
+                __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;         /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
+                __u32 pdh_cert_len;
+
+                __u64 plat_certs_uadr;        /* platform certificate chain */
+                __u32 plat_certs_len;
+
+                __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;        /* AMD certificate */
+                __u32 amd_cert_len;
+
+                __u64 session_uaddr;          /* Guest session information */
+                __u32 session_len;
+        };
+
 References
 ==========
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 50d1ebafe0b3..63d172e974ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -7149,6 +7149,131 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
+static int
+__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
+				      struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
+
+	params->session_len = data->session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start *data;
+	struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
+	void *amd_certs, *session_data;
+	void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
+	if (!params.session_len)
+		return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
+				&params);
+
+	/* some sanity checks */
+	if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
+	    !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
+	session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!session_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
+	pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
+				params.pdh_cert_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
+				params.plat_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
+				params.amd_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
+		goto e_free_plat_cert;
+	}
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (data == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free_amd_cert;
+	}
+
+	/* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
+	data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
+	data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
+	data->plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
+	data->plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
+	data->amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
+	data->amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
+	data->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
+	data->session_len = params.session_len;
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t) params.session_uaddr,
+			session_data, params.session_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	params.policy = data->policy;
+	params.session_len = data->session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+e_free_amd_cert:
+	kfree(amd_certs);
+e_free_plat_cert:
+	kfree(plat_certs);
+e_free_pdh:
+	kfree(pdh_cert);
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -7193,6 +7318,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
 		r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
+		r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 5167bf2bfc75..9f63b9d48b63 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -323,11 +323,11 @@ struct sev_data_send_start {
 	u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
 	u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved1;
-	u64 plat_cert_address;			/* In */
-	u32 plat_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u64 plat_certs_address;			/* In */
+	u32 plat_certs_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved2;
-	u64 amd_cert_address;			/* In */
-	u32 amd_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u64 amd_certs_address;			/* In */
+	u32 amd_certs_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved3;
 	u64 session_address;			/* In */
 	u32 session_len;			/* In/Out */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 4b95f9a31a2f..17bef4c245e1 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1558,6 +1558,18 @@ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
 	__u32 len;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
+	__u32 pdh_cert_len;
+	__u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
+	__u32 plat_certs_len;
+	__u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
+	__u32 amd_certs_len;
+	__u64 session_uaddr;
+	__u32 session_len;
+};
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
-- 
2.17.1


  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-30  6:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-30  6:19 [PATCH v6 00/14] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2020-03-30  6:19 ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2020-04-02  6:27   ` [PATCH v6 01/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 12:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-02 16:37       ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 18:04         ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-02 18:57           ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 19:17             ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-02 19:43               ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 20:04                 ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-02 20:19                   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 17:51   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-02 18:38     ` Brijesh Singh
2020-03-30  6:20 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 17:55   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 20:13   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-03-30  6:20 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 18:17   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 20:15   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-03-30  6:21 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 21:35   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 22:09   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-03-30  6:21 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 22:25   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-02 22:29   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-07  0:49     ` Steve Rutherford
2020-03-30  6:21 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 22:24   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 22:27   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-07  0:57     ` Steve Rutherford
2020-03-30  6:21 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2020-04-02 22:36   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-02 23:54   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-07  1:22     ` Steve Rutherford
2020-03-30  6:22 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03  0:00   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-03  1:31   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03  1:57     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03  2:58       ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-06 22:27         ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-07  2:17   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-07  5:27     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-08  0:01       ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-08  0:29         ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-08  0:35           ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-08  1:17             ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-08  1:38               ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-08  2:34                 ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-08  3:18                   ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-09 16:18                     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-09 20:41                       ` Steve Rutherford
2020-03-30  6:22 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 18:30   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-03 20:18   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03 20:47     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-06 22:07       ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03 20:55     ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-03 21:01       ` Ashish Kalra
2020-03-30  6:22 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 21:07   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03 21:30     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 21:36   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-03-30  6:22 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 21:10   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03 21:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-04-08  0:26   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-08  1:48     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-10  0:06       ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-10  1:23         ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-10 18:08           ` Steve Rutherford
2020-03-30  6:23 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP_RESET ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 21:14   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-03 21:45     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-06 18:52       ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-08  1:25         ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-08  1:52           ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-10  0:59             ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-10  1:34               ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-10 18:14                 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-10 20:16                   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-10 20:18                     ` Steve Rutherford
2020-04-10 20:55                       ` Kalra, Ashish
2020-04-10 21:42                         ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-10 21:46                           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-10 21:58                             ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-10 22:02                         ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-11  0:35                           ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 22:01   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-03-30  6:23 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2020-03-30 15:52   ` Brijesh Singh
2020-03-30 16:42     ` Ashish Kalra
     [not found]     ` <20200330162730.GA21567@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
     [not found]       ` <1de5e95f-4485-f2ff-aba8-aa8b15564796@amd.com>
     [not found]         ` <20200331171336.GA24050@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
     [not found]           ` <20200401070931.GA8562@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
2020-04-02 23:29             ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 23:46   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-03-30  6:23 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2020-03-30 16:00   ` Brijesh Singh
2020-03-30 16:45     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-03-31 14:26       ` Brijesh Singh
2020-04-02 23:34         ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-03 12:57   ` Dave Young
2020-04-04  0:55   ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-04-04 21:57     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-04-06 18:37       ` Krish Sadhukhan
2020-03-30 17:24 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Venu Busireddy
2020-03-30 18:28   ` Ashish Kalra
2020-03-30 19:13     ` Venu Busireddy
2020-03-30 21:52       ` Ashish Kalra
2020-03-31 14:42         ` Venu Busireddy

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