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From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 15:05:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4393662.RPWnPK42dp@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180413125313.GA2633@thunk.org>

Am Freitag, 13. April 2018, 14:53:13 CEST schrieb Theodore Y. Ts'o:

Hi Theodore,
> 
> This was always the original design intent, but I screwed up and no
> one noticed until Jann reached out to be and said, "Hey.... this
> doesn't seem to make much sense".

I disagree, but I guess you would have expected that. But this is not the 
issue.

What I would like to point out that more and more folks change to 
getrandom(2). As this call will now unblock much later in the boot cycle, 
these systems see a significant departure from the current system behavior.

E.g. an sshd using getrandom(2) would be ready shortly after the boot finishes 
as of now. Now it can be a matter minutes before it responds. Thus, is such 
change in the kernel behavior something for stable?

Ciao
Stephan

  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-13 13:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-13  1:30 [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13  1:30 ` [PATCH 2/5] random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13  1:30 ` [PATCH 3/5] random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13 22:31   ` kbuild test robot
2018-04-13  1:30 ` [PATCH 4/5] random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13  1:30 ` [PATCH 5/5] random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13  5:38 ` [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test Stephan Mueller
2018-04-13 12:53   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-13 13:05     ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2018-04-13 17:00       ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-17  0:07         ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-05-17 20:53           ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-17  6:01         ` Christophe LEROY
2018-05-17 20:56           ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-02 16:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven

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