From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 036/103] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
Date: Sun, 7 Aug 2022 15:01:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4783140a61f278e7ed6969e36bb8f9272ed40aa8.1659854790.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1659854790.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs
to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX
case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be
defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option
ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 +++
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 6231ef005a50..f0f8eecf55ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING)
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002027,
VMWRITE_BITMAP = 0x00002028,
VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002029,
+ VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS = 0x0000202A,
+ VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x0000202B,
XSS_EXIT_BITMAP = 0x0000202C,
XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x0000202D,
ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP = 0x0000202E,
@@ -628,4 +631,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
+struct vmx_ve_information {
+ u32 exit_reason;
+ u32 delivery;
+ u64 exit_qualification;
+ u64 guest_linear_address;
+ u64 guest_physical_address;
+ u16 eptp_index;
+};
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index ec2bd4df0684..4a3b3dc5d4d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
+static bool __read_mostly ept_violation_ve_test = 0;
+module_param(ept_violation_ve_test, bool, 0444);
+
#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2
@@ -785,6 +788,13 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * #VE isn't used for VMX, but for TDX. To test against unexpected
+ * change related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on
+ * it.
+ */
+ if (ept_violation_ve_test)
+ eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
/*
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
@@ -2588,8 +2598,11 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
&_cpu_based_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
+ u32 ept_violation_ve = ept_violation_ve_test ?
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE : 0;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
- KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+ KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL |
+ ept_violation_ve,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
@@ -2618,6 +2631,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
return -EIO;
vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+ _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
}
if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
vmx_cap->vpid) {
@@ -4455,6 +4469,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
if (!enable_ept) {
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
}
if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
@@ -4582,8 +4597,40 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+ if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+ if (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
+ if (!vmx->ve_info) {
+ /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
+ struct page *page;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vmx->ve_info) > PAGE_SIZE);
+ page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (page)
+ vmx->ve_info = page_to_virt(page);
+ }
+ if (vmx->ve_info) {
+ /*
+ * Allow #VE delivery. CPU sets this field to
+ * 0xFFFFFFFF on #VE delivery. Another #VE can
+ * occur only if software clears the field.
+ */
+ vmx->ve_info->delivery = 0;
+ vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
+ __pa(vmx->ve_info));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Because SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE is
+ * used only when ept_violation_ve_test is true,
+ * it's okay to go with the bit disabled.
+ */
+ pr_err("Failed to allocate ve_info. disabling EPT_VIOLATION_VE.\n");
+ secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(
+ vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
@@ -5183,7 +5230,14 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (handle_guest_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu)))
return 1;
fallthrough;
+ case VE_VECTOR:
default:
+ if (ept_violation_ve_test && ex_no == VE_VECTOR) {
+ pr_err("VMEXIT due to unexpected #VE.\n");
+ secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(
+ vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE);
+ return 1;
+ }
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
@@ -6249,6 +6303,17 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
+ if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
+ struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
+ pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx\n",
+ vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
+ ve_info = __va(vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
+ pr_err("ve_info: 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%04x\n",
+ ve_info->exit_reason, ve_info->delivery,
+ ve_info->exit_qualification,
+ ve_info->guest_linear_address,
+ ve_info->guest_physical_address, ve_info->eptp_index);
+ }
}
/*
@@ -7245,6 +7310,8 @@ void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+ if (vmx->ve_info)
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmx->ve_info);
}
int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 7df3cd254b47..a65f360f6d75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
} shadow_msr_intercept;
+
+ /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
+ struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
};
struct kvm_vmx {
@@ -566,6 +569,7 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML | \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | \
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-07 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 165+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-07 22:00 [PATCH v8 000/103] KVM TDX basic feature support isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 001/103] KVM: x86: Move check_processor_compatibility from init ops to runtime ops isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 002/103] Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs" isaku.yamahata
2022-08-11 9:59 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-25 19:48 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 7:16 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-11 11:16 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-11 17:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-12 11:35 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-15 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-15 23:06 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-23 5:27 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-09-01 9:03 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-09-01 14:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 004/103] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 8:38 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-11 11:38 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 005/103] KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 006/103] KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 007/103] KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 008/103] x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 8:49 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-08 10:41 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-25 20:16 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-10 8:18 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-25 20:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 010/103] KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from confidential VMs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 011/103] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 012/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 013/103] KVM: TDX: Define " isaku.yamahata
2022-08-11 3:15 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-25 21:50 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 014/103] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 015/103] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 016/103] KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 017/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers isaku.yamahata
2022-08-23 3:39 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-23 15:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-26 4:48 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-30 6:51 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-31 3:40 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-08-26 6:24 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 019/103] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 7:17 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-24 0:53 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-08-26 6:44 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-27 3:52 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-29 19:09 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-30 8:57 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-30 9:26 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-08-30 12:01 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 021/103] KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 022/103] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 4:07 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-29 19:17 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-31 2:18 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 023/103] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 8:08 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-31 5:51 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 024/103] KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 025/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 026/103] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 3:20 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 027/103] KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 9:10 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 028/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 029/103] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 030/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-31 7:07 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 031/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 032/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-31 8:03 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 033/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis isaku.yamahata
2022-08-08 10:14 ` Huang, Kai
2022-09-01 5:54 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 034/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 035/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 6:07 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` isaku.yamahata [this message]
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 037/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 038/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map() isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 6:48 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 039/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 7:12 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 040/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 041/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 7:44 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 042/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 8:59 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 043/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 044/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 6:38 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 045/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 046/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 047/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 048/103] KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:05 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 049/103] KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:23 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 050/103] KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:27 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 051/103] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 052/103] KVM: x86/VMX: introduce vmx tlb_remote_flush and tlb_remote_flush_with_range isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 053/103] KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support isaku.yamahata
2022-08-16 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-16 23:04 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 054/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 055/103] KVM: Add functions to track whether GFN is private or shared isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 056/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Let vcpu re-try when faulting page type conflict isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 057/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 058/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 059/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 060/103] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 061/103] KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 062/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 063/103] KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 064/103] KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 065/103] KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 066/103] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 067/103] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 068/103] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 069/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 070/103] KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 071/103] KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 072/103] KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 073/103] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 074/103] KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 075/103] KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 076/103] KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 077/103] KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 078/103] KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 079/103] KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 080/103] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 081/103] KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 082/103] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 083/103] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 084/103] KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 085/103] KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 086/103] KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 087/103] KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 088/103] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls (TDG.VP.VMCALL) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 089/103] KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 090/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 091/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 092/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 093/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 094/103] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 095/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-17 22:40 ` Sagi Shahar
2022-08-26 6:46 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 096/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 097/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 098/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 099/103] KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 100/103] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 101/103] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 102/103] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 103/103] KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU isaku.yamahata
2022-08-08 3:47 ` [PATCH v8 000/103] KVM TDX basic feature support Bagas Sanjaya
2022-08-08 20:44 ` Isaku Yamahata
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