Re: [Keyrings] Re: [PATCH 01/04] Add multi-precision-integer maths library

[Dax Kelson <dax@gurulabs.com>]

 ..... Original Message .......
On Sun, 29 Jan 2006 11:38:22 -0500 "Trond Myklebust" <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> wrote:
>On Sun, 2006-01-29 at 12:33 +0100, David Härdeman wrote:
>
>> >Why would you want to use proxy certificates for you own use? Use your
>> >own certificate for your own processes, and issue one or more proxy
>> >certificates to any daemon that you want to authorise to do some limited
>> >task.
>> 
>> I meant that you can't use proxy certs for your own use, so you still need 
>> to store your own cert/key somehow...and I still believe that the kernel 
>> keyring is the best place...
>
>Agreed. Now, reread what I said above, and tell me why this is an
>argument for doing dsa in the kernel?
>
>> >...and what does this statement about "keys being safer in the kernel"
>> >mean?
>> 
>> swap-out to disk, ptrace, coredump all become non-issues. And in 
>> combination with some other security features (such as disallowing 
>> modules, read/write of /dev/mem + /dev/kmem, limited permissions via
>> SELinux, etc), it becomes pretty hard for the attacker to get your 
>> private key even if he/she manages to get access to the root account.
>
>Turning off coredump is trivial. All the features that LSM provide apply
>to userland too (including security_ptrace()), so the SELinux policies
>are not an argument for putting stuff in the kernel.
>
>Only the swap-out to disk is an issue, and that is less of a worry if
>you use a time-limited proxy in the daemon.

I seem to remember a feature in the kernel that allows each uid to mlock a small number of memory pages specifically intended to be used by daemons that cache keys. It is possible this was a Fedora kernel patch and not in the mainline kernel.

>> >> Further, the mpi and dsa code can also be used for supporting signed 
>> >> modules and binaries...the "store dsa-keys in kernel" part adds 376 
>> >> lines of code (counted with wc so comments and includes etc are also 
>> >> counted)...
>> >
>> >Signed modules sounds like a better motivation, but is a full dsa
>> >implementation in the kernel really necessary to achieve this?
>> 
>> How would you do it otherwise?
>
>Has anyone tried to look for simpler signing mechanisms that make use of
>the crypto algorithms that are already in the kernel?

Maybe you meant something else, but history has shown that 'rolling your own' mechanism is a bad idea.

Are there even any suitable algorithms in the kernel??

___
Dax Kelson
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