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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
	arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
	devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 11:38:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <453770c9-f9d7-4806-dbae-d19876f2a22e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846793743.2349.8478208161427437950.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>



On 02/03/2017 16:18, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The SEV memory encryption engine uses a tweak such that two identical
> plaintexts at different location will have a different ciphertexts.
> So swapping or moving ciphertexts of two pages will not result in
> plaintexts being swapped. Relocating (or migrating) a physical backing pages
> for SEV guest will require some additional steps. The current SEV key
> management spec [1] does not provide commands to swap or migrate (move)
> ciphertexts. For now we pin the memory allocated for the SEV guest. In
> future when SEV key management spec provides the commands to support the
> page migration we can update the KVM code to remove the pinning logical
> without making any changes into userspace (qemu).
> 
> The patch pins userspace memory when a new slot is created and unpin the
> memory when slot is removed.
> 
> [1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Spec.pdf

This is not enough, because memory can be hidden temporarily from the
guest and remapped later.  Think of a PCI BAR that is backed by RAM, or
also SMRAM.  The pinning must be kept even in that case.

You need to add a pair of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPs (one that doesn't map
to a PSP operation), such as KVM_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_ENCRYPTED_RAM.  In
QEMU you can use a RAMBlockNotifier to invoke the ioctls.

Paolo

> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    6 +++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |   93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |    3 +
>  3 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index fcc4710..9dc59f0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>  	unsigned int handle;	/* firmware handle */
>  	unsigned int asid;	/* asid for this guest */
>  	int sev_fd;		/* SEV device fd */
> +	struct list_head pinned_memory_slot;
>  };
>  
>  struct kvm_arch {
> @@ -1043,6 +1044,11 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>  	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  
>  	int (*memory_encryption_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
> +
> +	void (*prepare_memory_region)(struct kvm *kvm,
> +			struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
> +			const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
> +			enum kvm_mr_change change);
>  };
>  
>  struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 13996d6..ab973f9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -498,12 +498,21 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  }
>  
>  /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
> +struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot {
> +	struct list_head list;
> +	unsigned long npages;
> +	struct page **pages;
> +	unsigned long userspace_addr;
> +	short id;
> +};
> +
>  static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
>  static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
>  static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm);
>  static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm);
>  static int sev_asid_new(void);
>  static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
> +static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages);
>  #define __sev_page_pa(x) ((page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) | sme_me_mask)
>  
>  static bool kvm_sev_enabled(void)
> @@ -1544,9 +1553,25 @@ static inline int avic_free_vm_id(int id)
>  
>  static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>  {
> +	struct list_head *pos, *q;
> +	struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *pinned_slot;
> +	struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot;
> +
>  	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
>  		return;
>  
> +	/* if guest memory is pinned then unpin it now */
> +	if (!list_empty(head)) {
> +		list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
> +			pinned_slot = list_entry(pos,
> +				struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot, list);
> +			sev_unpin_memory(pinned_slot->pages,
> +					pinned_slot->npages);
> +			list_del(pos);
> +			kfree(pinned_slot);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	/* release the firmware resources */
>  	sev_deactivate_handle(kvm);
>  	sev_decommission_handle(kvm);
> @@ -5663,6 +5688,8 @@ static int sev_pre_start(struct kvm *kvm, int *asid)
>  		}
>  		*asid = ret;
>  		ret = 0;
> +
> +		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot);
>  	}
>  
>  	return ret;
> @@ -6189,6 +6216,71 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *sev_find_pinned_memory_slot(
> +		struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *i;
> +	struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot;
> +
> +	list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
> +		if (i->userspace_addr == slot->userspace_addr &&
> +			i->id == slot->id)
> +			return i;
> +	}
> +
> +	return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void amd_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> +				struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
> +				const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
> +				enum kvm_mr_change change)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *pinned_slot;
> +	struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE) {
> +
> +		if (!mem->memory_size)
> +			goto unlock;
> +
> +		pinned_slot = kmalloc(sizeof(*pinned_slot), GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (pinned_slot == NULL)
> +			goto unlock;
> +
> +		pinned_slot->pages = sev_pin_memory(mem->userspace_addr,
> +				mem->memory_size, &pinned_slot->npages);
> +		if (pinned_slot->pages == NULL) {
> +			kfree(pinned_slot);
> +			goto unlock;
> +		}
> +
> +		sev_clflush_pages(pinned_slot->pages, pinned_slot->npages);
> +
> +		pinned_slot->id = memslot->id;
> +		pinned_slot->userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
> +		list_add_tail(&pinned_slot->list, head);
> +
> +	} else if  (change == KVM_MR_DELETE) {
> +
> +		pinned_slot = sev_find_pinned_memory_slot(kvm, memslot);
> +		if (!pinned_slot)
> +			goto unlock;
> +
> +		sev_unpin_memory(pinned_slot->pages, pinned_slot->npages);
> +		list_del(&pinned_slot->list);
> +		kfree(pinned_slot);
> +	}
> +
> +unlock:
> +	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
> +}
> +
>  static int amd_memory_encryption_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  {
>  	int r = -ENOTTY;
> @@ -6355,6 +6447,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
>  	.update_pi_irte = svm_update_pi_irte,
>  
>  	.memory_encryption_op = amd_memory_encryption_cmd,
> +	.prepare_memory_region = amd_prepare_memory_region,
>  };
>  
>  static int __init svm_init(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 6a737e9..e05069d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -8195,6 +8195,9 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
>  				const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
>  				enum kvm_mr_change change)
>  {
> +	if (kvm_x86_ops->prepare_memory_region)
> +		kvm_x86_ops->prepare_memory_region(kvm, memslot, mem, change);
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-16 10:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh

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